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                                                          ABSTRACT 
 
This research project aims to address the oxymoron created by the fact that although 
the infliction of serious mental harm is an international crime and, as in every crime according 
to the legality principle that applies in criminal law, all of its elements have to be proven in 
order for the defendant to be convicted, in the course of warfare, international criminal courts 
and tribunals convict defendants for the causation of serious mental harm to civilians with no 
recourse from ad hoc furnished psychological and psychiatric opinions and reports. Rather 
convictions are made through discussion only of facts or by citing psychological reports for the 
mental harm incurred in general to the wider affected civilian population. On this account, and 
taking as a model the Daubert standard which requires a judge to take a stance on issues of 
scientific or technical expertise by relying only on reliable expert opinions and reports, the 
current thesis explores whether the particular standard and its reliability precept that originate 
from the U.S. criminal procedure can be transplanted into international criminal law. This 
would thereby oblige international judges to relate to civilian mental harm only through ad hoc 
provided substantiated psychological opinions and reports. 
This thesis can be largely seen as informally divided into three thematic units. The first 
one relates to the international criminal law contour and explores how international criminal 
courts and tribunals, with no resort to psychological opinions and reports provided ad hoc, 
reach the conclusion that civilians have suffered mental harm. Underlining the problems such 
practice creates for the integrity of law, a possible way of introducing the Daubert standard as 
a general principle, is further explored.  
           Following this thread of thought, the discussion in the second thematic unit takes place 
on a domestic law framework and looks at the Daubert standard as a domestic principle that 
could be possibly transplanted into international criminal law. The analysis begins by 
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delineating the standard in the U.S. jurisprudence from where it originated, and continues to 
encompass about twenty different legal orders in coming to underline the need different legal 
systems point out for issues of expertise to be addressed by the judge on scientifically reliable 
grounds. 
Finally, in the third thematic unit, the thesis returns again to the international contours 
to discuss and demonstrate that the reluctance of international criminal courts and tribunals to 
resort to the aid of mental health experts for the assessment of the psychological harm suffered 
by civilians, is not something that should be seen as related to any structural limitations these 







Chapter 1: The Question of the Daubert Standard Application in 
International Criminal Law as a Mode for Assessing Warfare’s 




In our era, if anything the 20th century came to teach, it is warfare’s heinous face. Two 
World Wars, extensive loss of life and destruction, war crimes and most notably the Holocaust, 
came to shake humanity’s conscience. Today, the dire consequences of warfare are widely 
recognized, including its psychological impact both on combatants as well as on  civilians.1 At 
the same time, the psychological impact of warfare on the latter has been less explored even 
by mental health scientists.2 Echoing this reality, this is the case also with the law. Courts are 
ready to address the mental harm incurred to that combatants ,3 yet, when it comes to civilians, 
they tend to place their emphasis on physical injury and death rather than on psychological 
scars. Thus, they either do not address relevant civilians’ claims at all,4 or they relate to them 
                                                          
1 For the case of combatants, see Michael Sledge, SOLDIER DEAD: HOW WE RECOVER, IDENTIFY, BURY & HONOR 
OUR MILITARY FALLEN, Columbia University Press, 2005,261; Kessler et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in 
the National Comorbidity Survey, 52(12) Archives of General Psychiatry 1048 (1995); C. Hoge et al., Combat 
duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems and Barriers to Care, 351(1) New England J. Medicine 13 
(2004); A.C. Iversen et al., Risk Factors for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder among UK Armed Forces 
Personnel, 38 Psychological Medicine (2008) 511. For civilians see Nathan Stein et al., The Differential Impact 
of Terrorism on two Israeli Communities, 83(4) Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 528 (2013); R. Srinivasa Murthy & 
Rashmi Lakshminarayana, Mental Health Consequences of War: A Brief Review of Research Findings, 5(1) 
World Psychiatry 25 (2006) 
2 David Benedek et al, Disaster Psychiatry: Disasters, Terrorism and War in KAPLAN AND SADOCK’S 
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (Benjamin Sadock et al. 9th ed., 2012), Vol. II, 2617; Patrick 
Palmieri, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Sandro Galea, Robert Johnson, Stevan Hobfoll, The Psychological Impact of 
the Israel-Hezbollah War on Jews and Arabs in Israel: The Impact of Risk and Resilience Factors, 67 Social 
Science & Medicine (2008) 1208, 1209 (noting that few studies have examined the impact of war on civilian 
populations.) 
3 See indicatively Landy Sparr, Combat-related PTSD in Military Court: A Diagnosis in search of a Defense, 39 
Int’l. J. Law & Psychiatry 23 (2015); Danielle Ferguson, Courts Accepting PTSD as criminal defence, 
Associated Press, 23 July 2018 available at https://www.apnews.com/ea72fdf856fb4a27aad98e2c74ed2a03  
4 See on this Ali Jaber case before the U.S. courts where although the plaintiffs, relatives of civilians killed as a 
result of the U.S. drone strikes, claimed that the particular U.S. policy contravened the jus in bello 
proportionality principle due to the incidental fear it caused among the civilian population. The Court did not 
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without resorting, eclectically or not, to scientific opinions and reports, which, in the end, 
makes any mental harm-related conclusions look arbitrary.5 This is palpably the case with 
international criminal courts and tribunals, which follow an inconsistent jurisprudential line. 
Sex-related crimes, for example the crime of rape, induce the calling of psychologists or 
psychiatrists to assess the victim’s psychological status.6 This is not the case though for other 
international crimes where the psychological plight of the civilian victim who is testifying as a 
witness before the court is described either with no recourse at all from expert opinions or 
through general citations of the suffering incurred to the affected civilian population.7  
It is true that acts of warfare wreak havoc and impact adversely on a large number of 
civilians. By definition, international criminal courts and tribunals come to try the most heinous 
crimes that are perpetrated on a large-scale, widespread basis and are to be seized with crimes 
involving many victims. The high numbers of the affected civilians and the inability for many 
of them to appear and testify before court, does not mean that the judges should negate 
acknowledging the general mental harm incurred to these civilians in toto as a result of a 
defendant’s actions. Courts do consider the larger picture and they buttress their assertions that 
the defendant’s actions have caused mental harm to the affected civilian population in general 
by discussing in particular the psychological harm suffered by the civilians testifying before 
them. Yet, exactly because these civilians’ testimonies are to serve as the verification ground 
                                                          
address at all these civilians’ pleas as far as their mental harm was concerned. On this see regarding the 
plaintiffs’ arguments Ali Jaber et al. v. United States, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Complaint, 
Civil Action No.1:15-cv-840 filed on 7 June 2015 at paras.82-83, 85 available at 
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/AliJaberComplaint.pdf. For the judgment see 
Ali Jaber et al. v. United States, U.S. Court of Appeal (D.C. Circuit), 30 June 2017. See also the case of the 
Kunduz strike where the District Court of Koln in Germany did not address the psychological harm instilled 
upon the affected civilians. On this see VG Koln, Judgment, 26-K 5534/10, 9 February 2012, para.36  
5 On this account see for example the European Court of Human Rights awarding non pecuniary damages for 
the fact that a civilian suffered shock as a result of an aerial attack without substantiating through a scientific 
opinion provided ad hoc that indeed such grave psychological harm has been inflicted. On this see ECtHR, 
Isayeva v. Russia, App. No.57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005, paras.237-240 
6 On this see Farhad Malekian, JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing (2014) 156-157 
7 See infra Chapter 2 
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on a micro level of the wider mental harm incurred, as this is also portrayed many times in 
relevant psychiatric reports and studies, the psychological harm of the testifying civilians must 
be substantiated in a way that it cannot be deemed to be arbitrarily inferred. In that sense, its 
assessment cannot be grounded on any pronouncements by judges lacking psychiatric 
expertise, but by mental health experts. 
Indeed, the fact that acts of warfare have caused trauma and anguish to the civilians can 
be many times easily deduced by the acts of warfare that judgments and reports come to 
describe.8 In some cases, it is even sufficient for an international criminal court to stay on such 
general assertions. For example, during the reparations phase and once the guilt of the 
defendant has been decided, reference to the harm sustained by the civilians can be more 
general to the extent that what is at stake is not the exact degree of the harm the civilians 
sustained but their victimhood status and their eligibility for compensation.9 In order for such 
victimhood status to be awarded it is enough that the individual in question has suffered harm. 
The level and degree of the sustained harm does not matter. 
          This is not the case with the role civilian harm plays in the main trial or even in the 
sentencing phase where the linkage between such harm and the defendant’s actions is not used 
to grant a certain status to the affected civilians and protect their interests but to convict the 
                                                          
8 See for example the Schabas-Davis Report, which referred to ‘mental traumas’ based on how Israeli civilians 
affected by the Hamas-launched rocket attacks described in their testimonies the fear and other psychological 
symptoms they experienced (Report of the detailed findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry 
established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-21/1, Human Rights Council, 29th sess., 24 June 
2015, para.568). See also the fact that the ICC Prosecutor in the Arrest Warrant issued for Sudan’s president, 
Bashir, proceeded to note that applying force and entering the villages, looting, killing and raping, pro-Bashir 
forces obliged survivors of these attacks to be forcibly expelled from their homes and on account of this even if 
physically not sustaining any injuries, these persons internally displaced suffered from ‘serious mental harm’ 
because ‘the psychological scars to these persons obliged to be distanced from their native land were 
immense.’ (Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest under article 58 against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, Summary of the case, p.p.5-6 available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-
4E9C-A672-3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf) 
9On this see the experts’ report in the case of Bemba ICC, Annex, Public Redacted Version of Annex, 28 
November 2017, ICC-01/05-01/08-3575-Conf-Exp-Anx-Corr2, Expert Report on Reparation Presented to Trial 
Chamber III, International Criminal Court, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, The Hague, 20 November 2017, para.18 
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defendant and lead to the deprivation of his liberty. With only the causation of ‘serious mental 
harm’ being an international crime, there the gravity of the incurred harm does matter. It is on 
this account that the current thesis argues that the sustained psychological harm cannot be 
assumed but must be proven through resort to scientific reports.  
 
The need for international criminal courts to consider psychological or psychiatric 
opinions and reports does not mean that courts cannot set their own criteria for what constitutes 
‘serious mental harm.’ Nor should these criteria always coincide with the dicta of mental health 
sciences. Thus, international criminal courts and tribunals have held in the past that ‘serious 
mental harm’ involves the infliction of strong fear or terror, intimidation or threat constitutes 
‘more than a minor or temporary impairment of mental facilities’ and thus should be seen as a 
causation factor of ‘serious mental harm.’10 Serious mental harm has been deemed to involve 
more than ‘a vague state of anxiety’, 11  going ‘beyond temporary unhappiness.’ Without having 
to be permanent or irremediable, 12 in order to be asserted, serious mental harm must 
nevertheless bear the characteristics of a ‘grave and long disadvantage to a person’s ability to 
lead a normal and constructive life.’ 13  
Equally in the domestic realms, criminal law, both in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions, does not necessarily mirror the definitions psychiatry or psychology have 
endorsed for mental disorders. This is portrayed in the case where law comes to discuss when 
a person is to be found not mentally stable. In common law, the concept of ‘disease of the 
                                                          
10 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, March 12,2008, para.45-47; 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, December 1, 2003, para.815; ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, May 21, 1999,para.110; 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, May 15, 2003, para.321. On this 
account see also the relevant similar jurisprudence of the ICTY in ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic,IT-02-60-T, 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, January 17,2005, para.645   
11 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Seromba, supra note 10, paras.47-48 
12 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Semanza, supra note 10,para.322 
13 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T, para.738 
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mind’ is defined more broadly than in mental health sciences and is not limited to psychiatric 
disorder, but comprises any mental disorder that manifests itself in violence and is prone to 
recur.14 In civil law jurisdictions like the French one, the Penal Code enables diminished 
criminal responsibility for persons ‘suffering from a psychological or neuropsychological 
disorder’.15 While as noted this definition is closer to the mental health findings,16 still, it is 
underlined that the focus of the provisions is not so much to the exact nature of the mental 
disorder but rather the alteration of the intellectual insight and the potentially caused loss of 
control.17  
At the same time, while courts can set their own criteria of what constitutes ‘disease of 
the mind’ and its impact on the pronounced sentence, in both common and civil law, it is 
ultimately for mental health experts to declare whether an individual bears a certain 
psychological or psychiatric condition. The courts take these psychiatric evaluations as a given 
fact and judicially incorporate them accordingly in their judgments. The case of R v. Sullivan 
before the House of Lords is an example taken from the English jurisprudence that clearly 
illustrates this issue. Sullivan had an established diagnosis of epilepsy. One day, while visiting 
                                                          
14 For the fact that this is the case with English courts see Rafiq Memon, Legal Theory and Case Law defining 
the insanity defence in English and Welsh law, 17(2) J. Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 230, 240 (2006); 
Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 (Lord Denning) available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1961/3.html; R v. Sullivan [1984] AC 156 (the House of Lords ruling that 
epilepsy constitutes a disease of mind). For the fact that U.S. courts follow on the issue the standards set by 
English jurisprudence see Herbert Fingarette, The Concept of Mental Disease in Criminal Law Insanity Tests, 
33 U. Chicago L. Rev. 229 (1996). For the fact that the same is true also for courts in Australia and New 
Zealand see Bruce Arrigo & Stacey Shipley, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: ISSUES AND 
CONTROVERSIES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE, 2nd ed., Elsevier, 2005, 112   
15 Art.122-1, French Penal Code available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000029370748&cidTexte=LEGITE
XT000006070719&dateTexte=20160619&oldAction=rechCodeArticle&fastReqId=27496891&nbResultRech=
1 (in French) 
16 Caroline Fournet, Between Lack of Responsibility and Dangerousness: Determinism and the Specificity of the 
French Criminal Law on Lack of Intellectual Insight and Loss of Control in LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED 
RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Alan Reed & Michael 
Bohlander eds., Routledge, 2016) 355  
17 Ibid  
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his neighbor, he had a seizure and, at the same time, hit his friend. Despite the fact that doctors 
testified that epilepsy was not a ‘disease of the mind’, the Court ruled to the contrary.26  
The Court did not doubt that medically Sullivan had an epilepsy seizure. Rather what 
the Court discussed was whether epilepsy could be termed a ‘disease of the mind.’ Similarly, 
under French criminal law, it is up to the court to evaluate how a person’s mental disorder 
impacts his final sentence.27 Taking the analogy to the international field and the discussion of 
warfare’s psychological impact, international judges have the discretion of defining mental 
harm differently than mental health sciences. Nevertheless, in order to decide whether a civilian 
has suffered mental harm, courts must resort to the aid and findings of fields such as psychiatry 
and psychology.  
The need to resort to mental health experts becomes more acute given that sometimes 
it may be difficult to delineate and trace mental harm. In this case, recourse from experts would 
be even more imperative in order to contest whether or not mental harm has been incurred.28 
In comparison to mental harm, physical injury is externally manifested to the naked eye and 
can be easily assessed even in absence of any medical reports asserting it. The common rules 
of sense, which are to be applied by judges according to the law of evidence embedded in the 
various statutes of the international criminal courts and tribunals, permit them to easily discern 
whether a certain wounding can be termed grave. Yet, psychological harm, or the scars that a 
                                                          
26 Rafiq Memon, Legal Theory and Case Law defining the insanity defence in English and Welsh law, 17(2) J. 
Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 230, 241 (2006) 
27 Article 122-1 of the French Penal Code stipulates that the court bears the mental disorder factor in mind when 
it comes to pronounce the punishment and the manner in which it is going to be carried out. On this see Jean 
Pradel, Criminal Law in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW (George Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., Kluwer Law 
International, 2008) 120 
28 Eliav Lieblich, Beyond Life and Limb: Exploring Incidental Mental Harm under International Humanitarian 
Law in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, Derek Jinks et 
als eds., 2014, 185, 201-202 (mentioning and persuasively refuting the intangibility argument) 
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certain event has left on a person’s psyche, is not always demonstrable and cannot be assessed 
without resorting to the dicta of mental health sciences.   
With no set standards of when warfare’s psychological impact becomes ‘serious’ and 
with no recourse from mental health experts, any assessments of psychological harm by 
international criminal judges run the fear of being arbitrary, jeopardizing the defendants’ rights 
and casting doubts on whether such an approach is in tandem with the legality principle in 
criminal law that requires all convictions to take place on firm grounds. As noted by Judge 
Herrera Carbuccia in her dissenting opinion on Laurent Gbagbo’s acquittal, ‘reasoned 
judgments allow the parties and the public to know the legal and factual basis upon which the 
accused has been convicted or acquitted. The right to a reasoned judgment is essential to a fair 
trial, in particular to protect against arbitrariness.’35 Justice Cossio-Diaz of the Mexican 
Supreme Court also remarks that just as scientists and experts cannot claim for themselves the 
competence to assess evidence, delineate legal notions and conduct the balance between 
different legal precepts, the judge does not have equally the competence to construct the 
reasoning in cases where the premises of this reasoning are based on scientific notions. If the 
judge does so, there is a risk that judgments issued are unfounded and unjustified.36  It is on 
this account that the thesis will argue for the introduction of the Daubert standard in 
international criminal law. This will also serve as a mode for compelling international criminal 
judges to only formulate their opinions on the level and nature of civilians’ suffering through 
recourse from mental health experts.  
                                                          
35 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Gbagbo and Charles Ble Goude, Dissenting Opinion to the Chamber’s Oral Decision of 15 January 2019, ICC-
02/11-01/15, 15 January 2019, para.22 
36 National Supreme Court of Justice, Voto Concurrente que formula el Ministro Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz en el 
Amparo en Revision 2146/2005, fallado por el Pleno de la Suprema Corte el Veintisiete de Febrero de 2007 at 





Endorsed now in U.S. federal legislation,38 the U.S. standard traditionally relates to the 
admissibility of expert evidence and can be seen as introducing two different components. The 
first, relates to the need for judges to only base their judgments on matters of expertise on 
scientifically reliable opinions and reports, while the second refers to the establishment of a 
threshold test for judges in order for them to evaluate the scientific validity of any expert 
opinions. On this account, the U.S. Supreme Court drafted in Daubert a number of parameters 
that judges must take into account, for example whether the expert report is based on reliable 
methods and whether it has been published in peer review journals.  
The current thesis will not focus on the threshold aspect of the Daubert judgment that 
is largely linked to the ‘gatekeeping’ role that judges must play and has led to both States and 
scholars having reservations regarding the standard’s adoption.39 Rather, this thesis will focus 
on the first component of the standard and will argue for Daubert to be transplanted into 
international criminal law so that judges are required to base their related mental harm 
assessments on scientifically reliable views only. Also, it is not an accident that in the U.S. it 
is this general scientific reliability requirement that has led scholars and courts to view Daubert 
as establishing such an obligation beyond any admissibility realm. Along these lines, the 
standard has been invoked by courts as a way for judges, through reference to expert opinions, 
to decide on whether a matter should be deemed to be scientifically valid. 40 Scholars have 
                                                          
38 Rule 702, U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence 
39 As far as States are concerned see the case of Ireland discussed in Chapter 5. For the reservations of scholars 
see infra Chapter 4.  
40 For example, in the Kitzmiller case, the U.S. District Court, reached the conclusion that intelligent design should not 
be taught at schools as an alternative to the evolution theory because intelligence design did not rest on scientifically 
reliable grounds in order to be termed as ‘science’. The Court did not explicitly refer to the Daubert standard but the 
parameters it used in order to discredit intelligent design as a scientific theory closely related to it. For example, the 
Court noted that the intelligent design theory had failed to gain acceptance in the scientific community, had not 
generated peer-review publications and it had not been the subject of testing and research, all criteria established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the Daubert case as coming to answer the question of what constitutes ‘science.’ On this see 
Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2
d
 707 (M.D. Pa.2005); See also Megan Dillhoff, Science, 
Law and Truth: Defining the Scope of the Daubert Trilogy, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1289, 1314 (2011) (providing the 
references in the Daubert case where the U.S. Supreme Court necessitated a theory to have been tested, published in 
peer-review journals, being subject to rebuttal and be of general acceptance in order to be deemed as ‘scientific’); Jay 
Wexler, Kitzmiller and the ‘Is it Science’ Question, First Amendment L. Rev. 90, 105 (2006); Joelle Anne Moreno, 
19 
 
equally argued that the judicial review of acts and decisions of U.S. administrative organs that 
rule on issues of expertise, for example the case of EPA on environmental issues, must include 
a consideration of whether these decisions and acts rest on scientifically valid grounds.41  
In that sense, contrary to the pre-Daubert Frye standard in U.S. jurisprudence where the 
duty to rely on science befell only upon the expert and judges merely reviewed whether the 
experts could do this task, Daubert rendered clear that it is the task of judges to express 
themselves on scientific matters and assess whether any conclusions on these have been 
reached through a reliable scientific methodology.42 If we can draw a parallel from the way 
judges are called to deal with legal cases, we could say that Frye established a stance towards 
science reminiscent of the legality review judges undertake in public law. As in public law and 
legality review, judges only examine whether certain acts abide by the legal rules without 
entering into further examining their content and purpose. As well, under Frye, judges are 
meant to see only whether the furnished reports conform to the principles of science without 
being able to question their conclusions.  
On the contrary, Daubert gives the authority to the judge to do so, making clear what 
courts and scholars have stressed, namely that the expert cannot be inaugurated as a co-decider 
                                                          
It’s Just a Shot Away: MMR Vaccines and Autism and the End of the Daubertista Revolution, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 1511, 1534-39 (2009). Similar contentions have been brought forth in the cases referring to the autism tests, most 
notably these of Cedillo, Hazlehurst and Snyder, involving children who had been vaccinated against contagious 
children diseases such as measles, mumps and rubella and after some years were diagnosed with autism disorder. There, 
the courts relied explicitly on the Daubert standard in order to assess not the admissibility of expert evidence but the 
reliability of the scientific contentions and reach a judicial conclusion that could be scientifically validated. On these 
see Cedillo et al. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fed. Circ., Judgment, August 
27,2010; Hazelhurst et al. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fed. Circ., Judgment, 
May 13, 2010; Snyder v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, No.01-162V, filed 
August 11,2009; Megan Dillhoff, ibid, 1305-1309 (2011); Donald McNeil Jr., Court says Vaccine not to Blame for 
Autism, N.Y. Times, Feb.12, 2009 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/health/13vaccine.html
 
41 Paul Miller & Bert Rein, ‘Gatekeeping’ Agency Reliance on Scientific and Technical Materials after Daubert: 
Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative Process, 17 Touro L. Rev. 297 (2016); Andrew Trask, 
Daubert and the EPA: An Evidentiary Approach to Reviewing Agency Determinations of Risk, University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 569, 585 (1997); Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, ‘Regulatory Daubert’: A  
Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative 
Law, 66(7) Law & Contemporary Problems 7,44 (2003) 
42 See infra the discussion in Chapter 4 
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together with the judge.43 The latter remains the sole arbiter of the case and this is true also in 
matters of expertise. Similar to the merits review of acts and decisions where judges review 
not only their conformity with legal rules but also whether their content and goal is in tandem 
with the existent legal framework,44 under Daubert the judge is entitled to check not only 
whether the experts’ reports typically conform to generally accepted scientific standards but 
also put into scrutiny the actual content of the reports’ scientific conclusions.  Still, the 
susceptibility of the scientific conclusions to judicial scrutiny means that scientific issues 
cannot be discussed unless they are based on a reliable epistemological basis. If this basis is 
not provided in the reports and opinions put before the judge’s consideration, it is the judge 
who must introduce it to the legal proceedings.  
Yet, even if conceded that such a scientific reliable platform of mental harm assessment 
must be introduced in international criminal law, the question is how. On this, the thesis would 
like to propose that this could take place through the international criminal law principles mode 
as the latter appear in international criminal law having a norm-begetting function. On this, 
special reference will be made to the ICC Statute with the ICC currently being the only 
international criminal court with universal jurisdiction.  
The potential of the international criminal law principles to generate a change in 
international criminal law is embedded in their nature. The fact that they are  ‘principles’, 
renders clear that it is not the legal rules, but rather their essence, that international criminal 
                                                          
43 On the fact that this is especially a concern among judges both in Europe as well as in Latin American 
jurisdictions see for example the reference on the issue by the Supreme Court of Peru in Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Republica, Sala Penal Transitoria, R.N.No 1658-2014, Lima, 15 March 2016 at 38-39 available at 
http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/blog/jaimedavidabantotorres/wp-
content/uploads/sites/125/2016/03/CS_D_RESOLHOMICPARTE01_15032016.compressed.pdf as well as 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Working Group on the Quality of Justice, Study on the role 
of Experts in Judicial Systems of the Council of Europe Member States, Strasbourg, 1 September 2014 at 5 
44 For the distinction between the legality review and the merits review see David Bennett, Balancing Judicial 
Review and Merits Review, 53 Admin. Rev. (2000) 4 
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judges are expected to employ.45 When it comes to Daubert, this means that the question is not 
whether the standard in toto can apply as a general principle, but instead its basic precepts. 
These must be seen as focusing on the new elements the standard came to bring to the 
jurisprudential discussion, namely the need for judges to relate to issues that go beyond their 
expertise along epistemologically reliable grounds.  The question is, then, whether this 
reliability precept can be deemed to be so cardinal and given its existence in a number of 
different and diverse jurisdictions, if it can  be considered to be a general principle of law. If 
the answer is affirmative, the Daubert standard could apply in international criminal law to the 
extent that such application would not negate the causes of international criminal justice; on 
the contrary, it would promote them and would further fulfil the role scholars have envisioned 
about general principles as ‘norm sources’, focusing on the adaptation of existing rules to new 
needs and realities.46  
As will be discussed in the next chapter, to the extent that psychological suffering 
triggers international criminal repercussions once it constitutes ‘serious mental harm’, the 
introduction of the Daubert standard in international criminal law would oblige the judge to 
articulate through reliance on psychological or psychiatric reports furnished ad hoc why the 
particular individual testifying before the court has sustained such harm. Such individualized 
psychological opinions and reports could be furnished either at the time of the indictment writ 
when the witnesses’ list is compiled or even, due to the time lapse since the events, during the 
oral proceedings when these civilians testify before court if rendered feasible.47 If such harm 
                                                          
45 Fabian Raimondo, General Principles of Law as applied by International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 6 
The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 151 (2007)  
46 Robert Kolb, Principles as Sources of International Law, 53 Netherlands Int’l. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2006) 
47 Sometimes the time gap between the time the crimes have been committed and the taking place of the trial 
proceedings can be so big that the civilian mental harm incurred due to the defendant’s actions cannot be 
accurately measured during the trial stage. Such instances may refer to cases for example where the defendant is 
fugitive and is being apprehended only years after the issuing of the indictment writ. For example in the case of 
Karadzic, the initial indictment writ was filed in 1995 for alleged crimes committed between 1992-95, yet the 
actual trial proceedings took place only in 2016 due to the defendant being fugitive all these years. On this see 
Amended Indictment against Radovan Karadzic Unsealed, The Hague, October 2002 available at 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/amended-indictment-against-radovan-karadzic-unsealed ; Prosecutor v. Karadzic, 
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cannot be traced anymore due to the advent of time between the commitment of the crime and 
the opening of the trial, the judge should at least call for a mental health expert to testify 
whether, based on the specific events and the status of the civilian at the time of the trial, it 
would be plausible to assume that he or she could have experienced serious mental harm.  
 
1.2 The Importance and Contribution of the Thesis 
 
A potential application of the Daubert standard by international criminal courts and 
tribunals bears ramifications both inside and beyond the international criminal justice 
framework. Firstly, the requirement to resort to witnesses connects international criminal law 
with domestic law and the treatment of expert testimonies there. Already from ancient times, 
expert witnesses were called to testify in criminal trials.57 In ancient Rome, information on 
record shows that the body of Julius Caesar was examined by Antisius, who opined that it was 
the sword thrust in Caesar’s thorax that caused his death, rather than any other of the total 
                                                          
IT-95-5/18-T, Public Redacted version of judgment issued on 24 March 2016, vol. I, 24 March 2016 ,p.p.1-2,5 
(the Trial Chamber noting inter alia the possible impact of the passage of time to the reliability of the witnesses’ 
testimonies.) According to a study, the effects of the missile attacks on Israeli civilians exposed to these attacks, 
were weak three months after their termination On the other hand, a study coming to assess the posttraumatic 
stress in a group of medical students exposed to the NATO strikes in the former Yugoslavia, found that even 1 
year after the attacks, 11% of the affected students suffered from PTSD and the level of intrusion and avoidance 
symptoms-both characteristic clusters of PTSD-related symptoms- remained significant. In another study, 14% of 
ethnic Albanian Kosovars were found to meet PTSD criteria even two years after the end of hostilities in Kosovo. 
Finally, another study conducted in 2003 on Israelis who had been taken as prisoners of war during the Yom 
Kippur war in 1973 revealed that 23% out of a sample of polled such prisoners continued to meet criteria for 
PTSD even 30 years after their captivity had ended. On these see Jelena Gavrilovic et al., Predictors of 
Posttraumatic Stress in Civilians 1 Year after Air Attacks: A Study of Yugoslavian Students, 190(4) J. Nervous 
& Mental Disease 257,260 (2002); William Fernandez et al., Mental Health Status among ethnic Albanians 
seeking medical care in an Emergency Department two years after the war in Kosovo: A Pilot Project, 43(2) 
Annals of Emergency Medicine 1 (2004); Zahava Solomon & Rachel Dekel, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder among 
Israeli ex-prisoners of war 18 and 30 years after release, 66 J. Clinical Psychiatry 1031,1035 (2005). These studies 
underline on one hand the importance for the indictment writ to be compiled and mental health scientists to assess 
the psychological harm of the civilians called to testify in trial as close as possible to the traumatic event and 
secondly that such psychological expert assessments can have a validity for the criminal proceedings even if 
compiled long after the incriminating event and the defendant’s actions. 
57 For the fact that a witness is qualified as an ‘expert’ by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education see 
Rule 702, U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_702 See also 
Jefferson Ingram, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 12th ed., Elsevier, 2015, 419  
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twenty-two stabbings.58 Mental harm issues have always been in the epicentre of judicial 
proceedings. This is acutely demonstrated in medieval Europe where mental harm illnesses 
were connected with perceptions of witchcraft59 and individuals who suffered from mental 
illnesses were seen as suffering from ‘mania.’60 As a result, in countries such as England, till 
the middle of the 19th century, medical witnesses were not often called to assess individuals’ 
mental health conditions.61 When they were called, such as in France, it was not so much in 
order to assert whether or not a particular individual suffered from a mental disorder, but rather 
to assert the jargon of ‘mania’ the legal system had adopted for such situations.62  Later in the 
19th century, however, psychiatric experts gradually started replacing the non-expert witnesses 
regarding the pronouncement of mental health issues.63 Throughout the 20th century, law came 
to develop a separate stance from mental health sciences on its definition of mental illness and 
mental harm,64 but courts still rely on the scientific expertise of psychiatrists in mental health 
issues. 
Secondly, particularly as far as warfare’s psychological impact is concerned, the thesis 
contributes to judges discussing matters of mental harm and suffering more accurately and 
responsibly. Psychological and psychiatric opinions and reports on the psychological harm 
sustained by civilians testifying before the court as victims, renders the judges the ability to 
assess whether the incurred harm can be deemed to be ‘serious’ based on epistemological 
evidence rather than arbitrary personal assertions. This is the case regarding the decisions of 
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64 Tony Ward, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility in England  1843-1939 (DPhil Thesis,1996) 
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international criminal courts and tribunals concerning mental disorders, such as PTSD, and the 
reparations due to be awarded to civilians for the mental harm they experienced.65 
By relying on ad hoc provided mental health experts’ opinions for the particular 
civilians testifying before the court, international criminal judges pronounce a verdict on the 
mental harm inflicted in concreto to the particular individuals and not in abstracto to a larger 
group of civilians as is currently the case. In this sense, to the extent that the defendant is being 
tried for particular harm caused to particular individuals rather than for the wide-scale harm 
hostilities have caused, the in concreto personification of the incurred harm meets this 
requirement and adds to the credibility of the judicial pronouncements. 
It is true that in describing whether the incurred psychological harm to civilians is so 
grave as to constitute ‘serious mental harm’, the mental health expert reports and opinions 
cannot simply determine whether or not such harm has, in fact, been inflicted. As noted above, 
the causation of such ‘serious mental harm’ is in some cases explicitly mentioned in the 
Statutes of international courts and tribunals as a prerequisite for the assertion of an 
international crime as it constitutes part of a crime’s actus reus, namely the elements that must 
be in place in order for the crime to be committed. Nevertheless, any psychological or 
psychiatric reports on the causes of mental harm tell us little about the crime’s mens rea, 
namely the question whether a person applying a certain degree of force affecting civilians 
wanted their psychological harm to occur. This is particularly important given that according 
to the ICC Statute,66 conviction for an international crime is not based only on the creation of 
a certain result or situation but also on the culprit’s knowledge that such a result would be 
incurred and his intention to nevertheless cause it. 
                                                          
65 See infra Chapter 7 
66 On this see art.30 of the ICC Statute 
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Understandably, the existence of such knowledge and intention is difficult to prove. 
Along these lines, the consideration of psychological or psychiatric reports and opinions does 
not mean that the number of defendants who will be convicted rather than acquitted will 
automatically augment. It does mean though that the actus reus issues of the crimes will come 
to be discussed in a methodological and scientifically ordained way when matters of mental 
harm are involved. If a proper conclusion can be made regarding the assertion or not of the 
crime’s actus reus, the mens rea intention and knowledge requirements can be further 
discussed the way such questions have already been addressed both on a domestic law level as 
well as in the international criminal law realm.67 
The wider ramifications of the role mental health experts can play in international 
proceedings opens the discussion of their utility also beyond criminal courts and tribunals. For 
example, in the realm of the ICJ, in the Pulp Mills case, Judge ad hoc Vinuesa lamented the 
fact that ‘despite the lack of specialized expert knowledge, the Court sets itself the task of 
choosing what scientific evidence is best, discarding other evidence and evaluating and 
weighing raw data and drawing conclusions.’68 Matters become worse given that many times 
ICJ judges are presented not only with many, but also with conflicting opinions on matters that 
evade their legal expertise. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case regarding the construction of a 
dam in the Danube river, the Court noted that the numerous furnished scientific reports 
provided abundant evidence that the project’s impact and its environmental implications were 
                                                          
67 As far as domestic criminal law is concerned, for the role ‘reasonableness’ plays as a construction on these 
knowledge and intent-inferring issues and its limitations see Hisham Ramadan, Reconstructing Reasonableness 
in Criminal Law: Moderate Jury Instructions Proposal, 29 J. Legislation 233 (2013) (discussing the U.S. legal 
order); Lisa Silver, Is this the end of subjective Intention? The Supreme Court of Canada and the Walle case, 27 
July 2012 available at http://www.ideablawg.ca/blog/2012/7/27/is-this-the-end-of-subjective-intention-the-
supreme-court-of.html (discussing the Canadian jurisdiction). See also Rudolf Alexander Mikus, The Reasonable 
Person in Substantive Canadian Criminal Law, Thesis submitted to the University of British Columbia, 1995 
(discussing also the concept of reasonableness in German criminal law at 120 ff.). On an international criminal 
law level see discussion of inference of the intent in the Karadzic case in Marko Milanovic, ICTY convicts 
Radovan Karadzic, EJIL!Talk, 25 March 2016 available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/icty-convicts-radovan-
karadzic/ 





considerable.69 Yet, these reports, penned by three different groups of experts, equally but 
differently viewed the question of whether these environmental implications were as grave as 
to be posed as a red line to the existence of the dam.70 If the Daubert standard applied, the 
scientific reliability of the furnished reports, as an additional admissibility factor, could see 
some of them being ultimately rejected on methodological grounds making it easier for the 
Court to decide which one of them to rely on.  
Equally, in other instances, international courts have opted to rely upon expert opinions, 
but in a defective way without addressing State concerns that these opinions do not lie on a 
firm, epistemological basis. For example, in the Artava Murillo case, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights was asked to hold that the Costa Rican prohibition of the in vitro fertilization 
practice violated the applicants’ rights to raise a family.71 In order to decide on the matter, the 
Court summoned the opinions of seven experts and heard four of them in the oral 
proceedings.72 Yet, coming to address claims by Costa Rica that some of the expert opinions 
provided should not be taken into consideration by the Court because they did not rest on a 
solid scientific basis,73 the Court evaded the task of any Daubert-prone assessment by opting 
to see the Costa Rican contentions as relating not to the admissibility of the relevant evidence, 
but rather its probative value. The Court should have, instead, resorted to a Daubert standard 
rationale and argued for the existence or not of certain criteria in these opinions which would 
make them eligible for judicial consideration. Along these lines, the Court held that it would 
                                                          
69 ICJ, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1997, Sept. 25,1997, p.74, para.140 
70 Guillaume Gros, The ICJ’s Handling of Science in the Whaling in the Antarctic case: A Whale of a Case?, 6  
J. Int’l. Dispute Settlement 578, 579, n.10 (2015); Makane Moise Mbengue, International Courts and Tribunals 
as Fact-Finders: The Case of Scientific Fact-Finding in International Adjudication, 34 Loy.L.A. Int’l. & Comp. 
L. Rev. 53,64 (2011) 
71 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Artavia Murillo et al. (‘in vitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica, 
Judgment of 28 November 2012 
72 Ibid, paras.11-12 
73 Ibid, paras.50 and 60 
27 
 
take into account the particular expert opinions together with the rest of the provided 
evidence.74 
The fact that international judges do not rely on expert opinions at all or they rely in a 
way that is problematic from a methodological point of view, has been criticized by scholars.75 
This phenomenon can be tolerated up to a point on account of the international courts’ 
aspirations to cultivate and promote their institutional autonomy. However, when it comes to 
international criminal courts and tribunals, the fact that non reliance on epistemological 
assertions leads ultimately to the conviction of individuals and their incarceration rather than 
to only the political shaming of States or the payment of indemnities, makes the current practice 
more problematic and urges the need for reform.  
Respect for the defendant’s rights has been the cornerstone of every criminal system in 
order for trials to be deemed fair. A trial is not fair if the law does not award certain rights to 
the defendant. A trial is not fair if the court does not respect these rights or if judges reach 
conclusions that are not based on evidence. Yet, the trial is equally not fair if despite all these 
conditions being met, the procedure leading to the attainment of evidence is blemished. The 
current thesis argues that this is exactly the case when it comes to the assessment of warfare’s 
psychological impact on civilians.  
 
1.3 The Thesis Method 
 
The thesis proposes the reform of the current expert evidence assessment system 
through the introduction of the Daubert standard in international criminal law. Acknowledging 
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the cardinal role comparative law has played when it comes to the elaboration of general 
principles in both international law76 and international criminal law in particular77 and the 
pivotal role comparative law has played in the formation of international criminal procedure,78 
I will argue for such a Daubert standard application based on a comparative legal analysis.  
Comparative law can have many meanings, encompassing totally different tasks such 
as the comparison of legal systems in order to find out what law ought to be, the study of 
foreign legal systems, the justification of law making by mapping what has happened in another 
country and the looking into the arrangements in different countries when it comes to a specific 
topic or aspect79 like in the case of the current thesis. This does not mean that the relevant 
comparative analysis purports to be monolithic. Whereas the thesis will undertake a 
straightforward comparative law approach by juxtaposing different criminal procedure 
provisions and discuss various judgments,80 in acknowledgment of the assertion that legislation 
and judicial decisions-what has been termed as the ‘official portrait’ of a legal system81-provide 
an incomplete picture about the actual legal reality,82 the thesis, driven by a functionalist 
comparative approach,83 will look also beyond the official binding documents of the legislative 
                                                          
76 L.C. Green, Comparative Law as a Source of International Law, 42 Tulane L. Rev. 52 (1967-1968) 
77 Mireille Delmas-Marty, L’Influence du Droit Compare sur l’Activite des Tribunaux Penaux Internationaux in 
CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX ET JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES (Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty eds., 
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78 Sergey Vasiliev, The Usage and Limitations of Comparative Law and the Methodology of International 
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79 Otto Pfersmann, Ontological and Epistemological Complexity in Comparative Constitutional Law in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt & Joakim Nergeliius eds., Edward Elgar 
Publications, 2009) 84 
80 For the fact that the study and comparison of different legal systems represents a ‘straightforward comparative 
project’ see Mitchel de S.O. -l’E. Lasser, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY, Oxford University Press (2009) 13   
81 Ibid at 30 
82 Ibid at 12. The particular author palpably demonstrates this when he states and shows how judgments of 
French courts ‘represent only part of the judicial story’ and that the other part comprises a ‘doctrinal and judicial 
component’ which is to be found in the views of the academics and the Report produced by the Rapporteur of 
the case and which is not explicitly included on a separate basis in the final issued judgment. On this see ibid at 
279 
83 The question that lies in the heart of the functional method is how a concept is dealt similarly in a number of 
different jurisdictions not only in the Statute books but also as far as the function of the norm is concerned. In 
other words, what lies in the heart of the functionalist approach is ‘what legal norms, concepts or institutions in 
one system perform the equivalent functions performed by certain legal norms, concepts or institutions of 
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and judiciary powers-namely laws and judgments- and discuss also works of the practitioners84 
or judicial documents, mainly interpretational rules in the assessment of evidence drafted by 
Supreme Courts,85 in an attempt to examine how the assessment of evidence is actually 
understood and implemented by judges in the criminal procedure of the examined jurisdictions. 
The fact that the functional comparative approach has been largely adopted by scholars to 
extract notions from municipal law and apply them to international law as general principles,86 
is an additional reason why the thesis opts to use this comparative method as its tool for 
examining whether the Daubert standard reliability precept can apply in international criminal 
law.  
At the same time, the thesis is aware that as the standard, positivist view about 
comparative law is accused of not being to place any comparative conclusions inside the wider 
social and political context,87 also the functional method may be seen as overtly putting the 
emphasis on similarity, ignoring context and cultural particularity.88  
As a response to this criticism generally geared towards the functional comparative 
method, the comparative analysis endorsed by this thesis does not stay so much to the question 
of whether the Daubert standard arrangement as encapsulated in Rule 702 in the U.S. Rules of 
Evidence appears on an exact mode also in other jurisdictions. Rather, mirroring a postmodern 
approach to comparative law, the thesis looks on whether the principles behind the Daubert 
                                                          
another system. On these see Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism, 49 
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84 For the important role academics play for the evolution of law in continental law countries where case law is 
not binding see Mitchel de S.O. -l’E. Lasser, supra note 80 at 39-40 (discussing the case of France) 
85 From all the comparative law theorists, Ernst Rabel has stressed how it is insufficient to compare only code 
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86 Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law, 22 EJIL 949,959 (2011) 
87 Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken ed., 
Routledge, 1997) 13-14 
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standard and most notably the reliability of the presented expert evidence precept, is to be found 
also in other legal orders.89 On this account, the fact that it is the animus of the Daubert standard 
rather than its corpus that is being sought for, is further illustrated on the way the various legal 
orders are examined in conjunction with their social and historical particularities.90 Thus, the 
way the various jurisdictions are grouped in the subsequent chapters as belonging either to the 
common law or to the continental law legal tradition, is directly associated in many instances 
with the question of whether or not these jurisdictions formed part of the British Empire. 
Historical associations are provided also in other cases throughout this thesis, for example in 
the discussion of the Latin American, the African countries or the Far East countries like China, 
Japan and South Korea.   
In all the studied jurisdictions, the thesis reviews the criminal procedure arrangements 
on the assessment of expert evidence in a quest to reach a conclusion on whether the need for 
the judge to utter an opinion on matters of expertise only through reliance on scientific opinions 
and reports, is a precept that can be deemed to constitute a general principle of criminal law. 
Scholars have stressed how when it comes to the detection of a general principle of 
international law, the value of the comparative research lies not necessarily on the large number 
of domestic jurisdictions studied, but on their representativeness.91 On this account, efforts 
have been made for a representative selection of the various legal orders that are examined in 
the realms of this thesis based on a ‘legal systems’ categorization92 along the question of 
whether the respective countries belong to the common or continental law tradition and whether 
they follow the adversarial or the inquisitorial system in criminal proceedings. A special 
                                                          
89 Mathias Siems, COMPARATIVE LAW, Cambridge University Press (2014) 97-99  
90 On this account see Mitchel de S.O. -l’E. Lasser, supra note 80 at 35 (discussing the way French judicial 
decisions are drafted along the historical background of the judge’s role in France) 
91 Jaye Ellis, supra note 86 at 956-957  
92 The particular categorization is considered to be reliable compared to others despite the criticism it has 
received. On this see Ellis, ibid at 957 
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analysis has been provided in cases like Italy, Israel or a large number of Latin American 
countries where these two criteria do not necessarily coincide.  Whereas the drafters of the ICC 
Statute never included a list of countries that should be examined in these cases,93 in the thesis 
I have undertaken the task of mapping the legal landscape in roughly the same number of 
countries endorsing the inquisitorial or the adversarial system in their criminal procedure, 
including the legal orders to which international criminal courts and tribunals cite the most, 
namely Germany, Australia, France, England and Wales, Italy and Canada in their comparative 
analysis of various issues.94  
Moreover, granted that scholars have underlined how a comparative analysis must also 
emphasize non-western legal orders,111 the thesis has tried to ensure that jurisdictions from all 
over the globe are examined and discussed. Particularly when it comes to Africa, with most 
African countries following the wider criminal procedure system they inherited from the 
colonizing powers, the thesis has placed emphasis only on those countries in the continent, 
which for political and historical reasons such as the creation of a new state in South Sudan or 
a new legal order in Rwanda due to the genocide there, re-evaluated any provisions they might 
have inherited from their colonial past. Special attention is put on Latin America where a 
considerable number of States that historically partook in the inquisitorial system, have 
decided, in the last few decades, to make a switch to the adversarial one. With Daubert 
stemming from an adversarial legal order like the U.S. one, the thesis examines whether the 
Latin American switch equally brought to an endorsement of Daubert by these countries 
Finally, since in coming to relate to the general principles of international criminal law, article 
21 of the ICC Statute plays an emphasis on the legal orders of the ICC Member States, 
                                                          
93 On this see Fabian Raimondo, supra note 45 at 151-152  
94 Ibid at 393,402   
111 Edward Eberle, The Methodology of Comparative Law, 16 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 51,54 (2011); Edward 
Eberle, The Method and Role of Comparative Law, 8 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev. 451,473 (2009) 
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particular attention has been given also to the need for the majority of the examined countries 
to fulfil also this condition. Nevertheless, apart from the U.S. from where Daubert originates 
in the first place, also other non-ICC Member States like India, China or Israel are also 
discussed when deemed necessary for the inclusiveness of the research. 
 The comparative analysis undertaken is a reform-oriented one to the extent that its 
results will aspire to pose an argument of how the current legal approach towards the 
assessment of psychological harm should take a different route.112 Whereas the Daubert 
standard can equally apply in civil and tort law cases and there is relevant comparative literature 
to support this,113 the comparative study that will be undertaken in the realm of this thesis will 
focus primarily on criminal law cases and will deviate from the literature due to the thesis’ 
international criminal law focus. An exception to this is for those cases where non-discussion 
of any civil law jurisprudence would render a wrong impression about the applicability of the 
standard in a particular jurisdiction.  
At the same time, the endorsement of the comparative legal analysis as the preferred 
methodological tool, has been made in full cognizance of the limitations such an approach 
poses. For example, de S.O.-l’E. Lasser demonstrated in his discussion of the French, U.S. and 
E.U. legal orders how each legal system has its own distinctive legal structures and features.114 
The person undertaking a comparative analysis must be aware of this and place any conclusions 
in context in order not to end up comparing ‘apples and oranges’ as de S.O.-l’E. Lasser 
eloquently puts it.115 On this account, the fact that the thesis resorts to the comparative method 
                                                          
112 For more on the reform-oriented research mode as a subcategory of the doctrinal analysis see Terry 
Hutchinson, The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law, 3 
Erasmus L. Rev. 130 (2015) 
113 See for example the examination of the role of Daubert in tort law in 4 different jurisdictions, namely 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan in Andrew Jurs, Balancing Legal Process with Scientific 
Expertise: Expert Witness Methodology in Five Nations and Suggestions for Reform of post-Daubert U.S. 
Reliability Determinations, 95 Marquette L. Rev. 1329 (2012)    
114 Mitchel de S.O. -l’E. Lasser, supra note 80 at 298 
115 Ibid at 270 
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in order to extract a common principle-that of the reliability of expert evidence-rather than the 
exact adherence to a particular legal rule posed by one country and followed by the others, 
helps to moderate the dangers lurking from attributing an all-encompassing role to comparative 
law. Principles rather than whole positivistic legal arrangements are more likely to be found 
pervading various jurisdictions, since law does share certain elements.  
Another limitation that the comparative law analyst must be aware of is the choice of 
the countries to be examined. Many comparative endeavours focus just on English-speaking 
countries or on Germany and France as far as continental Europe is concerned, simply because 
researchers speak mostly English, German and French and thus have the ability to peruse legal 
documents from the original only in these languages.116 A comparative analysis including only 
the Anglo-Saxon world or Germany and France as the main continental law countries, may 
have a limited practical utility and it is certainly not useful in the context of a broader scientific 
research.117 For this reason, the current thesis has tried to overcome this limitation by exploring 
equally other jurisdictions. In some cases this has been rendered possible due to my knowledge 
of the relevant languages (Spanish, Greek, Hebrew) whereas in other cases, particularly when 
it came to the study of the Far East countries, like China, Japan and Korea, I relied on published 
material in English.   
Certain words must be said also about the notion of warfare that provides the factual 
background against which the judgments of the international criminal courts and tribunals are 
examined. Whereas warfare can include also non-military measures, 120  in the realms of the 
                                                          
116 Mark van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Legal Research, Law and Method, December 2015 at 3-4 
available at https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/RENM-D-14-00001.pdf  
117 Ibid at 4 
120 Apart from cyber warfare, this is the case for example also with economic warfare and hybrid warfare. 
Aiming at damaging the economy of the enemy, economic warfare has been described as comprising methods 
ranging from blockade tactics to decentralized economic counter-measures in peacetime, economic warfare can 
involve the application of both forcible as well as non-forcible measures. On this see Vaughan Lowe & 
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Economic Warfare, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, March 
2013, paras.1, 8-21 available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
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thesis the notion will refer only to situations where civilians find themselves in the midst of a 
turmoil involving the use of force, irrespectively of whether or not the magnitude of the 
undertaken force is such in order for an armed conflict also to exist or whether such conflict 
takes place at land, sea or air or is internal or international. The applied force is examined 
irrespective of its defensive or offensive character.121  Moreover, the psychological impact of 
warfare will relate only to jus in bello scenarios and will not include jus ad bellum instances 
where civilians, recipients of threats of aggression, become terrorized and the affected state 
proceeds to the opening of hostilities against the state or non-state actor posing the particular 
threat.124  
                                                          
9780199231690-e292; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, Kluwer Law International, 
(3rd ed.,1999)161; Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND TARGETING PRACTICE, Routledge (2015) 92. From its turn, hybrid warfare is the term used by scholars to 
address the fact that modern conflicts are neither purely asymmetric nor purely conventional. The term is understood 
to comprise both military as well as non-military measures. On this see Shane Reeves & Robert Barnsby, The New 
Griffin of War: Hybrid International Armed Conflicts, Harvard Int’l. Rev. 17 (2013); Aurel Sari, Legal Aspects of 
Hybrid Warfare, Lawfare Blog, October 2, 2015 available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-aspects-hybrid-
warfare 
121 As noted by Michael Schmitt, article 49(1) of API defines attacks as ‘acts of violence against the adversary, 
whether in offence or in defence’. On this see Michael Schmitt, ‘Attack’ as a Term of Art in International Law:
 
The Cyber Operations Context in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 
(C. Czosseck & R. Ottis eds.,2012) 285 available at 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/CyCon_2012_Proceedings.pdf 
124 Such scenarios can arise in cases the terrorization of civilians can lead to discussions on whether the affected party 
is entitled to a pre-emptive self-defence right due to the fear its civilians harbour. For the fact that such an option does 
not lie in harmony with the existing criteria of a pre-emptive attack see Matthew Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: 
Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EJIL 151, 160 (2013) (citing the Caroline incident doctrine). See 
also Thomas Franck, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTIONS AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS, Cambridge 
University Press (2002) 107 (referring to a ‘clearly’ imminent attack); Ashley Deeks,
 
Russian Forces in Ukraine: A Sketch 
of the International Law Issues, Lawfare Blog, March 2, 2014 available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/russian-forces-in-ukraine-a-sketch-of-the-international-law-issues/ (noting that 
fear of an impending attack must be based on objective facts as well as facts that have or are reasonably expected to 
transpire). Along these lines, the International Law Commission has not found threats of aggression as sufficient to give 
rise to the right to self-defence. On this see 1991 ILC Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
art.16, Commentary, point (5) reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION (Stefan Barriga 
& Claus Kress eds.2012) Cambridge University Press, 189. See also the fact that the crime of aggression as integrated in the 
Rome Statute refers to the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution…of an act of aggression…’ Nowhere in this 
definition is the element of threats mentioned. On this see Mary Ellen O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is 
Aggression? Comparing the Jus ad Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J. Int’l. Crim. Justice 189, 199 (2012). On the history 
of the provision’s adoption see Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of 
Aggression, 8 J. Int’l. Crim. Justice 1179 (2010). On this account see also the fact that although the 1951 and 1991 
drafts of the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind made reference also to ‘threats of aggression’, 
in later drafts this reference to ‘threat of aggression’ is dropped and only cases of actual aggression are contained. On 
this see ILC Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Yearbook of the Int’l. L. Commission 
134,135 (1951); 1991 ILC Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Yearbook of the Int’l. 
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1.4 The Thesis Structure 
 
This Chapter introduces the problematic upon which the thesis rests and sketches the 
approach advocated as a possible solution. Chapter 2 proposes that the problem stems from the 
inconsistent way international criminal courts and tribunals relate to civilians’ psychological 
harm. Chapter 3 discusses how the problem could be solved using international criminal law 
contours through the introduction of a legal norm that would oblige judges to take into account 
ad hoc provided mental health experts’ opinions and reports. Taking into account Article 21 of 
the ICC Statute, which delineates the sources of international criminal law on which the ICC 
can rely, and given that no statutory or customary provisions are in place for the issue, the 
chapter explores the role general principles play and their norm-begetting function in 
international law, in particular, international criminal law.  
Concluding that the general principles of international criminal law could be a mode 
through which the Daubert standard could be introduced in international criminal law, Chapter 
4 discusses the standard in the U.S. legal order, history, and evolution. Chapters 5 and 6 remain 
                                                          
L. Commission 1991 at 96; 1996 ILC Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Yearbook 
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in the domestic realm and embark on the comparative analysis to attest whether the standard’s 
precepts can be also met in other legal orders: Chapter 5 covers common law jurisdictions, 
while Chapter 6 relates to the applicability of the standard beyond the common law world.  
Returning back to the international criminal contours, Chapter 7 will examine whether 
the reluctance of international criminal courts and tribunals to discuss warfare’s psychological 
impact based on psychiatric and psychological reports should be attributed to an inherent, 
structural setback of the international criminal law system. In this realm, it will discuss how 
international criminal judges, most notably those in the ICC, have taken into account such in 
concreto provided scientific reports in the sentencing phase in order to assess how much the 
gravity of the incurred psychological harm should affect sentencing of the defendant or the 




Chapter 2: International Criminal Courts and Tribunals and the 
Assessment of Warfare’s Psychological Impact upon Civilians 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
A unique oxymoron lies with international criminal courts and tribunals: whereas their 
statutes provide for expert witnesses in court proceedings133 and international criminal courts 
and tribunals have resorted to the aid of experts in the past,134 when it comes to warfare’s 
psychological impact, these judicial bodies have largely opted to relate to such impact on their 
terms in deference to any opinions or reports of mental health experts.   
Along these lines, instead of resorting to opinions of mental health experts to assess this 
harm, international criminal courts and tribunals have largely coined on their own the 
characteristics that ‘serious mental harm’ entails. Thus, it ‘need not cause permanent and 
irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, 
embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm that results in a grave and long-term 
disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.’135 In other instances, 
international criminal courts and tribunals have held that ‘serious mental harm’ must involve 
more than ‘a vague state of anxiety’,136  going ‘beyond temporary unhappiness.’ Without 
                                                          
133 Kai Ambos, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. III: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
Oxford University Press, 2016, 483 (noting how in the realm of the Tribunals the initiative is left to the parties, 
whereas the ICC follows the civil law tradition and endorses the list of experts, leaving the relevant initiative to 
the judge) 
134 See the use of experts by the ICTY in the Slobodan Milosevic case at 
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transcripts in the Katanga case at Prosecutor v. Katanga, Transcript No.139, p.33, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-139-Red-
ENG WT 11-05-2010 1/66 EA T (with reference to Dr. Baccard) 
135 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33--T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para.513 
136 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Seromba, supra note 10, paras.47-48 
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having to be permanent or irremediable, 137 in order to be asserted, it must nevertheless bear 
the characteristics of a ‘grave and long disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and 
constructive life.’ 138  
This judicial stance, to the extent that it describes and does not define the concept of 
‘serious mental harm’, fails to rest on certain criteria and even if it does, courts and tribunals 
have not elaborated on their nature. The absence of such criteria makes it impossible to review 
the reasonableness of the courts’ pronouncement on the issue, such reasonableness being a 
cardinal element of the judicial legal reasoning in criminal law.139 As a result, the assessments 
on the mental harm suffered by the civilians are characterized by a great degree of 
uncertainty.140  Yet, judges could have been furnished with criteria for the assessment of 
warfare’s psychological impact if they had opted to rest their pronouncements on opinions and 
reports penned in concreto by mental health experts.  
In the context of warfare, it is not feasible to expect psychologists and psychiatrists to 
be at hand to readily assess the civilians’ mental harm right after they have experienced certain 
emotions. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 1, such a psychological assessment cannot always 
bear fruit if undertaken months or years after the traumatizing event. Thus, what is being argued 
is that, in their judgments, international criminal courts and tribunals should reach the most 
epistemologically accurate point possible when depicting and rendering legal importance to the 
civilians’ suffering. The employment of mental health experts is not meant to necessarily 
reconstruct the pain and suffering these civilians have felt, but rather to provide an indication 
                                                          
137 ICTR, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Semanza,supra note 10, para.322 
138 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para.738 
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to the judge on whether the inflicted mental harm can indeed be termed as ‘serious’ as required 
by the relevant international criminal law and laws of war provisions.141  
Such an approach, which could entrench the discussion of warfare’s psychological 
impact on solid empirical and doctrinal grounds, has been undertaken on other facets of 
warfare’s psychological impact which relate to the credibility of the provided testimony rather 
than the suffered harm. For example, in Lubanga, the ICC Trial Chamber called a psychologist 
to testify on whether the psychological trauma a child soldier had experienced could impact his 
memory.142 Arguably, such resort to mental health experts could be applied to cases where 
warfare’s negative psychological impact extends to civilians. 
Hence, the current chapter, in conjunction with Chapter 7, will delineate how, while 
still far from reaching such an approach on methodological grounds, international criminal 
courts and tribunals are slowly moving towards this direction. The analysis will focus in this 
chapter on the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC and not to other courts, for example the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, to the extent that it is these international criminal judicial bodies that 
have rendered evidence that there can be international criminal responsibility  for the civilians’ 
mental harm. Moreover, as the focus here is on ‘international’ rather than ‘transnational’ 
criminal courts, the chapter will not discuss the jurisprudence of hybrid criminal courts, which 
try international crimes, but apply norms derived from the domestic legal order rather than 
purely from international rules.143  
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Based on these premises, the chapter will critically discuss the relevant international 
criminal jurisprudence in the next section. To the extent that the criminal prosecution of the 
incidental incurrence of mental harm is difficult to bear fruit,144 the discussion of such harm 
will take place through cases where its causation has been intentional. Such cases include 
examples fitting the realm of a number of crimes, from the crime of genocide to the 
commitment of inhumane acts. The chapter will then proceed to delineate the doctrinal 
problems that arise for the defendant’s rights as well as for the integrity of the judicial process 
from the fact that these judicial bodies do not rely on mental health expertise or do not provide 
the reliability criteria upon which such reliance takes place.  
 
2.2 Warfare’s Psychological Civilian Impact and the ICTY  
 
The ICTY has referred to warfare’s psychological toll on civilians in a number of cases 
related to the terrorization of these civilians. One such example is the case of Dragomir 
Milosevic concerning the siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces during the civil war in the former 
Yugoslavia. Dragomir Milosevic was commander of the relevant forces who was accused of 
undertaking a campaign of sniping and shelling against the city’s civilian population.145 This 
campaign led not only to physical injuries and deaths among the affected civilians, but also to 
a large impact on their psychological well-being.146 The Trial Chamber found Milosevic guilty 
of murder and causing inhumane acts due to the physical casualties and also guilty of the crime 
of spreading terror due to the psychological impact the extensive shelling and sniping had on 
                                                          
144 On this see Jessica Lawrence & Kevin Jon Heller, The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, the 
First Ecocentric Environmental War Crime, 20 Georgetown Environmental L. Rev. 1 (2007) 
145 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, Case No.IT-98-29/1-PT,Prosecution’s Submission of Amended 
Indictment pursuant to Rule 50 and Trial Chamber’s Decision dated 12 December 2006, 18 December 2006, 
para.5 
146 Ibid at paras.16,18,23 
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the inhabitants of Sarajevo.147 Ultimately, Milosevic was convicted on these charges, including 
for spreading terror. The Appeals Chambers upheld the charges but reduced the imposed 
sentence slightly.148 
Regarding the crime of terror, the Trial Chamber was led to the conclusion without 
resorting to a psychological or a psychiatric expert opinion that the attacks against Sarajevo 
‘left deep and irremovable mental scars on that population as a whole’ and that the 
psychological effect of the bombs that fell was ‘tremendous.’149 Responding to the defendant’s 
argument that such lack of scientific opinions should constitute grounds for an appeal, the 
Appeals Chamber held that Milosevic failed ‘to substantiate his assertion that in the 
circumstances of the present case it was necessary for the Trial Chamber to resort to such 
specialized knowledge.’150 The Appeals Chamber, noting that the Trial Chamber had 
considered ‘voluminous evidence showing the psychological impact the shelling and sniping 
had on the civilian population,’151 proceeded to explicitly discuss the following relevant 
evidence in detail: one woman had testified that her daughters returned from collecting water 
with their clothes soiled because of the fear they experienced; a doctor stated that mental health 
casualties exceeded physical casualties; and other witnesses recounted that they had harboured 
fear and lasting psychological effects.152   
The Appeals Chamber deemed enough to come to conclusions on the psychological 
impact Milosevic’s actions incurred only by reiterated as proof these testimonies and without 
ordering any further psychological evaluation of the civilians testifying as witnesses. The only 
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psychological assertion coming from a scientist was the testimony provided by the doctor, but 
it was also too general and did not refer to the mental harm suffered by the particular civilians 
testifying before the Tribunal.   
Due to this, there would be doubts on whether these testimonies can be of any service 
in the realm of an international criminal trial where punishment must be explicitly based on 
proven facts related to the particular incident in question. At the same time, it can be argued 
that for the Appeals Chamber, such a thorough scientific approach might not be considered to 
be cardinal since, according to its rationale, the fact that the Trial Chamber had established that 
these attacks undertaken by Milosevic’s forces constituted unlawful attacks causing serious 
injury and death, the threshold gravity  for the crime of terror should be deemed as having also 
been met.153  
Yet, it is important to note that the linking of physical devastation and carnage to the 
psychological impact attacks may have had, led Judge Liu Daqun to make a different statement 
regarding the crime of terror in his partly dissenting opinion.154 The Judge noted that for the 
Chamber’s majority, the victims of the crime of terror were not these civilians who were 
terrorized, but instead were those injured by the acts of violence.155 To the extent that this 
comprised also civilians killed by the attacks, Judge Daqun deemed this to be problematic 
because civilians were considered victims of the crime of terror even if they had not survived 
the attacks in order to live with the created terror.156 Along these lines, Judge Daqun proposed 
the crime of terror to be based on the actual terrorization of civilians, measured not in 
conjunction with the physical casualties these civilians have suffered but through the mental 
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trauma or psychological harm caused.157 This harm would be determined ‘on a case-by-case 
basis’ ‘in light of most recent developments in psychological disorders.’158 
In that sense, Judge Daqun’s dissenting opinion demonstrates that: hurdles exist for 
international judges because of the lack of epistemological standards for the measurement of 
warfare’s psychological impact; any judicial attempts to resort to pronouncements on mental 
health issues with no reliance on mental health expert opinions are bound to be general, 
inconsistent, and insufficient and; reliance on mental health experts’ opinions and reports could 
address the issue.  
The case of Blaskic is another case that presents similar problems regarding the 
assessment of the mental harm incurred by the civilians. Blaskic was a Bosnian Croat colonel 
who was indicted, convicted, and sentenced for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, war crimes concerning operations of the Bosnian Croat army aimed to 
ethnically cleanse Bosnia from non-Croats, and crimes committed against Muslim Bosnians. It 
should be noted that Blaskic was indicted and consequently convicted for the fact that, through 
his acts, he deliberately caused serious mental harm to the affected civilians.159 On these 
grounds, in coming to assert the indictment charges, the Trial Chamber did not refer to any 
mental health experts’ opinions, but only to the testimonies of civilian victims. The Chamber 
thus asserted that the soldiers under Blaskic’s command ‘terrorized the civilians by intensive 
shelling, murders and sheer violence’160 and that the women and children who were detained 
in camps as a result of these military operations, ‘were terrorized and threatened by their 
guards.’161 The indictment writ’s description of ‘inhumane acts’ was that these acts were  meant 
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to cause great mental and physical suffering.’162 However, given that there was no reference to 
scientific opinions on the magnitude of the caused mental harm, the Trial Chamber considered 
these acts to have caused mental harm of such magnitude that could render them to be termed 
‘inhumane.’ 
In the Trial Chamber’s rationale, psychological or psychiatric assessments on the issue 
of the caused harm were replaced with a descriptive approach which the judges undertook on 
their own. By combining a number of heinous acts such as the use of human shields, beatings, 
physical and psychological abuse and intimidation, and the deprivation of food and water,163 
the magnitude of the caused harm could be demonstrated. The Chamber thus referred to the 
‘atmosphere of terror reigning in the detention facilities’ as a manifestation of the crimes of 
cruel and inhumane treatment.164 In that sense, the Trial Chamber did not take the approach 
that the degree of the caused mental harm should be left to be diagnosed by mental health 
experts, but rather it held that this could be done by the judges themselves as long as cases were 
assessed ‘on a case by case basis with due regard for the individual circumstances.’165  
In Blagojevic, the question of whether or not mental harm was sustained by the victims 
acquired an additional value. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic were indicted for committing 
various crimes against Bosnian Muslims during the Yugoslav civil war, including the forcible 
transfer of women and children and the killing of Bosnian Muslim men.166 In the indictment, 
the prosecution did not claim any physical or mental harm suffered by the victims of the 
defendants’ policies.167 Nevertheless, in its final brief, the prosecution did claim that the killing 
of the men combined with the abuse they sustained and the forced transfer of women out of 
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Srebrenica did result in serious mental harm for the survivors.168 Reference was made to the 
lasting effects of the psychological trauma for these survivors and the continuation of 
nightmares and feelings of fear and depression among the women from Srebrenica long after 
the event.169  
On these grounds, in a number of instances in the body of the judgment, the Trial 
Chamber referred to the effect of the defendants’ policies on the civilian victims and concluded, 
without any recourse to any psychological or psychiatric authority, that the suffering 
experienced by these civilians met the threshold of serious mental harm. For example, 
regarding the forced displacement of women, children, and the elderly, the Trial Chamber 
noted that ‘it is convinced’ that such displacement ‘was itself a traumatic experience which in 
the circumstances of this case reaches the requisite level of causing serious mental harm.’170 
However, even though the Trial Chamber listed the civilian victims’ experiences, it did not 
elaborate further on how it shaped its conviction that this level of trauma had been reached. 
Similarly, the Trial Chamber found that the mental harm suffered by survivors of these attacks 
who had lost their relatives, equally reached constituted ‘serious mental harm.’171  
Yet in other instances , the Trial Chamber did proceed in this same case to relate to the 
findings of mental health experts, namely that the women from Srebrenica suffered from 
nightmares, feelings of fear, and depression and their psychological condition was ‘still 
extremely grave.’172 Nevertheless, instead of relating these mental health reports to the facts of 
the case, the judges opted to make general assertions that ‘serious mental harm’ was inflicted 
in a number of incidents without backing their claims on psychological or psychiatric evidence 
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contained in the experts’ opinions. The Trial Chamber did not relate to the case of these women 
but proceeded to state, on account of other incidents and without providing any mental health 
findings to buttress its claim, that there was sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the trauma suffered by the survivors of mass executions constituted ‘serious mental 
harm.’174 Furthermore, with no reliance to mental health expert sources, the Trial Chamber 
proceeded to make psychological assertions such as that ‘the fear of being captured…the sense 
of utter helplessness and extreme fear…is a traumatic experience from which one will not 
quickly-if ever-recover.’175 Similarly, the Trial Chamber stated that ‘the men suffered mental 
harm having their identification documents taken away from them.’176  
In another instance, the Trial Chamber brought up its awareness of the fact that ‘the 
men who were separated, detained, abused and subsequently killed, suffered serious mental 
harm in that they knew what their fate was.’177 On these grounds and in order to assert whether 
‘serious mental harm’ had been inflicted, the Trial Chamber did not rely on any psychological 
holdings. The judges, noting that the notion was not defined in the ICTY Statute, scanned the 
previous jurisprudence on the characteristics such mental harm takes according to international 
criminal tribunals.178 As a result, the Trial Chamber found that there was evidence in order to 
conclude ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that the trauma and wounds suffered by the individuals 
who managed to survive the executions did constitute serious bodily and mental harm.179  
The Trial Chamber noted that it was equally convinced that the displacement of 
children, women, and the elderly was a traumatic event that had caused serious mental harm. 
On these grounds, it proceeded to recount the wanderings of the affected civilians in their quest 
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to find a safe refuge from the atrocities and the threats to their lives.180 It ultimately concluded 
that there was ‘no doubt’ that the suffering of all these people who were subjected to the 
atrocities for which the defendants were held accountable, was to such an extent as to reach 
‘the threshold of serious mental harm’ under Article 4(2)(b) of the ICTY Statute.181 Moreover, 
the level of mental anguish suffered by those displaced from their homes and the particular 
policies undertaken ‘in such a manner as to traumatize them [the victims]’, constituted ‘serious 
mental harm.’182 Lastly, the Trial Chamber held that the mental harm suffered by the survivors 
who had to undergo the experience of searching for the bodies of their beloved persons met the 
‘required threshold to constitute serious mental harm.’183 
The same approach towards mental harm and the lack of any reliance on the opinions 
and reports of mental health experts can be found in the ICTY’s discussion of civilians’ mental 
harm from acts not directly related to the application of armed force during warfare, but rather 
from other warfare-related incidents. For example, in Martic, the Trial Chamber held that it 
would assess on a case to case basis whether the acts of torture caused ‘severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering.’184 For its assessment, it would take a number of factors into account 
‘including the duration of the suffering inflicted, the nature of the crimes, the physical or mental 
condition of the victim, the effect of the acts on the victim, the victim’s age and the victim’s 
position of inferiority to the perpetrator.’185   On these grounds, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that ‘in light of all the circumstances in which beatings and mistreatment were carried out’ the 
detainees had been subjected to serious physical and mental suffering, especially since some 
of these beatings and mistreatment took place as part of an intimidation policy.186 Similarly in 
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Limaj, the ICTY noted that the events which victims of international crimes recounted in their 
testimonies ‘were extremely traumatic events, involving at times matters of life or death.’187 In 
Celebici, the ICTY Trial Chamber, referring to the testimonies of victims or their friends and 
relatives, emphasized that it ‘recognizes that recollection and articulation of such traumatic 
events is likely to invoke strong psychological and emotional reactions, including feelings of 
pain, fear and loss.’188  
In Krstic, the ICTY Trial Chamber discussed the question of ‘serious mental harm’ 
inside the general framework of the crime of genocide and acts that left victims with the scars 
of pain and fear.189 These acts were committed by the Bosnian Serb Army under the 
responsibility of Krstic, the army general and commander,190 following the take-over of 
Srebrenica.191 In particular, under Article 4(b) of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber came to 
pronounce on whether the defendant had committed genocide by inflicting serious bodily or 
mental harm to his victims.192 On this account, the Trial Chamber referred to the trauma 
suffered by the survivors exemplified through the sentiments of pain and fear they felt and 
concluded that Krstic’s acts had caused ‘serious mental harm.’ 193   
The Krstic judgment is an example of one where the Trial Chamber took into account 
the mental health expert’s testimony on the inflicted mental harm. The judgment referred to 
the testimony of an NGO director who provided psychological support for the survivors of the 
Srebrenica take-over and noted that those who were younger children had developed 
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adjustment problems, such as low levels of concentration, nightmares, and flashbacks194 and 
that the level of the assessed trauma was  ‘exceptionally high.’195  
Nevertheless, the judgment did not proceed to scientifically determine how severe the 
mental harm causing the high level of trauma needed to be in order to bear international 
criminal repercussions. The Trial Chamber did not resort to a mental health expert opinion in 
order to answer the question of whether such trauma met the legal requirements the courts and 
tribunals have set in order for a case of mental harm to be termed ‘serious.’ Rather, it opted to 
decide on its own that, in light of the trauma suffered by the survivors of the mass executions, 
it was convinced that the civilians affected by Krstic’s acts suffered ‘serious mental harm.’196 
 
2.3 The Assessment of Warfare’s Psychological Impact in the Realm of the ICTR 
 
   The ICTR has dealt with a number of cases where fear was created among the 
civilians who were victims of abhorrent acts, but the creation of fear was not the distinct aim 
of the acts. For example, in Akayesu, the defendant was charged for being present at, and even 
facilitating acts of sexual assault, beatings, and murder which all gave rise as the Tribunal notes 
to feelings of ‘constant fear.’197 These acts inflicted, according to the Tribunal, not only 
physical but also mental harm as part of a general policy of genocide.198 In coming to reach 
such a conclusion, the Trial Chamber did not rely on any mental health scientific findings. 
Commenting on the infliction of serious bodily or mental harm and without separating the two 
forms of harm in its observations, the Trial Chamber noted that such harm should not 
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necessarily be permanent and irremediable.199 It continued to cite torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment, and persecution as examples of such harm.200 The Trial Chamber 
acknowledged, on its own, the existence of trauma among the affected civilians caused by the 
crimes they were subjected to without resorting to mental health expert opinions. Along these 
lines, the Trial Chamber noted that  
‘many of the eye-witnesses…have seen atrocities committed against their family 
members or close friends…The possible traumatism of these witnesses…is a matter of 
particular concern to the Chamber. The recounting of this traumatic experience is likely to 
evoke memories of the fear and the pain once inflicted on the witness and thereby affect his or 
her ability fully or adequately to recount the sequence of events in a judicial context. The 
Chamber has considered the testimony of those witnesses in this light.’201  
Moreover, the Trial Chamber, to the extent that it was not able to assess the existence 
of such trauma in some instances, preferred, instead, to resort to the aid of mental health experts 
to assume that this should be the case. It thus stated that 
‘The Chamber is unable to exclude the possibility that some or all of these witnesses did 
actually suffer from posttraumatic or extreme stress disorders and has therefore carefully 
perused the testimonies of these witnesses, those of the Prosecutor as well as those of the 
Defence, on the assumption that this might possibly have been the case….’202 
The lack of such trauma diagnosis by relevant scientists received additional dimensions 
in this particular case through the Trial Chamber’s own assertion that the inconsistencies in the 
witnesses’ testimonies during the pre-trial and main trial stages should be explained by the 
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trauma these civilians had experienced which had rendered recollection of precise details 
difficult. 203  
Niyitegeka is another case that equally raised the question of the impact that the mental 
suffering by civilians has on the judicial assessment of the legal characterization of a certain 
act undertaken during warfare. Here, the question was whether the mental suffering the 
civilians experienced due to the defendant’s actions was to such an extent as to legally term the 
defendant’s acts as ‘inhumane’ and thereby convict him under Article 3 of the ICTR Statute.204 
 In order to reach this conclusion, the Trial Chamber did not rely on any psychological 
findings, but rather looked at the nature of the defendant’s acts. The Trial Chamber described 
how Niyitegeka rejoiced when Assiel Kabanda, a prominent Tutsi, was captured and 
subsequently killed, decapitated, and castrated, and his skull was pierced through the ears with 
a spike.205 The Chamber found that  
‘the jubilation of the Accused, particularly in light of his leadership role in the attack, 
at the decapitation and castration of Kabanda, and the piercing of Kabanda’s skull, supported 
and encouraged the attackers, and thereby aided and abetted the commission of these 
crimes.’206  
 The Trial Chamber reached a similar conclusion on account of an incident where 
Niyitegeka instructed his men to sharpen and insert a piece of wood into the genitals of a female 
corpse after the woman had been shot dead.207 It concluded that the relevant acts were ‘acts of 
seriousness comparable to other acts enumerated in the Article, and would cause mental 
suffering to civilians, in particular, Tutsi civilians, and constitute a serious attack on the human 
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dignity of the Tutsi community as a whole.’208 The Trial Chamber did not further elaborate on 
why these particular acts met the ‘seriousness’ threshold or why would they were deemed to 
cause mental suffering to the general civilian population even though they concerned specific 
individuals.  
At the same time, these questions could have been addressed by the Trial Chamber to 
the extent that they were raised during the oral proceedings. On this account, the defendant’s 
lawyers, after stressing that the prosecution grounds of causation of serious mental or physical 
suffering or injury or serious attack on human dignity should be seen as referring to the 
insertion of the piece of wood into the deceased woman’s genitalia, proceeded to argue that the 
particular event did not have a sufficient impact and was not of such a scale to fulfil the 
‘inhumane acts’ requirements.209 When asked by the Trial Chamber’s President how they could 
make such a claim and whether it had to do with the fact that the insertion of wood to the 
genitalia was done to a corpse and not to a living person, one of the defence lawyers provided 
the following answer: 
‘Yes, ma'am.  And of course, that can't be rape either when your Lordships are 
considering rape.  I don't believe one can rape a deceased person, it may be necrophilia or 
something, but it is not rape in the criminal sense.  But the evidence with relation to the shock 
or the horror, I think, was that the witness was going to his lunch and he got goose bumps, my 
Lord, had his lunch and got goose bumps on the way back when he saw it, my Lord.  And I say 
that is clearly not in the category of the type of horror and mental suffering that this particular 
section of the statute is designed to prevent or address.’210 
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This answer rendered clear that the connection of the incident with the notion of mental 
harm focused on the fact that the sight of the corpse with the piece of wood inside her genitalia 
caused goose bumps to the witness because of the horror and shock he experienced before this 
heinous sight. Nevertheless, in its judgement, the Trial Chamber did not proceed to relate this 
incident to the goose bumps the civilian felt in order to attempt a linkage between the 
committed act and its implications for the civilian’s psychology. In that sense, the Trial 
Chamber did not relate, at all, to the question of whether the experiencing of goose bumps 
could lead to harm of such a degree in order for it to be termed as ‘serious.’  
 The same issue regarding the ICTR’s non-elaborate analysis on how it reached the 
‘seriousness’ conclusion regarding the inflicted mental harm can be found in the Kayishema 
and Ruzindana judgment.211 There, the defendants were charged for their role in the massacres 
that took place in the regions of Kibuye and Bisesero during the Rwandan genocide. The Trial 
Chamber found them both guilty of genocide. In coming to address the charge in the indictment 
concerning the perpetration of ‘inhumane acts’ according to Article 3 of its Statute, the Tribunal 
referred to the serious character these acts must have as far as mental harm is concerned and 
continued by stating that 
‘….The Prosecution on the other hand suggests that victims have suffered mental harm 
amounting to other inhumane acts due to them having witnessed atrocities for which the 
accused is responsible. For example, in relation to Count 4 the Prosecution submits  
“with respect to serious mental harm, six survivors testified (and the survivors of all the 
other massacres testified) that they witnessed family members and friends being killed. As 
established by the evidence, Tutsi civilians were placed in an environment of fear and 
desperation and were forced to witness the killing and the severe injuring of friends, family 
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and other Tutsi civilians. The killings were brutal in manner. The people saw carnage and heard 
the people singing exterminate them, exterminate them…The Prosecutor submits that such an 
environment inherently causes serious mental harm.”’212 
Although this assertion that serious mental harm is ‘inherently’ caused was not based 
on any mental health experts’ findings, the Trial Chamber adopted it in an unconditional way 
and posed it as stemming naturally from the described events. On these grounds, the judges 
noted that they were ‘in no doubt that a third party could suffer serious mental harm by 
witnessing acts committed against others, particularly against family or friends….’ 213  At the 
same time, the Trial Chamber did not provide the source of its certainty and did not cite any 
empirical knowledge or data referring to this or even other similar cases.  
This ‘axiomatic’ approach of the Trial Chamber towards the psychological impact of 
the attack was criticized by the defendant’s lawyers who implied that the establishment of 
mental harm incurred to civilians with no specific medical certificates referring to such harm 
is arbitrary and goes against the defendant’s presumption of innocence.214 Considering the fact 
that the assertion of the ‘inhumane acts’ parameter in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute refers only 
to ‘serious mental harm’, the determination of whether the inflicted mental harm was indeed 
serious or not becomes of cardinal importance.  
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2.4 Warfare’s Psychological Civilian Impact and the ICC  
 
In the first case where an individual was convicted by the ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
was found guilty for the crime of conscripting children and obliging them to participate in the 
hostilities that had erupted in the Democrat Republic of Congo.215 In coming to discuss the 
harm caused to child soldiers from recruitment, the Trial Chamber referred explicitly to the 
serious trauma such practice caused to the affected children.216 In order to reach such a 
conclusion, the Trial Chamber did take into account the opinion of a competent psychologist.217 
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber proceeded in this assertion without further specifying the 
criteria upon which it had decided to declare this psychologist’s opinion as admissible. In that 
sense, the Chamber failed to create a consistent policy of introducing such expert assessments 
in the judicial discussion of the psychological harm sustained by the victims. As a result, the 
lack of such criteria rendered the Trial Chamber’s practice in Lubanga susceptible to review 
and non-sustenance in future judgments. In fact, this was the case that the ICC Trial Chamber, 
under a different composition, was called to discuss regarding the psychological suffering by 
civilians in the Katanga case. 
 In Katanga, the Prosecution had charged the defendants under Article 7(1)(k) for the 
crime of inhumane acts due to the ‘intentional infliction of serious injuries upon civilians.’218 
The Pre-Trial Chamber specified these injuries as pertaining to the affected civilians’ body and 
limbs. On the other hand, the Prosecution did not specify whether these injuries were physical 
or non-physical. In coming to find the defendants guilty for the causation of ‘serious mental 
and physical harm’ on these grounds, the Trial Chamber referred to how a woman, taken 
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captive, was raped several times and repeatedly assaulted. For its claim that such conduct 
brought mental harm to the victim that could be termed as ‘serious’, the Trial Chamber 
provided two references to the trial’s transcripts.219 In coming to examine the sources, one sees 
that both of them relate to the witness’s recounting of the rape and her interrogation by soldiers 
once in captivity.220 These sources do not contain any reference to specific psychological harm 
suffered by the victim or to its seriousness. Thus, such harm was left to be deduced by the 
horrendous nature of the undertaken acts.  
 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber accepted the assertion of a village chief affected by 
Katanga’s crimes that those children violently conscripted to fight were ‘traumatized’ in order 
to deduce from such an assertion the conclusion that such trauma should be seen as a reason 
why one of these children soldiers denied, before the Court, any army participation.221 In spite 
of the fact that both the witness assertion as well as the Court’s deduction contained strong 
elements pertaining to mental health sciences’ expertise, the Court did not resort to the aid of 
mental health experts in order to verify whether the claimed trauma of the children that 
appeared before the Court could be asserted.  
 
2.5 The Lack of Reliable Standards in Judges’ Conclusions: The Impact for the 
Defendant’s Rights and the Integrity of the Judicial Process 
 
Judges are meant to base their decisions on evidence and proven facts.222 When it comes 
to expert witnesses, the ICC has, in essence, applied the principles of the Daubert standard, 
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holding that in coming to evaluate these experts’ testimonies, ICC judges are to review the 
experts’ methodology and the general reliability of the expert evidence.223 Yet, as demonstrated 
in many instances, at least as far as warfare’s psychological impact on civilians is concerned, 
the ICC judges do not resort to the aid of mental health witnesses in the first place. This is 
despite the fact that, when it comes generally to the aid expert witnesses provide to the judges, 
the ICC has emphasized the value expert witnesses have for the very acceptance by the Court 
of certain events as facts rather as just mere accounts. For example, in coming to depend in the 
Katanga case on witnesses rather than expert witnesses for the recounting of the historical 
background that gave rise to the conflict in the realm of which the defendant’s crimes were 
committed, the Trial Chamber noted that 
‘…the witnesses to whom the Chamber makes reference were above all protagonists in 
the conflict and their accounts can in no way be likened to that of an expert. The Chamber 
therefore wishes to emphasize that…this section does not constitute a body of findings of fact: 
it is simply an account, inevitably incomplete, that seeks to facilitate understanding of some 
aspects of the situation in the DRC and more particularly of the conflict which raged in Itturi 
at that time.’224 
The question whether, when it comes specifically to issues pertaining to mental health 
sciences, such a reluctance on the part of the international criminal courts and tribunals to 
evaluate expert testimonies should be associated with an inherent institutional inability of these 
bodies to approach and assess such evidence will be explored in the next chapter. The current 
section will examine the effect such judicial reluctance has on the defendant’s rights and the 
overall integrity of the judicial process itself. This is the case when matters pertaining to 
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warfare’s psychological impact do not constitute matters of common knowledge that judges 
can take into account without reference to the evidence process.225 In other words, they 
constitute pronouncements on expert issues which cannot be undertaken without reliance on 
an expert authority.  The next section will underline how the particular approach currently 
taken by international criminal courts and tribunals compromises the two aforementioned 
elements, namely defendants’ rights and the integrity of the judicial process. It will start with 
the rights of the defendant and continue by addressing the issue of the general impact of the 
judicial practice on the integrity of the process.  
 
2.6 The Current Judicial Approach and its Impact on the Rights of the Defendant 
 
Scholars have noted that ‘there has been relatively little interest in the rights of the 
accused before international criminal courts.’226 On these grounds, there is additional 
importance in addressing the way international criminal courts and tribunals determine how 
the psychological impact of warfare affects the rights of the defendants. The lack of reliable 
criteria in the formation of epistemological conclusions touches upon a number of issues which 
relate to a greater or lesser extent to the right of a fair trial. For example, such practice leads 
judges to issue non-reasoned judgments as far as the particular part is concerned. The need for 
judgments to be reasoned is a major cornerstone of modern legal orders which should be based 
on the rule of law and the absence of reasoning in court decisions violates the defendants’ right 
to a fair trial.227 This should be viewed in light of the fact that such absence precludes 
hierarchically higher courts from reviewing the way the particular conclusions have been 
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reached. This inability for appeal courts to review judgements ultimately gives rise to a 
situation where judges can formulate their conclusions arbitrarily without the ability to criticize 
and double-check these conclusions.228  
Additionally, the lack of reliable standards affects the presumption of innocence that 
any defendant must enjoy. Through the current practice, international judges infer, on their 
own with no scientific support, the impact of certain acts and conclude that these acts cause 
serious mental harm and suffering to the affected civilians. Without the involvement of experts, 
depending on the existence of prejudices that judges may be have in their assessment of the 
impact of these acts, there is the possibility that the resulting mental harm may not be of such 
magnitude that it is, in fact, ‘serious.’ In that sense, under the current judicial approach, there 
is greater chance of refusing to consider the defendant as possibly innocent, thus infringing 
upon the presumption of innocence.  
To the extent that both the need for judgments to contain explicit reasons and be 
justified and the presumption of innocence relate to the right to a fair trial,229 there may be a 
possible violation of the right to a fair trial. Since the right to a fair trial is a cardinal one,230  
the grounding of any legal conclusions on assertions made by judges without recourse to 
witnesses’ testimonies constitutes a ground of appeal for the rendered judgment.  
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2.7 The Current Judicial Approach and its Impact on the Wider Integrity of the Judicial 
Process 
 
The lack of reliable standards in the assessment of matters falling outside a judge’s 
expertise when relying on their own cognitive facilities rather than on expert testimonies raises 
issues for the integrity of the judicial process on two levels. The one is procedural, relating to 
the fact that judges are not allowed to reach conclusions on expert issues on expertise 
knowledge attained in ways other than the introduction of relevant expert reports or opinions 
through the rules ordained by the criminal or civil procedure. The second is substantial and 
refers to the question of how judges can reach conclusions on the level of the incurred mental 
harm and that ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ the affected civilians have suffered ‘serious mental 
harm,’ without recourse to mental health experts. 
When it comes to the first issue, domestic courts have highlighted it. In Rowe v. Gibson, 
a U.S. case, a dispute took place to the extent that the 7th Circuit of Appeal based its judgment 
on the fact that Judge Posner conducted research using the internet on his own initiative.231 The 
case concerned the granting of summary judgment on the time an inmate in Indiana was 
allowed to take a pill for his stomach in his cell. Judge Posner, writing the majority’s position, 
refuted the medical expert’s testimony and relied on internet articles and sources that he himself 
found. Posner’s stance was criticized by Judge Hamilton, his peer at the bench.232 Scholars 
have also raised doubts as to whether this particular case could be cited for extracting general 
conclusions about allowing judges to draw on material not formally brought to the trial by the 
parties. Posner’s approach, in Rowe v. Gibson, was meant to address specific problems 
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stemming in U.S. law from pro se litigation cases regarding whether the defendant could have 
his arguments heard before the court. Hence it is possible that no general conclusions regarding 
judges’ discretion to resort to material not officially presented to the trial should be drawn from 
this case.233 This is especially valid given that Posner’s stance on the issue was criticized by 
Judge Hamilton, his peer at the bench,234 and it has not been equally shared by other U.S. state 
courts235 or by courts in other jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia.  
Similarly, in the Bornyk case before the Canadian courts, the question was whether a 
fingerprint found in a burgled house belonged to the defendant as a police fingerprint expert 
claimed.236 The trial judge relied on articles published generally on fingerprinting in order to 
refute the police officer’s stance without calling the latter to defend his position in light of the 
reservations the articles casted on fingerprint analysis in general.237 The trial judge 
consequently proceeded to acquit Bornyk.238 However, the Crown appealed the decision citing 
as grounds of appeal, inter alia, the fact that the trial judge had relied on pieces of scientific 
literature that was not introduced to the trial by either party, was not tested in evidence, and 
was not put in the consideration of the testifying police officer.239 In coming to accept the 
appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted that judges were to rely, in principle only, 
on evidence presented throughout the trial.240 This had not happened in this particular case as 
far the reliance of the trial judge on published research was concerned. On these grounds, the 
                                                          
233 M.Cristina Martin, ‘Googling’ your way to Justice: How Judge Posner was (almost) correct in his Use of 
Internet Research in Rowe v. Gibson, 11 Seventh Circuit Review 1,30-31 (2015) available at 
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Court of Appeal criticized the trial judge for compromising ‘the appearance of judicial 
independence essential to a fair trial’ and proceeded to note that the trial judge ‘while he sought 
submissions on the material he had located, by the very act of his self-directed research…he 
assumed the multi-faceted role of advocate, witness and judge.’241  
In response to the Bornyk judgment, scholars have argued that the Court of Appeal 
‘exaggerated the magnitude of the threat to fairness’ since it would have been more unfair if 
the trial judge had not taken any action at all in further raising and incorporating his concerns 
about the epistemological validity of fingerprint analysis in his final judgment.242 In that sense, 
the Court of Appeal’s criticism of the trial judge’s stance and of these scholars who argued 
against the Court of Appeal judgment, relates to the way the scientific objections about the 
fingerprint analysis were introduced by the trial judge. Whereas, for the Court of Appeal, an 
expert witness should have been called to testify on account of the police officer expert’s 
testimony, the cited scholars thought that the trial judge could fetch the materials and 
contentions that cast doubts on the epistemological validity of fingerprint analysis on his own 
in the trial procedure.243 In both cases, however, both the Court of Appeal and the scholars 
agreed that the expert’s axiological conclusions on the fingerprint found in the house should 
be buttressed by relevant scientific evidence about fingerprint analysis as a method. 
This stance is further articulated in the Australian jurisprudence, in a number of 
judgments issues by the Full Court of the Family Court.244 For example, in Barclay & Orton, 
the judge of first instance brought material relating to the interests of the child before the parties 
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in order to get their response on the scientific issues this material raised for the child’s well-
being. The Full Court stated, though, that while it was commendable for the judge to rely on 
scholarly articles in order to support his stance, he could not hand this scholarly material to the 
parties for their response.245   
In the McGregor case, the federal judge relied on materials not brought in the trial by 
the parties in order to relate to the concept of ‘parental alienation.’246 The Full Court rejected 
such an approach and disapproved of the fact that the particular articles the judge had relied on 
had become the prism through which the evidence was assessed.247 On these grounds, the 
federal judge’s reliance on such material raised problems because it was not introduced into 
evidence and, ultimately, the approach represented ‘a failure to afford the appellant natural 
justice and procedural fairness.’248 Similarly, in X and X, the Full Court held that the question 
whether genital herpes was incurable was not one of general knowledge and thus the judge was 
not entitled to provide an answer to it without the relevant scientific proof.249 In KB & TC, two 
children aged ten and twelve expressed the will to live in Japan with their father rather than in 
Australia with their mother.250 Due to the fact that the trial judge had balanced all of the relevant 
parameters,251 the Full Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to accept the children’s volition 
to live with their father and further rendered clear that the question of the benefit that a child 
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would derive out of his relationship with his other siblings was not a matter of general 
knowledge and thus the judge should shape his conviction based on expert opinions.253 
The second issue, namely the substantial hurdles that the non-reliance on experts 
fetches to the integrity of the trial through the non-sufficient delineation of the incurred mental 
harm as ‘serious,’ is equally important given the fact that international crimes need the 
intentional causation of such harm to be ‘serious’ in order to be asserted. In cases of incidental 
mental harm, assuming that such harm should be a parameter in the jus in bello proportionality 
balance that the military commander is called to conduct,254 mental health experts’ reports can 
provide an indication to the judges on whether the decision of the commander to proceed with 
a certain operation should be seen as reasonable based on the anticipated military advantage. 
This, to the extent that the need for such mental harm to be ‘serious’ in order to be able to 
outbalance any military advantage considerations, has been stressed by international scholars 
who have pointed out that the more severe the harm the less likely it is for any military 
considerations to prevail.255  
For example, for David Luban, the lives of soldiers and enemy civilians are of an equal 
value and the proportionality test involves a ‘transfer of risks’ perception which should be a 
one-to-one ratio. This means that in a life or death situation, a soldier would only be permitted 
                                                          
253 KB & TC (2005) FamCA 458 at 87 (quoted in the presentation delivered by the Honourable Chief Justice 
Diana Bryant at the Judicial Conference of Australia colloquium). On this see Diana Bryant, The use of extrinsic 
materials-with particular reference to social science and family law decision making, Fremantle, Western 
Australia, 5-7 October 2012, p.11 available at http://jca.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Extrinsic-
Materials_paper.pdf  
254 For scholars stressing the role incidental civilian harm can play in jus in bello see Eliav Lieblich, supra note 
28; Solon Solomon, Bringing Psychological Civilian Harm to the Forefront: Incidental Civilian Fear as Trauma 
in the case of Recurrent Attacks, EJIL!Talk, 25 April 2018 available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/bringing-
psychological-civilian-harm-to-the-forefront-incidental-civilian-fear-as-trauma-in-the-case-of-recurrent-attacks/  
For an analysis of the jus in bello proportionality and its components see David Akerson, Applying Jus in Bello 
proportionality to Drone Warfare, 16 Oregon Rev. Int’l. L. 173 (2014) 
255 Isabel Robinson & Ellen Nohle, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack: The Reverberating Effects of 
Using Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, 98(1) Int’l. Rev. Red Cross 107,130 (2016) 
65 
 
to kill one civilian in order to save the life of another fellow soldier.256 For Adil Ahmad Haque, 
the aim of the jus in bello proportionality is to avoid the causation of greater harm in warfare. 
Such a stance is meant to encompass excessive harm incurred not only to enemy civilians but 
also to a state’s own civilians.257 While each stance is translated into different conclusions, the 
common denominator is the fact that excessive civilian harm cannot be justified by resorting 
to any arguments of military advantage.  
The Rome Statute seems to hold likewise. In coming to delineate the proportionality 
equation, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) refers to civilian injury that is ‘clearly excessive’ rather than just 
‘excessive’, as stipulated in the similarly worded Article 51(5)(b) of AP I  and serious mental 
harm could be seen as such, especially when it relates to the emergence of trauma258 given that 
in forms of warfare like cyberwarfare, major instruments like the Tallinn Manual underline that 
the causation of severe mental suffering must be seen as being tantamount to injury.259 
Reference to ‘serious’ injury caused to civilians has also been made by the ICC in cases of 
intentional attacks against civilians.260  
International quasi-judicial bodies, such as fact-finding commissions have also 
associated the infliction of ‘serious mental harm’ with the bearing of international criminal 
repercussions and with the ICC involvement. Such an association has sometimes taken place 
explicitly in the relevant report conclusions or implicitly through the denouncement these 
bodies have put forth regarding the infliction of a certain degree of mental harm and suffering 
on civilians. This is palpably demonstrated in the various reports fact-finding bodies have 
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penned at the backdrop of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, the Schabas-Davis 
report, penned in the aftermath of an Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2014 on account of 
the rocket attacks launched by Hamas, opted to describe, in detail, the psychological symptoms 
experienced by both Israeli and Palestinian civilians in coming to substantiate their mental 
harm and the assertion of war crimes, referring to the need for an ICC investigation.261  In its 
discussion of the conflict’s psychological toll on civilians, the report mainly described cases of 
posttraumatic stress disorder and other stress-related symptoms.262  
Although the report did not specify whether the mental harm suffered by these civilians 
could be termed as ‘serious’ or ‘grave’, the description of such harm based on mental disorder 
symptoms, implies that the answer should be in the affirmative. Yet, as long as international 
criminal law does not endorse scientifically reliable standards for evaluating such harm, its 
discussion is condemned to remain subjective and amorphous. To the extent that the delineation 
of the incurred psychological impact is important for the prosecution of certain acts, the 
inability of international criminal courts and tribunals to reliably assess it violates the legality 
principle and the fact that criminal rules must be as detailed as possible in order for individuals 
to know in advance which behaviour is allowed and which is denounced by criminal law.263 
On these grounds, as scholars note,264 it is the role of the courts, through their interpretation of 
the various provisions, to let individuals know in advance whether certain behaviours are 
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denounced in the hope that such knowledge will deter them from contravening the law. Yet, 
even beyond the deterrence level, exact substantiation of the level of mental harm that needs 
to be incurred in order for the defendant to be convicted for his actions, is required also by the 
fact that convictions must come only once the facts upon which the indictment is based, have 
been proved ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ requirement is not 
served if the caused mental harm is not discussed on scientifically reliable grounds and it is 
this issue that will constitute the focus of the next section.  
 
2.8 The Assessment of Warfare’s Psychological Impact and the ‘Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt’ Proof Requirement  
 
The inability to properly define the extent of the caused mental harm leads to an 
inability of the courts to be led to conclusions ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’ This in turn raises 
the question of whether the produced judgments do bear the proper justifications. Ultimately, 
the objectives served by the evaluation of evidence methods, namely the lessening of any 
intrusion of subjective views in the judgment’s corpus, are served by the need for the judgments 
to be grounded on reasoned opinions and be consistent with the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
requirement.265  In that sense, the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ requirement links together the 
two issues cited above, namely the integrity of the judicial process and the proper definition of 
mental harm as one of its facets.  
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The need for the defendant’s guilt to be established ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ exists 
both in common as well as continental law criminal jurisdictions.266 Common law systems refer 
explicitly to the particular standard in criminal law.267 Depending on the particular country, 
those following the civil law system have the creation of a ‘full’, ‘reasoned’, or ‘intimidate’ 
conviction as a standard of proof in criminal cases.268 While some scholars have argued that 
this should be deemed as different from the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard, other scholars 
consider the two standards to be the same.269 The standard refers to the conviction created by 
the fact-finding party in a criminal trial, be it the jury or the judge, that the defendant’s guilt is 
certain and that the prosecutor’s recounting of the incriminating events constitutes the only 
reasonable way these events could have transpired.270 
It is true that in some common law jurisdictions, the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
standard’ is not always required for mental health issues. This is the case with special defences 
when the defendant claims a mental health illness, such as insanity.271 In these cases, it would 
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be difficult for the prosecution to prove the opposite, namely that the defendant is not insane. 
For this reason, while the prosecution, generally, has to prove truthfulness of its claim of 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, in this particular instance, the burden of proof falls on the 
defence.272 In this occasion, acknowledging the fact that in mental illness and other psychiatric 
conditions one cannot always talk with certainties, the law requires ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ rather than a standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’  While such an 
arrangement is found in common law provisions, for example Rule 850(a)(b) of the US 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, this shift in the burden of proof is not allowed by the ICC 
Statute.273 Moreover, the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard continues to be applicable in 
cases pertaining to mental health matters outside the special criminal defences’ framework. 
This is the case with the mental harm incurred by the victims.  
Along these lines, the international criminal courts and tribunals have resorted to the 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard in a number of cases. In several instances in Blaskic, the 
ICTY Trial Chamber stated that it was brought to a certain conclusion ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt.’ This was the case when questioning whether certain attacks against some villages had 
any military objectives or whether they were carried out merely to attack the Bosnian Muslim 
population of these villages.274 It was equally the case once the tribunal was called to pronounce 
a stance on whether Blaskic knew about the international humanitarian law violations that took 
place on account of these events. The Trial Chamber held that ‘it was persuaded beyond all 
reasonable doubt that General Blaskic had reason to know that violations of international 
humanitarian law were being perpetrated.’275  
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Similarly, in Blagojevic, the ICTY referred to the formation of its judgment ‘beyond all 
doubt.’ In Jelisic, the Trial Chamber did not reach the conviction that the defendant had the 
intent to commit genocide ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and thus he was acquitted of any 
genocide charges despite the number of his victims.276 In Martic, the Trial Chamber acquitted 
Milan Martic of the crime of persecution because it did not find ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that 
the defendant wanted to commit the attacks he was accused of which included the constant 
shelling of Croatian cities.277 In Limaj, the defendant was acquitted because prosecution did 
not establish ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that Limaj had command or effective control over a 
prisoners’ camp or over the relevant soldiers who were guarding it.278 Finally, in Akayesu, the 
ICTR held that it was persuaded ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the defendant had threatened 
to kill a woman on two occasions during her interrogation.279 
The certainty the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard imposes does not mean that the 
issue has to be proven ‘beyond the shadow of a doubt.’280 Rather, reliance on the ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ standard means reliance on the subjective view of the deciding judge.281 In 
Delalic, the ICTY held that ‘a reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertains 
in the circumstances’282 and this utterance is seen as depicting the subjective facets the standard 
entails.283 The same is also true regarding the structure of the ‘intimate conviction’ in civil law 
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jurisdictions.284 Additionally, the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard means that an alternate 
factual scenario that differs from that conceded by the court or tribunal cannot be possible.285 
In that sense, the rationale behind the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard is that while the 
impact of any subjective views cannot be obliterated, it is nevertheless less stark once the 
particular standard of proof is required.286  
It is important to note that the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard must be tied to the 
existence of an evidence evaluation method. In other words, for the prosecution to assert that 
the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard is the only way events could have happened, there must 
be concrete and firmly accepted evidence that things could not have taken an alternate 
course.287 Such concrete and firm evidence is entrenched through the adoption of an evidence 
evaluation method288 that can, as well, ultimately reduce the danger of judges projecting their 
subjective beliefs upon their judgments.289  
In cases pertaining to warfare’s psychological toll on civilians, Haradinaj illustrates the 
effect of a lack of any reliable standards on the assertion of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
standard. In this case, Lahi Brahimaj, one of the defendants convicted for the serious mental 
harm he had inflicted on one of his victims, argued before the Appeals Chamber that the Trial 
Chamber had erred in accepting the infliction of such physical and mental pain since the victim 
himself had not stated that he had experienced such pain and mental trauma from the cruel 
treatment he was subject to.290 The Prosecution, on the other hand, argued that this pain and 
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trauma should be inferred by the nature of the beatings and the torturing of the victim.291 The 
Trial Chamber sided with the Prosecution by considering the physical and mental trauma 
suffered and still being felt according to the judges as well as the lasting physical consequences 
from the beatings and the related ongoing mental trauma.292 The Appeals Chamber 
consequently proceeded to uphold Brahimaj’s conviction.293  
It has been argued that judges have two ways of evaluating evidence, namely a 
mathematical one that involves statistical analysis294 and a non-mathematical one that uses 
psychological or cognitive methods.295 It has been further argued that when it comes to the 
question of how the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard is to be expressed, non-mathematical 
approaches should be the starting point of the analysis.296 Thus, when establishing a ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ standard for the psychological impact of warfare,  there is additional value 
for the courts and tribunals to rely on mental health expert pronouncements that are based on 
social sciences or medical knowledge. In other words, judges should not base their judgments 
on ‘an intuitive holistic evaluation’297 rather than on firm grounds. In the past, this led to the 
substitution of the jury with professional judges in domestic criminal cases.298 It is argued, 
however, that in international criminal cases, there should be inclusion of forensic scientists 
and mental health experts instead of substitution of the jury. 
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2.9 International criminal courts and the mental harm discussion impact on domestic war 
crimes trials 
 
The need for international criminal courts and tribunals to define the psychological 
impact of warfare using reliable scientific standards is indicated by the fact that, on many 
occasions, the lack of such standards on an international level leads domestic judges to totally 
obliterate any need to examine whether the inflicted terror also caused ‘serious mental harm.’ 
Thus, in coming to try possible war crimes, domestic judges often find it sufficient to state that 
an event caused terror to civilians without justifying how or why they reached this conclusion.  
On these grounds, the juxtaposition of the ICTY judgments discussed above to 
judgments rendered by Bosnian and Croatian national courts regarding war crimes during the 
Yugoslav civil war, can be provided as an example of a case-study relevant framework. 
Although this jurisprudence is not vast, it points to the fact that, as is the case with international 
criminal courts and tribunals, domestic courts of countries that have emerged from the civil 
war in Yugoslav have come to treat the psychological impact of warfare on civilians without 
referring to mental health expert opinions. 
As far as Bosnian courts are concerned, the case of Kurtovic is indicative. Kurtovic was 
indicted for applying ‘measures of intimidation and terror.’299 In particular, he obliged his 
prisoners to eat pages of prayer books and touch a live wire under voltage with their bare hands, 
and ordered his prisoners to lower their heads to the floor while keeping their hands above their 
head, something that, as recorded in the judicial decision, caused pain and ‘immense fear’ 
among the particular civilians. The judgment included the testimony of one of the witnesses 
who described that due to events he experienced, he suffered from poor sleep. Moreover he 
                                                          
299 Bosnia and Herzegovina Court, Kurtovic case, Judgment, Aug. 27, 2007, p.p. 1-2, 8, 10, 13, 28 
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constantly pictured the past events in his mind, he had become more aggressive, and he had 
problems with his adrenal levels.300 The Court did not address these civilians’ symptoms at all 
or even consider whether they indicated war trauma or denoted the infliction of ‘serious mental 
harm.’ The Court found Kurtovic guilty for the crime of terrorizing civilians without even 
discussing the level of fear these civilians had experienced. Given that international criminal 
jurisprudence has held that only ‘extreme fear’ constitutes terror,301 determination of the level 
of fear created would have legal significance in this particular case. Of note, it would be crucial 
to determine this level through the aid of mental health experts.302 
Similar questions and approaches regarding warfare’s psychological impact were raised 
before Croatian courts in the case of Jankovic, who was indicted for incidents and acts that led 
to the inhumane treatment and terrorization of his victims.303  Here, the Court noted an incident 
where the defendant shot about twenty shots before the feet of his civilian victim to the extent 
that, as the judgment notes, the civilian ‘froze in fear’ ‘psychologically entrenching into 
herself.’ However, the Court did not further evaluate legally or attach any importance to 
whether there was an infliction of ‘serious mental harm’ or not, It could be argued that lack of 
reliance on scientific reliable criteria rendered the Court unqualified to properly undertake such 
stance and that the interests of justice would be better served if mental health experts had been 
called to testify as expert witnesses.  
 
                                                          
300 Ibid, p.8 
301 On this see Julinda Beqiraj, Terror and Terrorism in Armed Conflicts: Developments in international 
criminal law in WAR CRIMES AND THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES: CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATION AND 
INVESTIGATION (Fausto Pocar et al., eds. Edward Elgar Publishing,2013) 270 
302 In that sense, see the striking factual similarity with the case of Haradinaj, where the KLA soldiers under the 
orders of the defendant forced civilians ‘to eat a small plastic-coated book’, yet in the case of Haradinaj the 
indictment did not include any charges of terrorization of the civilian population. On this see Prosecutor v. 
Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84-T, Fourth Amended Indictment, October 16, 2007, para.54 
303 Sibenik County Court, Croatia v. Jankovic, K-7/09, Judgment, Sept. 24,2010, p.p.1-2,3,counts 3,5 and 8, 





The current chapter sketched the inconsistent manner that international criminal courts 
and tribunals have used so far to determine the extent of warfare’s psychological impact on 
civilians. It stressed how international criminal judges assess the psychological harm inflicted 
upon the civilians without considering the opinions of mental health experts at all or just 
considering them in a general sense. The chapter proceeded to demonstrate the problems 
created by such a judicial practice both regarding the assurance of the verdict’s quality and 
certainty as well as the defendant’s human rights standards. Lastly, it discussed how such a 
practice on an international level also impacts the way domestic courts come to discuss the 
psychological impact of warfare based on general utterances and without resorting to further 
scientific evidence. In that sense, having sketched the problems entailed in the current approach 
of the international criminal judges towards warfare’s psychological civilian impact, the next 
chapter will turn to the thesis suggestion of addressing the issue through the introduction of the 
Daubert standard by exploring the cardinal question of whether the Daubert standard can be 





Chapter 3: Addressing the Inconsistency: The Assessment of 
Warfare’s Psychological Civilian Impact and the Question of 
Whether an International Criminal Law Principle can be Established  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
While the previous chapter illustrated the inconsistency with which international 
criminal law deals with the psychological impact of warfare on civilians, one can ask if 
international criminal law de lege lata provides the tools to the judge to address the issue. 
International criminal law does not provide a consistent answer either to the question of how 
expert evidence is to be assessed or to the question preceding it, namely whether international 
criminal judges have to resort to experts in the first place. The instruments governing the 
function of international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR,304 acknowledged 
the fact that expert witnesses might be called but at the same time and adopting the free 
probative value of evidence, held that this expert evidence could be assessed at will by the 
judge. 305 At the same time, echoing the Daubert reliability precept, the procedural rules 
governing these tribunals held that no evidence would be admissible if obtained by methods 
which cast a substantial doubt on its reliability.306   
As far as the ICC is concerned, Regulation 44 stipulates that the Court is to draft a list 
of experts from which expert witnesses are to be drawn.307 Yet, the ICC Regulations do not 
                                                          
304 On this see art.14 of the ICTR Statute 
305 ICTR Rules of Procedure, Rules 89(C ) and 90(D) 
306 Kimberley Miles, Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor, Issue: Expert Witnesses, New England 
School of Law, War Crimes Prosecution Project, Fall 2001, p.3 available at 
http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/wcmemos/2001/miles.pdf  
307 On this see Rule 95 of the ICTR Rules of Procedure; Regulations of the Court adopted by the Judges of the 
Court on 26 May 2004, fifth plenary session, The Hague, 17-28 May 2004, ICC-BD/01-01-04  
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elaborate further on how these witnesses’ testimonies are to be evaluated. Whereas Regulation 
44(5) holds that it is the Chamber that may issue an order not only regarding the subject of the 
expert’s report, but also regarding the way the expert’s evidence is to be presented308exerting 
great control over how the expert’s report is to be also drafted, 309 the ICC Regulations do not 
elaborate on how these reports are to be assessed or on whether resort to an expert should be 
compulsory in the first place. In that sense, any potential for the Daubert standard to be 
introduced into international criminal law should be seen as lying in the auspices of the ICC 
Statute and the way the various legal precepts come to become part of international criminal 
law. Along these lines, article 21 of the ICC Statute stipulates that  
The Court shall apply: 
a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
b) In the second phase, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict 
c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards. 
             Based on this provision and given that there is no guidance on the issue by the ICC 
Statute, the Elements of Crimes, or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that one cannot 
                                                          
308 Regulations of the Court adopted by the Judges of the Court on 26 May 2004, fifth plenary session, The 
Hague, 17-28 May 2004, ICC-BD/01-01-04  
309 Katrin Olof Einarsdottir, Comparing the Rules of Evidence Applicable before the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC, 
2010, 96 available at http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/4226/12225/1/1_fixed.pdf  
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point to the existence of a custom, it is only if deemed to be a general principle that the Daubert 
standard reliability precept can be seen as forming part of international criminal law. This 
generates the question of what conditions need to be in place in order for a general principle to 
be declared as a source of law on one hand in public international law in general and 
consequently in international criminal law.   
 
3.2 The General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law  
 
The introduction of the general principles of law as a source of international law dates 
back to at least the 19th century and relevant arbitral awards.310 However, it took a more 
conspicuous place in the international law discourse in the first half of the 20th century in the 
realm of the Permanent Court of Justice,311 and immediately triggered a number of questions. 
Article 38 of its Statute, repeated after World War II in the ICJ Statute,312 the successor of the 
Permanent Court of Justice, made a reference to ‘the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations.’ Such reference raised in turn the question of whether ‘uncivilized’ nations 
existed.313 Along these lines, scholars criticized the particular phraseology for embedding a 
pre-World War II standard in a post-World War II document.314  
                                                          
310 On this, see Fabian Raimondo, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2008) 10-15 
311 Bin Cheng, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURT AND TRIBUNALS, Cambridge 
University Press (1953) 2,21 
312 ICJ Statute, art.38; Bin Cheng, ibid at 21 
313 On this see Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to ‘General Principles’ of International Law, 11 
Michigan J. Int’l. L. 769,773-74 (1989-1990) (holding that all UN members today are considered to be 
civilized) 
314 But see also the approach of scholars who have opted to link this civilizing requirement with the question of 
whether or not a country partakes in the free market model and endorses market-oriented reforms. On this see 
Alan Audi, Iraq’s New Investment Laws and the Standard of Civilization: A Case Study on the Limits of 
International Law, 93 Geo. L. J. 335,338-39 (2004) 
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Moreover, scholars debated whether these general principles should be viewed as 
related to natural law, seen primarily as principles stemming from international law and, on an 
auxiliary basis, from the domestic legal systems or considered to have originated from national 
domestic law.315 As well, there were disagreements as to whether such principles should be 
deemed to be interpretational, non-binding tools used to interpret treaty and customary law, or  
binding316 and meant to fill lacunae in international law.317 In fact, in coming to include the 
general principles as a source of international law, the drafters of the Permanent Court of 
Justice’s Statute appeared to be aware of the incomplete character of treaty and customary law, 
at least at the time of the Statute’s drafting. Due to this, general principles seemed to be used 
to address situations of  a non liquet, restricting, in turn, the use of any self-devised rules by 
international judges.318 
The scholarly debate was sustained inter alia by the fact that international law 
instruments do not provide a relevant list of these principles.319 At the same time, the question 
whether a notion constitutes such a principle or not is tied to the principle’s nature, without 
though its public or private law character playing a difference as suggested by Lauterpacht.320 
                                                          
315 Bin Cheng, supra note 311 at 2-3, 9 (noting interesting that the word ‘nation’ in the provision seems to imply 
the concept of a nation as a group of people, not necessarily confined in state, national frontiers). See on this 
also Mosler’s view that the general principles are to be seen as domestic principles which nevertheless apply in 
international law under an ‘international law’ hat. (Herman Mosler, General Principles of Law, 2 Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law 513,519, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 
1999). Oscar Schachter summarizes very well the whole dispute by including in such general principles both 
‘principles of municipal law that are recognized by civilized nations’ as well as ‘principles that are derived from 
the unique character of the international community’. On this see Oscar Schachter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, Martinus Nijhoff (1991) 50-53. For a discussion of Schachter’s categorization see Neha 
Jain, Judicial Lawmaking and General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law, 57 Harvard Int’l. L. J. 
111,117-120 (2016) 
316 Bin Cheng, supra note 311 at 4-5 
317 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of ‘General Principles’ in the Development of International Law, 57 Am. J. 
int’l. L. 279,280 (1963) 
318 Nguyen Quoc Dihn, Patrick Daillier & Alain Pellet, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, Librairie Generale de droit 
et de jurisprudence (2nd ed.,1980) 312 
319 Marci Hoffman & Robert Berring Jr., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH IN A NUTSHELL, West Academic 
Publishing (2nd ed.,2017) 82 
320 Wolfgang Friedmann, supra note 317 at 281 
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Rather, what is important is whether the norm, as noted,321 ‘emerges from the universal practice 
of States in foro domestico’ and entails fundamental principles322 meant to be crystalized by 
customary and treaty law.323  
Such universal application of the principles should not mean that international law is 
indeed an ‘international’ body of norms that undertakes a homogenous, identical attitude 
towards various issues.324 For example, already from the 1970s, the impact of Latin American 
or Asian African law was noted.325 While nowadays the fall of socialism has minimized any 
influences of Marxist or socialist approaches to law, non-western influences continue to be 
present326 aside any influences traditionally cast by the English or the French legal orders as 
the main representatives of the common and continental law legal traditions.327  
Moreover, a principle must not apply in an identical way in order to be considered as 
‘general’. What suffices is that it demonstrates an ability to ensure the maximum agreement in 
the way national jurisdictions look at certain issues.328 In order to find whether such an 
                                                          
321 On this, see Portugal’s submission to the ICJ in the Right to Passage case cited by the Court in Case Concerning 
Right to Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Rep.1960, p.6,9 
322 Neha Jain, supra note 314 at 119; Mark Jenis, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, Aspen Law & 
Business (3rd ed.,1999) 55-56; Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 520 at 770 (referring to Bin Chen’s assertion that 
general principles are principles that are ‘cardinal’). See also Schlesinger referring to ‘a core of legal ideas 
which are common to all civilized systems’ at Rudolph Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law 
Recognized by Civilized Nations, 51 American J. Int’l. L. 734,739 (1957)   
323 Case Concerning Right to Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Rep.1960, 
p.123, 139-140,para.45 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fernandes)  (citing Verdross)  
324 Anthea Roberts et al., Comparative International Law: Framing the Field, 109 Am. J. Int’l. L. 467 (2015) 
325 On this see ICJ, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, Judgment, ICJ Rep.1970 at 3,290, 
para.5 (Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun)  
326 The existence of such different legal approaches may raise doubts as to whether these principles are endorsed 
by ‘a community of nations’ as required by certain international documents in order for these principles to be 
considered ‘general principles of international law’. On this see for example article 15.2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
327 Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193,n.1 (2002). The study 
of Glaeser and Shleifer conducted in 2002 found that among the civil procedure systems of 109 countries, 42 
countries followed the common law tradition and 40 the French civil law tradition. If the number of the countries 
that followed the German civil law tradition is also added, the final number of countries ultimately influenced 
either by the common law or the civil law model is even bigger. On this account see also the fact that international 
criminal courts and tribunals have referred to Romano-Germanic and the Common law family as the two main 
legal families in coming to relate to the general principles pertaining to ‘all nations’ or ‘the nations of the world’ 
(Fabian Raimondo, supra note 45 at 393,400) 
328 Wolfgang Friedmann, supra note 316 at 284  
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agreement exists, the interpreter of law engages into a comparative analysis and examines 
whether the underlined principle exists in national legal systems.329 When it does, it is 
presumed that the principle as a general principle of law can fill any gaps that exist in 
international law330 in areas where the law is insufficient, obscure, or imperfect.331 The question 
that arises though is whether the judge is entitled to resort to this general principles gap-filling 
mode in all cases or he has to give preponderance to the application of treaty and custom.332 
The idea that treaty and custom have to be preceded in any lacunae filling quest, has 
led to the view that resort to the general principles is sometimes a form of judicial activism to 
the extent that such principles are considered sources of international law only on a default 
basis when customary or treaty law does not apply.333 In that sense, although Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute does not establish a hierarchy between the different international law sources and 
general principles can apply simultaneously with custom and treaty, 334 it is assumed that the 
search for the relevant applicable norm will follow the order that the provision establishes. The 
interpreter of law will first examine whether a custom or treaty applies and will resort to the 
general principles only when it does not.335  Such an approach is true particularly when it comes 
to international criminal law336 as will be delineated in the next subsection.   
 
                                                          
329 For the fact that this was the way pursued by Portugal also in the Right to Passage case before the ICJ see Case 
Concerning Right to Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Rep.1960, p.123, 
136, para.34 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fernandes)   
330 Mark Jenis, supra note 321 at 55-56; Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 7 
331 Neha Jain, supra note 315 at 113 
332 Ibid at 114 
333 Maria Panezi, Sources of Law in Transition: Re-visiting General Principles of International Law, Ancilla Iuris 
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309 at 20 
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International Law 513,518, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1999) 
336 Jonatan Thormundsson, The sources of international criminal law with reference to the human rights principles 
of domestic criminal law, 39 Scandinavian Studies in Law, 387,388 (2000)  
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3.3 The General Principles of Law as a Source of International Criminal Law 
 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute bears similarities in its wording to article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute when it comes to the role general principles play. As a branch of public international 
law, it should not be surprising that also international criminal law draws its sources from 
customary law, treaties, and the general principles of law.337 The latter have been seen as 
‘sweeping and loose standards of conduct that can be deduced from treaty and customary rules 
by extracting and generalizing some of their most significant common points.’338  
Yet, this transplantation of the Article 38 hierarchy in the ICC Statute should not be 
seen as following the arrangement contained also in the Statutes of the Tribunals preceding the 
ICC. To the contrary, none of these Statutes contained any reference to the general principles 
as a source of international criminal law.339 The lack of any previous provision models as well 
as the fact that in some instances the Tribunals mentioned in their judgments the general 
principles in a rather in a confusing way340 may explain how, in the Rome Statute, the notion 
of ‘principles’ did not merit a clearer treatment. The nebulous landscape around the concept of 
general principles may be aggravated by the fact that the general principles of international 
criminal law are cited in Subsection (c) following reference to treaty and customary law341 
indicating that they are clearly seen as a subsidiary source of international criminal law.342 
                                                          
337 Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 393 
338 Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oxford University Press (2001) 151 
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principles of law consonant with the basic requirements of international justice.’) 
341 At the same time it has been noted that international criminal law does not follow the article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute treaty-custom-general principles hierarchy to the extent that the Statutes of international tribunals such 
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source of law. On this see Mia Swart, Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the 
Sources of International Law and ‘Adventurous Interpretation’, 70 ZaoRV 459, 463 (2010)  
342 Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 102 
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that their importance in the wider international criminal law 
framework should be deemed as minimal. On the contrary, even more than in other fields of 
international law, general principles are considered to be playing an important role in the 
development of international criminal rules.343  
This has been portrayed historically in the role that these principles have played in 
international criminal trials as far back as the post-World War II trials.344 In the Nuremberg 
trials of the Nazi criminals, this role was stressed inter alia also on account of the arguments 
that the defendants posed. Wanting to take advantage of the lack of any international criminal 
code predating the war, the defendants argued that they could not be tried for crimes against 
peace and humanity. They based their argument on the legality principle found in criminal law 
which stipulates that a person can only be held criminally responsible if his acts are criminally 
punishable by law at the time they take place.345 However, the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal refuted their argument and the judges stressed that the legality principle 
should not be seen as just a general principle of criminal law, but rather as a general principle 
of justice, embedded with a moral content.346 Under this lens and along the precepts of natural 
                                                          
343 Neha Jain, supra note 315 at 116 
344 For the fact that the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal should be seen as the first international 
criminal tribunal in modern history see Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 75 
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justice,347 the judges held that the legality principle was entrusted with not permitting the reign 
of injustice that would take place if the crimes of the defendants were left unpunished.348   
Moreover, aside from embedding the legality principle with a moral content through 
resort to the general principles of law, the judges also aimed to substantiate the prosecution of 
the defendants for crimes conducted throughout the war. This is because, according to the 
Tribunal, the law of war was not to be found only in treaty rules, rather, but rather also in 
custom and ‘from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military 
courts.’349 The general principles of law were equally cited by the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal in order to refute the defendants’ argument that they were just obeying orders 
when they committed the various crimes350 and in order for the Tribunal to establish that 
criminal responsibility should be viewed on an individual basis according to a ‘well-settled 
principle’ so that mass punishments could not be sanctioned.351  
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, instituted to try the crimes 
committed by the Japanese during World War II, largely followed the jurisprudential path set 
by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal.352 This related also to the relevant 
pronouncements regarding the role that general principles could play in the establishment of 
criminal responsibility.353 While the International Military Tribunal for the Far East did not 
examine cases entailing the argument that the defendants were just obeying orders, reference 
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to the general principles was made along the lines posed by the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal regarding the nullum crimen principle and the defendants’ arguments that 
their behaviour was not criminalized at the time their acts were committed.354 This use of 
general principles by international criminal courts and tribunals to emphasize certain precepts 
that are considered basic can also be found in the jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals. 
The relevant analysis can thus be epimerized according to each court or tribunal. 
More close chronologically to the ICC, international criminal courts and tribunals and 
most notably the ICTY, have equally awarded a major role to the general principles.355 At the 
same time, given that the ICTY  analysis takes place on generalized grounds rather than through 
explicit reference to particular legal systems, scholars have convincingly argued that 
international criminal tribunals largely failed to put forth a coherent methodology according to 
which they assess whether a principle constitutes a general principle of law.356 
For example, in Tadic, the ICTY had to resort to the general principles in order to decide 
whether or not it could sustain the defence argument that there was a violation of a relevant 
general principle since the Tribunal had not been established by law. According to the defence, 
international human rights documents rendered clear that the right to a fair trial should entail 
trial by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law and that the ICTY 
did not meet this requirement because it had been established by a UN Security Council 
Resolution.357 The Appeals Chamber held that this requirement constituted a general principle 
of law, even though it had a different meaning in domestic jurisdictions than in international 
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law which does not have the classical partition of power in executive, legislative, and judiciary 
branches.358 Along these lines, the general principle was interpreted not as precluding the 
establishment of a tribunal by the UN Security Council, but rather as demanding that 
international trials follow international human rights’ law fairness standards.359  
This need for international criminal courts and tribunals to examine whether a particular 
norm can also be transplanted into international law can be seen in a number of other cases 
decided by the ICTY. For example, in Delalic,360 Esad Landszo, one of the defendants, claimed 
before the ICTY Appeals Chamber that his diminished responsibility at the time he committed 
the crimes for which he was sentenced should be a ground for his acquittal.361 In order to 
substantiate his claims, the defendant claimed that the role of diminished responsibility leading 
to his acquittal was established as a general principle in a number of domestic criminal 
jurisdictions.362  
In coming to refute Landzo’s argument, the Appeals Chamber conducted an 
examination of various common law and continental law criminal systems and concluded that 
diminished responsibility as a general principle referred to the mitigation of a sentence rather 
than to the question of a defendant’s acquittal.363 Additionally, in Kordic, in having to decide 
whether self-defence could constitute grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, the ICTY 
judges examined the concept of ‘defences’ as put forth in the national criminal codes and found 
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judicial bodies ‘established by law,’ which served as a basis for the Appeal Chamber’s fair trial discussion 
encompasses the obligation both for a court to be established according to a procedure prescribed by law as well 
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TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Philippe Sands, Cambridge University Press, 
2003, 129-133). For a similar view to that expressed by Crawford see also Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 
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360 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 20 February 2001 
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the concept to ‘form part of the general principles of criminal law that the International Tribunal 
must take into account in deciding the cases before it.’364 
At the same time, in the ICTY jurisprudence, general principles of law have also been 
the foundation upon which international norms have come to rest even though international 
judges do not always specify on which national jurisdictions they rely in order to reach such a 
pronouncement. For example, in Tadic, Judge Sidhwa held that, according to most national 
jurisdictions, ‘no appeal lies unless conferred by statute’.365 Whereas through such reference 
the Judge could make a strong case about the need for appeals to be based on Statutes rather 
than mere judicial decisions,366 the fact that he did not refer to specific legal systems367 arguably 
weakened his point. 
Similarly, in Erdemovic,368 the Trial Chamber dismissed duress as grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility369 based on ‘the general principles of law as expressed in 
numerous national laws and case law.’ Yet, apart from a reference to the French legal order,370 
the Trial Chamber did not specify to which national jurisdictions it was referring.371 In the same 
case, the judges referred to domestic law in order to conclude that there existed ‘a general 
principle of law common to all nations’ according to which crimes against humanity were 
subject to the most severe sentences.372 Yet, they did not specify which national legal systems 
                                                          
364 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Koridc et al., IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para.449 
365 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-941-AR72, 2 October 1995, para.6 
366 Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 91, n.365 
367 Ibid  
368 ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, 29 November 
1996,para.19 
369 Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 100 
370 For a criticism of the ICTY’s reliance to the French jurisdiction as a sole reference see Andre Nollkaemper, 
Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An analysis of the Practice of the ICTY in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE ICTY, Gideon Boas & William 
Schabas eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2003) 394 
371 Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 96 
372 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Trial Chamber, IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment,29 November 1996, 
para.31. For criticism of the implications the Trial Chamber drew from such a conclusion see Fabian Raimondo, 
supra note 310 at 98 
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they relied on to reach such a pronouncement.373 In Delalic, the Trial Chamber held that ‘it is 
apparent that it is a general principle of law that the establishment of criminal culpability 
requires an analysis of two aspects.’ Yet, it did not refer  to any national jurisdictions to buttress 
the deriving of such a general principle apart from that of the USA.374  
In other instances, the ICTY has resorted to the general principles of law to further 
buttress notions contained in its Statute. Thus for example, in Blaskic, the Trial Chamber 
mentioned the general principles of criminal law regarding the criminal responsibility of 
individuals participating in the commission of crimes, although such responsibility is already 
established under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.375 Similarly, in the same case, the ICTY 
referred to the proportionality principle as a ‘general principle of criminal law’, together with 
Article 24(2) of the ICTY Statute which came to explicitly introduce the principle in the 
tribunal’s proceedings.376 In Kunarac, the Trial Chamber stressed the fact that it had applied 
the presumption of innocence to the accused, not only according to Article 21(3) of the ICTY 
Statute, but also as a general principle of law.377 In this particular case, the Trial Chamber held 
that the prosecution had the onus to prove the defendant’s guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and 
such an obligation stemmed not only from the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, but also from the 
fact that the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ evidentiary requirement constituted a  general principle 
of law.378  
                                                          
373 For criticism of this judicial stance see Antonio Cassese, The Contribution of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the Ascertainment of General Principles of Law recognized by the 
Community of Nations in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD, Sienho Yee & Tieya Wang eds., 
Routledge (2001) 48; Fabian Raimondo, supra note 310 at 98 
374 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para.424; 
Fabian Raimondo, supra note 517 at 110  
375 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para.264 
376 Ibid, para.796 
377 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 22 February 
2001, para.559 
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At the same time, there have been cases where the ICTY has resorted to the general 
principles of law also in order to decipher whether a certain act or initiative is sanctioned or 
frowned upon by international criminal law. For example, in Furundzija, the judges delved into 
the national legal systems in order to examine whether there was a general principle of law that 
could hold that rape included the oral penetration of the penis in the victim’s mouth. Failing to 
find that such act was defined as ‘rape’ in national jurisdictions, the judges held that such 
conduct still fulfilled the requirements of the international crime of ‘rape’ due to the fact that 
it harmed the victim’s dignity that should be protected during warfare both by the laws of war 
and human rights law.379 In the Tadic case, Judge Nieto-Navia relied on the comparative 
analysis of different domestic jurisdictions–continental law countries did not view the 
defendant’s retrial after acquittal as a violation of the principle of non bis in idem whereas 
common law countries did–in order to conclude that he could not find a general principle 
preventing the prosecution from appealing the defendant’s acquittal.380  
Whereas the general principles of law have been referred to also by other international 
criminal courts and tribunals like the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the ICTR,381 in most 
cases,382 these courts and tribunals have cited the general principles, examining issues already 
dealt in the ICTY jurisprudence, such as whether the Trial Chamber can decide on a legal issue 
based on the testimony of one witness, or the establishment of concepts such as those of 
individual responsibility or of the presumption of innocence.383 In that sense, for the scholar 
                                                          
379 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10 December 1998, 
para.183;Fabian Raimondo, supra note 517 at 112-115. On this see also the criticism of Bantekas on the fact that 
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who wants to trace the development of the concept of general principles through the 
jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals, the ICTR or the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone , with a few notable exceptions,384 do not offer many insights. 385  
This historical background of how general principles have been treated so far in 
international criminal law makes the juxtaposition between Articles 21 and 38 justified and 
expected. General principles of law can be also a source of international criminal law if their 
precepts can be found in a number of different, representative jurisdictions across the globe. 
On this account, as is the case with its counterpart in Article 38, Article 21 c) does not only call 
for a numerical but also for a qualitative universalism to the extent that these principles must 
be universal because they introduce basic precepts common to humanity’s legal conscience 




According to the ICC Statute, the general principles of law is one way for a norm to 
become a source of international criminal law. In absence of any relevant treaty or custom, the 
assertion that the Daubert standard can constitute such general principle is the most feasible 
way to argue for its potential to be introduced as a norm in international criminal law. This 
preconditioned a discussion on the role general principles play in public international law in 
general and in international criminal law in particular, something which the current chapter 
aspired to do. It was demonstrated how such general principles can be used in order to fill 
                                                          
384 For an example of a case where recourse to the general principles of law offers such insights and raises 
questions see the SCSL Trial Chamber Norman case and Raimondo’s relevant analysis in Fabian Raimondo, 
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91 
 
lacunae in law on a de lege ferenda basis. To the extent that international criminal law does 
not currently contain any arrangements on when expert opinions are to be sought or how they 
are to be assessed, it can be argued that resort to the general principles’ norm-begetting function 
can be a suitable vehicle for addressing the issue. On this account, what needs to be asked and 
explored is whether the Dauber standard and its requirement that judicial holdings on expert 
issues must be based on reliable scientific opinions can be seen as a general principle of law, 
rampant in most common law and continental law jurisdictions in order to be consequently 
considered also as a general principle of international criminal law. This task of mapping the 
Daubert standard reliability precept in the legal orders around the globe will be undertaken in 
chapters 5 and 6. In the meantime, the next chapter will discuss the inception and the evolution 














Chapter 4: The Daubert Standard in the U.S. Legal Order  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
           Daubert is a standard that emerged in the U.S. legal order. Its essence cannot be seen as 
detached from the wider precepts governing the law of evidence in U.S. law. As well, it is an 
example of a common law jurisdiction applying the adversarial system in criminal 
proceedings.386 Whether a country follows the adversarial or inquisitorial system or not is 
affected by its deep historical roots in the way justice came to be distributed in Europe 
throughout the centuries. In continental Europe, most notably in countries such as France, 
Spain, or Germany, judges were central figures who continued to have major absolute roles in 
the distribution of justice and were considered to be similar to kings or emperors. This was not 
the case for juries. In England, however, the introduction of common law as the amalgam of 
various customs and laws pronounced as legally binding by judges came to answer the question 
of ‘what is law’ mostly through stressing the role of the people rather than that of the king or 
emperor. On this account, the role of the jury became important and the judge was seen as 
someone meant to decide on the parties’ claims. Yet, it was the parties themselves who, based 
on the orality principle, had to present their claims before the judge and the jury and convince 
them that they were true. Thus, it has been argued, that the adversarial system should be defined 
as ‘a system of adjudication in which procedural action is controlled by the parties and the 
adjudicator remains essentially passive.’387 
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16, 2005, para.146 available at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/96/9610.htm 




         The question of whether a country follows the inquisitorial or the adversarial system in 
its criminal procedure directly impacts how expert evidence is introduced and assessed. In 
inquisitorial law countries, this task is entrusted to the judge who calls on the experts to testify 
out of a list already available to the court,388 whereas in adversarial systems it is the parties that 
call in their own experts. In the latter case, the judge does not have a way to verify in advance 
that the parties will indeed resort to reliable experts and will not just opt to furnish an opinion 
or report written someone of questionable academic or scientific stance because it aligns with 
the parties’ arguments. In instances where expert bias is highly possible, unless the judge 
develops criteria to review the expert’s opinion on his or her own, there is the risk of adopting 
unequivocally the expert’s conclusions,389 turning the latter in a co-decider,390 thus 
undermining the rule of law and judicial independence. Not surprisingly, adversarial bias was 
cited as one of the reasons Daubert was pronounced.391 It is inside this general legal contour 
that the Frye-Daubert debate should be placed, mirroring the efforts of the U.S. courts to put 
criteria in order to guide the judge regarding the admissibility of expert evidence.392 
4.2 The Daubert Standard: Essence and Origins    
 
In order to trace the origins of the Daubert standard precepts, it could be argued that 
one would need to go back to the 14th century and the introduction of juries in trials before the 
U.S. courts. Juries were often ‘persons specially qualified to pass judgment in a particular 
                                                          
388 Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 227,247 (2000); 
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case’,393 but since this was not always the case, judges were often entitled to summon expert 
witnesses. Contrary to the rest of the witnesses, expert witnesses were expected to pronounce 
their stance on issues that the court or the jury were to decide upon.394 In this case, it was the 
judges who decided whether these experts’ testimonies should be passed to the jury. 
           This ‘gatekeeping’ role of the judges changed in the 17th century. By then, courts started 
permitting the parties to bring their own experts in as witnesses and the expert information was 
put directly to the consideration of the jury with no filtering intervention by the judges.395 The 
fact that the parties could bring in expert evidence led to a proliferation of the relevant material 
and started raising questions about its scientific reliability. The crucial criterion of whether the 
court would admit as evidence such testimony was whether the expert witnesses were qualified 
as experts in their fields with no reference to the scientific credibility of their reports.396 What 
mattered was whether the expert witnesses could make a living in their professions and fields 
of expertise.397 Due to the fact that each time courts decided on a case-to case basis whether an 
expert’s testimony would be admitted as evidence rather than employing a general 
admissibility test,398 the assessment mode of expert evidence caused inconsistency and 
unpredictability.399 
Already in 1901, as noted by Judge Learned Hand, the debate was not about whether 
or not expert knowledge should be used, and instead, was about how courts could best use it as 
                                                          
393 Lloyd Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 L. & Cont. Problems (1935) 403,407 
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an aid in the settling of disputes.400 Yet, the U.S. jurisprudence did not provide an answer on 
this. By placing the emphasis on the reliability of the experts themselves and their 
qualifications, there was no room for any discussion of the reliability of the provided opinions.  
          This vacuum in the treatment and assessment of expert evidence was addressed in 1923 
when the D.C. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals framed the Frye standard. In the Frye case, 
from where the name of the standard is derived, the Court had to decide whether results of a 
systolic blood pressure deception test–which is, in fact, the precursor of the polygraph test–
should be proclaimed as admissible evidence.401 Frye, appealing a second-degree murder 
conviction, argued that his expert should have been permitted to testify on the results of a lie 
detector test that showed that Frye was innocent.402 Echoing the stance of the courts till that 
point, Frye argued that if the question before the court did not lie in the sphere of common 
knowledge, the opinions of witnesses skilled in a related science, art, or trade should be 
rendered admissible. The Court disagreed. The judges deemed that it was not enough for the 
expert witnesses to be qualified in their fields; their conclusions needed to be based on the 
general principles of science.403 In that sense, coming to address the experts’ opinion’s 
reliability, Frye introduced what came to be known as the ‘general acceptance rule.’404  
In the decades that followed, Frye was treated with mixed feelings among scholars and 
judges. On one hand, those that viewed Frye positively pointed out to the fact that it provided 
uniformity and certainty among judges on how to evaluate evidence beyond their expertise and 
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constituted a firm jurisprudential line with consistency in decision-making.405 In truth, the Frye 
standard was more convenient for judges because it held that the latter’s task was not the 
understanding of the scientific debates, but the mere surveillance of the scientific world.406 
Additionally, Frye’s requirement that the provided opinion should be shared by the majority 
of the scientific community meant that a large number of scientists could be called to testify 
before courts without fears that their testimonies would be ultimately challenged as 
unreliable.407 On the other hand, Frye’s critics referred to the fact that the standard allowed 
judges to relinquish the judicial responsibility of pronouncing over the issues in a trial to the 
experts, including those that pertained to expert knowledge.408 Ultimately, returning to Hand’s 
view stated above, a judge should be aided by experts, but not substituted for by them. 
Scientific knowledge was portrayed as a very wide and deep sea in which the judge should 
learn how to swim.409 Yet, it was doubtful whether Frye gave judges the tools and the ability 
to engage in such an endeavour.  
            Frye showed that there was a need for the provided scientific evidence to enjoy ‘general 
acceptance’, but did not equally define what constituted such an acceptance or the width and 
scope of the scientific field and knowledge upon which such ‘general acceptance’ would 
apply.410 Without being able to further check the scientific validity themselves,411 courts could 
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be easily persuaded by experts that the latter’s conclusions were also generally accepted in their 
scientific fields. Given that experts were called by the parties to bolster certain narratives, it is 
questionable whether such scientific validity was necessarily always seen.412 Along these lines, 
and in relation to the reliability question, scholars emphasized the need for some kind of judicial 
screening to be established.413 
The scholarly criticism of Frye ultimately took a toll on the doctrine.414 Buttressed by the fact 
that, in some instances after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 70s, the U.S. 
courts had voiced the stance that Frye should be set aside,415 the U.S. Supreme Court signalled 
in 1993, the turning point was the judgment in the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
case.416 In this case, the judgment must be seen as part of a wider chain of relevant cases against 
the anti-nausea drug Bendectin and its alleged harmful effects to public health.417 As well in 
the realm of this case, in some instances, the U.S. courts had vindicated plaintiffs by admitting 
as evidence that expert testimony was based on scientific reasoning supported by published 
literature even if such reasoning did not constitute the prevailing view among scientists.418 
           In the Daubert case,419 Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, the plaintiffs, were born with 
serious birth defects and sued Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals arguing that Bendectin had caused 
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their congenital limb reduction defects.420 Both sides submitted affidavits to substantiate their 
respective claims regarding the question of whether Bendectin was indeed the cause of these 
defects.421 The district court held that the plaintiffs relied on studies that were insufficient in 
proving their claims since the scientific evidence that these studies embalmed ran contrary to 
an ‘overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence.’422 The Ninth Circuit did 
not focus on the factual insufficiency of the provided scientific evidence as the district court 
had done, but to their admissibility.423 The court cited the ‘general acceptance’ of the Frye 
standard in order to ultimately conclude that the plaintiffs’ presented scientific evidence on the 
connection between Bendectin and the defects sustained that could not be admitted as 
evidence.424 
The U.S. Supreme Court held otherwise. Its rationale against the upholding of Frye was 
based on the fact that the Frye standard originated from jurisprudence. In that sense, it could 
not override the stipulations on expert evidence contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
which were enacted in 1975.425 At the time Daubert was pronounced, Rule 702 read 
‘Testimony of Experts: If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise.’  
In that sense, albeit not explicitly, the question of the opinion’s reliability became 
interweaved with that of the opinion’s utility. As correctly noted   
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“to determine whether the expert’s testimony about scientific knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact….Daubert requires the judge to ask two questions: ‘whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid’ and ‘whether that reason or methodology 
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”426 
Along these lines, the court held that under Rule 702 the trial judge should ensure that 
all of the admitted evidence was not only relevant but also reliable. The court interpreted that 
the provision’s reference to ‘scientific knowledge’ includes knowledge that does not refer to 
‘subjective belief’ or ‘unsupported speculation’, but rather is based on scientific methods and 
is, thus, considered to be reliable.427 This connection between reliability and admissibility, as 
envisioned in Rule 702, prompted the court to put aside the Frye standard in favour of a new 
one, the ‘Daubert standard’, after the name of the case. According to the Daubert standard, 
expert opinions were to be deemed admissible if they were penned by a competent expert; 
incorporated scientific knowledge; were relevant to the facts of the case; were indeed needed 
to elucidate these facts and; were based on a scientifically-reliable method. 
          However, the court did not proceed to define what constitutes such a ‘scientifically 
reliable method’ and did not provide ‘a definite checklist or test.’428 Nevertheless, echoing 
previous federal courts’ jurisprudence,429 the U.S. Supreme Court articulated some parameters 
the judges could take into account in coming to evaluate the scientific reliability of a certain 
approach including the following: a) the question of ‘falsification,’ meaning whether a theory 
can be tested; b) ‘the known or potential rate of error’ of the particular scientific technique or 
theory; c) whether such theory or technique has been the subject of ‘peer review and 
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publication’ and; d) whether it has been generally endorsed by the wider scientific 
community.430 
           The last criterion renders clear that, even under Daubert, the question of whether the 
particular expert opinion met the approval of the majority of the experts’ peers continued to 
play a role. Yet, contrary to Frye, under Daubert, the ‘general acceptance’ of a scientific view 
did not constitute a prerequisite for the scientific opinion’s admissibility in court as a piece of 
evidence.431 The court rendered clear that the new standard it endorsed did not coincide with 
the quest for the scientific truth. As well, the court accepted that ‘scientific conclusions are 
subject to perpetual revision,’ yet ‘law on the other hand must resolve disputes finally and 
quickly.’432 In that sense, some scholars argued that, in Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not introduce a stricter admissibility test compared to Frye, but just raised the judges’ 
awareness to the problem of unreliable scientific evidence.433 
          Yet, it would also be wrong to disregard the qualitative difference Daubert brought to 
the judicial approach regarding expert evidence. Under Frye, expert witnesses were required 
to relate to the scientific opinions prevailing among the scientific community only once they 
based their reports on novel scientific findings. In other cases, however, where the experts’ 
reports were based on established  scientific literature, courts were likely to accept these reports 
as admissible evidence without further scrutinizing their reliability.434 
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         Moreover, whereas under Frye, emphasis was put on the judge’s conclusions which 
should coincide with those shared by the majority of the scientific world, Daubert did not so 
much stress any particular conclusion and, instead, stressed the methodology and the necessary 
principles undertaken to reach the conclusion.435 In this structure, the question of the reliability 
of the approach undertaken became central. The judge was appointed as a ‘gatekeeper’ of 
scientific evidence and was ultimately responsible for deciding which evidence was perceived 
to be scientifically reliable.436 In other words, the judge, not the scientific community, would 
decide which expert opinion should be deemed as resting on solid epistemological grounds and 
should, thereby, be declared admissible as evidence.437  
        In that sense, the difference between Frye and Daubert lies on the question who assesses 
the scientific reliability of any provided opinions. Whereas for Frye it is the general scientific 
community which comes to impose its in abstracto, already formulated general views on the 
question of the furnished opinions’ credibility, for Daubert it is the judge who undertakes this 
task in concreto, assessing the scientific validity of the provided opinions without being bound 
by prior predicaments.  As a result, and contrary to the possibility for judges under Frye to rely 
on generally accepted scientific precepts without requiring an ad hoc expert evaluation, the 
assessment process that Daubert entails cannot but lead to the need for expert evidence to be 
provided ad hoc for the particular facts in question in order for such evidence to be assessed. 
Conceptualizing the difference to the scenarios the thesis examines, whereas under Frye in 
order to substantiate mental harm, international criminal courts and tribunals can generally 
relate to established psychiatric opinions and reports stating in abstracto the fear and terror an 
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individual experience as a result of his exposure to warfare, Daubert necessitates judges to 
assess such harm on their own. To the extent that such an assessment cannot be based on 
generally accepted psychological precepts but must mirror the ad hoc psychological condition 
of the civilian or the civilians testifying before the judge, the assessment measure of the harm 
inflicted to them must be provided through psychological or psychiatric opinions and reports 
relating specifically to them. Along these lines, under Daubert, the judge is led to call for the 
aid of mental health experts in order for them to provide him with the scientific measure he 
needs in order to assess the incurred mental harm.    
         In the years that followed its pronouncement in the Daubert case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
proceeded to expand application of the standard to also include technical issues of expertise. 
In the case of General Electric Co. v. Joiner,438 the plaintiff, an electrician by profession, sued 
General Electric Co. for the fact that he developed lung cancer as a result of the material he 
used during his work. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court judge may exclude 
expert testimony when there are gaps between the evidence relied on by an expert and his or 
her conclusion. In that sense, the court underlined that, in the core of the Daubert standard, 
there lies the presumption that conclusions and methodology should be seen as utterly 
interconnected with each other.439 Expert conclusions cannot be valid unless they rest also on 
a reliable methodology. While implicit in Daubert, the explicit broadening of the standard’s 
applicability to all expert testimonies beyond the scientific world took place through the court’s 
judgment in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.440 Patrick Carmichael was involved in a fatal road 
accident and sued the tire manufacturing company on the grounds that it had produced a 
defective product. In assessing the testimonies of engineers as expert witnesses, the U.S. 
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Supreme Court also applied the Daubert standard to testimonies by non-scientists.441 Justice 
Breyer came to note that efforts to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific evidence 
were ‘unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases.’442 
          The gradual development of the Daubert standard in the U.S. jurisprudence through the 
aforementioned three Supreme Court cases made scholars see them as interrelated stages of a 
wider process. Hence, occasionally, reference would not be to the Daubert standard anymore, 
but rather to the ‘Daubert trilogy.443 Moreover, while the standard was pronounced in the realm 
of a massive tort law case, the principles it came to put forth for the admissibility of expert 
evidence came to apply also in criminal trials. On these grounds, discussion on the standard is 
relevant also for this thesis.   
4.3 Criticism of the Daubert Standard 
 
             Daubert introduced a revolution444 and the radical approach endorsed by it was 
immediately grasped by U.S. judges and scholars, some of whom having serious concerns 
about it. For example, right after the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, Judge Kozinski, one of 
the district judges to whom the case returned for further review and decision, accused his 
Supreme Court peers of creating a perplexing landscape in the admittance of expert evidence 
and obliging judges to choose one scientific opinion over another on issues that did not fall 
within their expertise.445 Moreover, the adoption of the Daubert standard led to fears that 
abandonment of the ‘general acceptance’ test, which provided certainty that the scientific views 
adopted by the judges and the juries did not lack scientific credibility, would augment the risk 
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for the judges and juries to be carried away by non-credible scientific claims and for ‘junk 
science’ or ‘pseudoscience’ to find its way into court.446 
              Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that ‘forensic evidence is 
not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.’447 Some scholars have pointed out that, 
while this is true under Daubert, this does not mean that ‘junk science’ was absent from 
courtrooms under Frye,448 while others have emphasized how, in essence, Daubert offers more 
guarantees for keeping ‘junk science’ outside courtrooms. because judges and juries have to 
weigh the presented scientific evidence each time and cannot rely on its general, authoritative 
character.449 Indeed, empirical data demonstrates that Daubert has not led to an increased 
intrusion of ‘junk science’ in judicial decisions as feared, and neither has it loosened the 
threshold for expert evidence admission.450 In fact, when it comes to ‘junk science’, it seems 
that Daubert reduced, albeit not drastically, chances of its admission by courts as evidence.451 
            At the same time, while the introduction of ‘junk science’ has not increased, some 
scholars have argued that, when it comes to the criminal law procedure, Daubert failed, mostly 
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due to the judges’ inabilities to properly assess forensic evidence.452 In its Report dated back 
in 2009, a Forensic Science Committee created by the National Academy of Sciences reached 
the conclusion that ‘the federal appellate courts have not with any consistency or clarity 
imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically valid reasoning and reliable 
methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert questions.’453 In that sense, the introduction 
of Daubert did not avert scenarios where, when it came to forensic sciences, judges ultimately 
accepted expert opinions that did not meet the criteria of scientific validity.454 However, it has 
been argued that the situation has changed after the publication of the 2009 Report and in many 
instances it is no longer the case.455 
          Possibly due to the judges’ lack of scientific expertise,456 U.S. courts have interpreted 
the Daubert scientific validation criterion to relate to a theory’s testability, rather than to its 
actual testing.457 Thus, these courts accepted that evidence based on polygraph examination or 
fingerprint identification was admissible since generally, both of these can be tested.458 Yet, it 
is noteworthy that even if a theory can be tested, this does not mean that it is also scientifically 
reliable.459 Moreover, courts have often been prone to substitute required scientific testing with 
‘adversarial’ testing in which the testing credentials of a theory do not come from the world of 
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science, but rather from the fact that it has been tested in the adversarial system for over a 
century.460 
          This elusiveness of the testing ground may become more acute due to the fact that the 
standard remains ambiguous, or ‘flexible’ as termed by the Committee,461 and does not provide 
a firm method for the assessment of expert evidence.462 As noted,463 Daubert provides a 
framework, but not a blueprint, that guides judges in their evaluation of expert evidence. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court indicated which elements judges have to take into account 
in coming to assess an expert opinion’s reliability, it did not provide further details on how 
these elements themselves were to be assessed. For example, while the Court spoke of ‘peer 
review publications’, it did not provide any indications of the number of such reviews needed 
nor of their quality.464 Similarly, the Court did not give any examples to explain how it 
perceived the ‘falsification’ of a scientific theory.465 The same is true also regarding the 
question of how judges can trace the error rates of scientific findings.466 
         Expert bias also casts doubt on the feasibility of the Daubert standard as a suitable tool 
for the admissibility of expert evidence. Modern society has come to rely extensively on 
experts.467 The moment courts have declared that expertise that fell short of the accepted dogma 
in a particular field of science is ‘reliable’, Daubert critics have raised the fear that litigants 
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manipulate the system deluging courts with expert opinions and that defence and prosecution 
lawyers in criminal trials use experts to promote their own partisan arguments under a mantle 
of scientific expertise.468 In that sense, the expert witness ceases to be an independent factor in 
trial meant to help the court in its judgment and is, instead, transformed into a pawn of the 
parties in order to serve their parochial interests. When judges and juries do not have opinions 
of their own on a particular matter of expertise beforehand, they are seen as caught in the middle 
of what has been termed as ‘a battle of experts’ which ‘degenerates into a simple beauty 
contest’,469 due to the fact that they cannot choose between the conflicting expert evidence that 
they have heard. These fears of compromise in the experts’ impartiality and the negative 
repercussions this can have on judges’ abilities to utter their stance on an issue is further 
mirrored in a relevant survey that took place among judges in the United States. This survey 
found that one of the most frequent problems that judges encountered with expert witnesses 
was their tendency to abandon objectivity and become advocates for one of the two sides in a 
trial.470 Quite interestingly, in an attempt to address this bias, scholars have called on judges 
themselves to take the initiative and invite expert witnesses to testify in the hope that this will 
lead to testimonies by ‘neutral witnesses’.471 
        At the same time, it is important to note that such grasp of expert bias is not necessarily 
perceived by judges outside the U.S. For example, Ian Freckelton and his peers conducted 
surveys on behalf of the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration which brought up, inter 
alia, the issue of the possible problems expert testimonies raised for judges. In a 2001 survey 
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that was conducted on a sample of 203 magistrates, 29.6% rated expert bias as the most serious 
problem expert evidence raised.472 In comparison, in a 2016 survey that was conducted on a 
sample of thirty-six Australian judges of which 72.1% were primarily involved in criminal 
cases, expert bias was only seen as a problem in four out of the fifty-five cases that were 
included in the study.473 Nevertheless, some judges expressed their surprise regarding this lack 
of expert bias, suggesting as noted, that expert bias is still a consideration which exists among 
judges,474 albeit maybe in a more subconscious manner. 
          The voices of criticism towards Daubert have not prevented judges and scholars from 
viewing the standard as a form of progress in the assessment of expert evidence.475 Even 
scholars who have pointed out the standard’s shortcomings and difficulties with its 
implementation in criminal law procedure have not called for abandoning the standard 
altogether. Rather, they propose ways for its improvement and for better implementation by 
the courts.476 In a national survey conducted among 400 U.S. state trial court judges, more than 
50% concluded that the Daubert standard had either ‘a great deal of value’ or ‘some value’ 
compared to only 6% who stated that the standard had no value at all.477 
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4.4 Acceptance of the Daubert Standard in U.S. State and Federal Practice and 
Jurisprudence 
 
The objections against the Daubert standard were not enough to hinder its further 
entrenchment in U.S. federal and state law and jurisprudence. Ultimately, the Daubert standard 
was incorporated in the U.S. federal rules of criminal procedure. Under the caption ‘Testimony 
by Expert Witnesses’, Rule 702 stipulates, in its current form, that a court will consider an 
expert opinion as admissible if   
a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.478 
           Currently, the Daubert standard is endorsed by most U.S. states.479 Along these lines, it 
can be argued that the tendency is for U.S. states to move from Frye to Daubert,480 albeit not 
without debates and occasionally also some stepping back. For example, in 2014, Florida 
conducted a number of deliberations on whether or not to endorse the Daubert standard over 
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the Frye one. Ultimately, the Florida legislature decided to adopt the Daubert standard,481 but 
in 2017, the Florida Supreme Court declined to approve it.482 Drawing on the fact that 
according to Florida’s constitution, it is the Court and not the legislature which must decide on 
new rules of court procedure unless these rules are substantive, the Court cited ‘grave 
constitutional concerns’ and left open the question of whether adoption of the Daubert standard 
should be seen as a procedural or substantive issue.483 
The augmenting preference of U.S. state courts for Daubert over Frye must be attributed 
to the dynamic the Daubert standard exhibits when it comes to the assessment of expert 
evidence. As correctly noted,484 Daubert does not circumvent the problems associated with 
how such an assessment is to take place, but rather takes the relevant burden from the jury’s 
shoulders and places it on those of the judge. Still, the underlining of the reliability parameter, 
not necessarily as something mirroring a general scientific consensus but as portraying the 
epistemological validity even of an individual opinion, renders a new dynamic and flexibility 




The current chapter discussed the origins and essence of the Daubert standard. Placing 
these origins in the wider adversarial system that governs criminal proceedings in the U.S., the 
chapter delineated how Daubert came to address the need for judges to not just rely on expert 
                                                          
481 Stephen Smith, Fourth District Court of Appeal Confirms Florida’s Adoption of the Daubert standard for 
Expert Witness Testimony in Florida State Court Applies Retroactively, August 1, 2016 available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/4th-dca-confirms-floridas-adoption-of-t-52057/  
482 Supreme Court of Florida, In Re: Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, No.SC16-181, February 
16,2017 
483 Ibid at 8 




evidence furnished by a competent person and required that they also embed reliable scientific 
conclusions. On this account, Daubert aspired to address the problem of ‘junk science’ in U.S. 
jurisprudence and the possibility that parties would resort to experts who would just pen a 
favourable scientific report which would serve the commissioning party’s interest. Despite 
some criticism addressed to it, largely due to the inability of the judges to review the validity 
of scientific conclusions, Daubert is by now the expert evidence assessment standard in most 
U.S. states. The question is, however, whether Daubert can be seen as applying beyond the 
confines of U.S. jurisdiction so that it can be deemed to hold a comparative value as a general 
principle of law. This is a question that the next two chapters will try to address. Chapter 5 will 
examine the application of the Daubert standard in other common law jurisdictions, whereas 














Chapter 5: The Daubert Standard in the Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
5.1 Introduction  
            
 The fact that the U.S. legal order comes under the wider caption of common law, similar 
to that in a number of other jurisdictions, makes the assumption plausible that the latter’s courts 
would most likely relate to expert evidence in a Daubert-like way too. Yet, an automatic 
transposition of Daubert in other common law traditions is far from evident.485 Despite the 
common law heritage they share, each state and jurisdiction is unique and holds its own specific 
features, to the extent that it would be utopic to argue that other states would automatically 
adopt in toto the U.S. procedural arrangement. This becomes more acute due to the fact that 
the U.S. does not belong to the British Commonwealth, whereas most other states that belong 
to the common law family do. In that sense, it is law precepts as developed by courts in England 
that serve as the natural guidance for judges in these common law countries. Thus, the Daubert 
standard, which is not a standard elaborated in the English jurisprudence, would not be seen 
automatically as susceptible to transposition.486 Along these lines, the critical question becomes 
not whether other foreign jurisdictions adopt the Daubert standard in globo, but rather whether 
or not they abide by its precept that judges must ensure that matters of expertise are discussed 
using opinions and reports which themselves are based on scientifically reliable grounds.  
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In order to address this question, the current chapter will focus on a number of common 
law jurisdictions. The discussion will start with the arrangements in England and Wales, given 
that the English law is the cradle of common law and will continue to see how English law has 
influenced other major Commonwealth countries around the globe. The examples of  Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, South Africa and Cyprus will be discussed. Turning 
the focus  to a possible English influence on non- Commonwealth countries which were once 
part of the British Empire, the thesis will discuss Ireland and Israel.487 On this account, it is 
particularly in these countries that the question of whether or not the Daubert standard 
reliability parameter should apply in criminal proceedings must be seen-if true-as a conscious 
option rather as an automatic endorsement of any established, common law approach.  
 
5.2 England and Wales 
 
English courts are the ones that formed the traditional common law stance according to 
which admission of expert evidence was to be based on the following criteria:488 
1. The witness should be an expert in his field. 
2. The subject of the expertise should relate to a judicially recognized body of knowledge or 
experience that fell beyond the reach of the ordinary juror. 
3. There should be a need for such an opinion to be provided. 
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4. The expert witness was not permitted to utter his personal opinion about the facts of the 
case. 
5. The opinion should be based on proven facts. 
In the Ikarian Reefer case, Cresswell J further elaborated on the above parameters by 
referring to the ‘independent assistance’ that the expert must provide to the court, namely that 
such an expert should mention the facts and assumptions upon which the conclusions are based; 
that the provided opinion must be well-researched and; that the expert informing the court 
likewise if this is not the case.489 In that sense, what becomes cardinal is that expert 
opinions are not just provided by competent authorities and, instead, are also grounded on 
a firm methodology. It is true that historically in the evolution of common law 
jurisprudence, the requirement that the opinion came from a person with specialized 
knowledge in a field predated the necessary elements that such an opinion should also 
endorse. At the same time, in early jurisprudence, this did not mean necessarily that this 
expert should be also formally qualified. Thus, for example in R v. Silverlock, an amateur 
graphologist was allowed to testify as an expert on handwriting.490 The element stressed 
was that the expert needed to possess experience, but not necessarily qualifications beyond 
those of a layman.491 As no certain qualifications were needed to escort the expert’s 
credentials, so too, there was no need for the provision of reliable scientific standards for 
the experts’ conclusions. In R v. Robb,492 a phonetician had identified the appellant’s voice 
using a technique that could not be deemed scientifically reliable. This, nevertheless, did 
not deter Lord Bingham from declaring the particular phonetician’s assessment as 
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admissible on the grounds that what should be examined by the judge was whether study and 
experience gave the expert more knowledge than a layman and whether the witness was skilled 
enough to possess the relevant knowledge.  
This lack of any consideration for the scientific reliability of the chosen method was 
gradually addressed by English courts. Thus, in the case of Kennedy v. Cordia, the UK Supreme 
Court explicitly came to include the reliability of the provided evidence as one of the 
parameters that had to be taken into account by the court concerning the question of this 
evidence’s admissibility.493 At the same time, it is important to note that when it comes to the 
question of how such reliability is to be measured, English jurisprudence has not followed a 
unified stance. While English courts have generally seemed to officially side with Frye, certain 
judgments have left open the prospects of a Daubert standard endorsement.    
In R v. Gilfoyle,494 a case concerning the question of whether a man had murdered his 
wife or she had committed suicide, in coming to assess the relevant opinion provided by 
Professor Canter, a distinguished psychologist, the Court of Appeal rendered clear that the 
expert’s scientific credentials were not enough on their own to declare a provided opinion as 
an admissible piece of evidence. This is because it is opinion itself that needs scientific 
reliability for this to take place. In the Court’s words  
‘…although Professor Canter is clearly an expert in his field….his reports identify no criteria 
by reference to which the court could test the quality of his opinions: there is no data base 
                                                          
493 UK Supreme Court, Kennedy (Appellant) v. Cordia (Services) LLP (Respondent) (Scotland) [2016] UKSC 6, 
Judgment (10 February 2016), para.44. For the fact that this is the case also in Scotland which has a different 
criminal jurisdiction from England and Wales see Young (Thomas Ross) v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 145 
(the Scottish High Court noting that expert evidence must be based ‘on a recognized and developed scientific 
discipline’) 
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comparing real and questionable suicides and there is no substantial body of academic writing 
approving his methodology.’495 
            At the same time, in Gilfoyle, the Court proceeded to clarify that, as far as the reliability 
requirement is concerned, its approach matches the Frye approach taken by U.S. courts. Citing 
the Frye standard approach as the authoritative approach endorsed by English jurisprudence as 
well, the Court concluded that ‘evidence based on a developing new brand of science or 
medicine is not admissible until accepted by the scientific community as being able to provide 
accurate and reliable opinion.’496 
Gilfoyle came to dispel any scientific methods which albeit can be reliable, but have 
nevertheless, not been accepted by the majority of the scientific community. Although 
reference to the Daubert standard is never explicitly made, it seems, as conceded by Lord 
Justice Kennedy in Dallagher497 that by proclaiming the validity of Frye, the Court in Gilfoyle 
indirectly made the juxtaposition with the Daubert standard and rejected the latter. Dallagher 
is important to the extent that in the particular judgment, Lord Justice Kennedy referred to the 
Gilfoyle case and the Daubert or the Frye dilemma posed there in order to conclude that the 
balance scales should be tilted in favour of the Daubert standard. Declaring that under English 
law the question of whether an expert opinion should be admissible or not should be judged 
according to whether or not the particular opinion is ‘sufficiently well-established to pass the 
ordinary tests of relevance and reliability,’498 Lord Justice Kennedy hailed to proclaim that  
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‘As to the English approach we have found it necessary to refer…to a number of 
decisions, especially Clarke, from which as it seems to us, the analogy with rule 702 [sic of the 
U.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure] is clear.’499 
Other cases decided by English courts also render the impression that when it comes to 
the question of the expert opinion’s reliability, English jurisprudence is amenable to an 
approach which endorses the Daubert standard and the admissibility of scientific opinions even 
if these are not shared by most scientists. For example, in the case of R v. Clarke, the Court had 
to decide whether the video superimposition methodology used to compare the defendant’s 
photograph with others taken at a robbery scene could lead it to be considered as admissible 
evidence.500 The Court noted that courts ‘should take into account modern methods of crime 
detection’ and that ‘it would be entirely wrong to deny to the law of evidence the advantages 
to be gained from new techniques and new advances in science.’501 It went on to state that, in 
coming to assess expert evidence, emphasis should be placed on the reliability of the scientific 
technique.502 In that sense, by linking the scientific reliability requirement with the existence 
of new scientific methods and techniques, the Court seemed to favourably view the prospects 
of accepting the Daubert standard as a suitable expert evidence admissibility threshold, without 
the Court itself ever explicitly stating so.  
It is true that, by citing reliability concerns, English courts have come to echo elements 
of the Daubert standard. The same is also true with their pronouncement that when it comes to 
the admissibility of expert evidence, judges are open to ‘new techniques and new advances in 
science.’503 At the same time, such a stance does not fully endorse the Daubert standard. 
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Although it applies the reliability parameters to the question of whether the witness has the 
necessary expertise, it does not equally demand such reliability parameters to be in place 
regarding how the selected methodology is applied to the facts of a case. This is palpably 
demonstrated in R v Reed, a case concerning the admissibility of DNA evidence, where the 
Court of Appeal held that ‘expert evidence of a scientific nature is not admissible where the 
scientific basis on which it is advanced is insufficiently reliable.’504 Yet, the Court failed to 
provide any indications on how such reliability is to be measured and consequently did not 
proceed to engage with any questioning of the undertaken methodology.  
Similarly, in the case of Harris involving the defendant’s request for review of her 
manslaughter conviction due to new medical evidence, the Court of Appeal, summarizing the 
established position in jurisprudence, held that it was necessary for expert witnesses to provide 
independent assistance to the Court by clarifying whether the requested opinion fell within 
their expertise and by stating the facts or assumptions upon which their opinions were based.505 
Yet, the Court did not extend such obligations to cover the methodology undertaken.   
Along the same lines, emphasis on reliability covering the witness’s expertise more than the 
way this expertise was to be applied to the contested facts can be seen in the stance the Court 
of Appeal took in Luttrell.506 In that case, coming to admit expert evidence based on lip-reading 
of a videoed conversation, the Court explicitly rejected the appellants’ argument that pieces of 
evidence should be seen as reliable only once they were subjected to cross-examination. The 
Court stated, as well, that, in their opinion, the proper view on the issue should be ‘that so long 
as a field is sufficiently well-established to pass the ordinary test of relevance and reliability, 
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then no enhanced test of admissibility should be applied.’507 Nevertheless, the Court did not 
further examine whether this reliable, epistemological method was also reliably applied to the 
facts of the case. On these grounds, the assumption seems to be that, since an opinion is 
provided by an expert and is based on a scientifically reliable field, it will also automatically 
apply to the facts of the case in a reliable way. 
Despite the plausibility that such an assumption holds, it does not cease to rest on a 
hypothesis. By the same token, there have been judgments by English courts that have sought 
to rectify the aforementioned stance as far as reliability is concerned and broaden its scope in 
order to also embrace methodological issues. This is true in English courts cases concerning 
the ‘shaken baby syndrome’ where defendants have been accused of manslaughter for the death 
of babies caused by violent shaking and hitting. For example, in Bowman, a case dealing with 
the autopsy on a deceased baby so that the Court could establish the possible guilt of the 
defendant for the baby’s death, the Court of Appeal explicitly held that the experts’ reports 
should include, among others, elements such as ‘the materials provided and considered, and 
the documents, statements, evidence, information or assumptions which are material to the 
opinions expressed or upon which those opinions are based’, ‘information relating to who has 
carried out measurements, examinations, tests…. and the methodology used, and whether or 
not such measurements…. were carried out under the expert's supervision’ and ‘the reasons for 
the opinion given.’508 Similarly, in the joint case of Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, the Court 
of Appeal referred to the fact that before coming to admit an expert opinion, the trial judge 
must examine, inter alia, to what extent the expert’s view is widely held.509 This emphasis on 
the reliability parameter is also seen in other cases outside the ‘shaken babies syndrome’ 
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framework.510 For example, in Ahmed & Anor v. R,511 the Court of Appeal examined the 
question of whether the testimony of Professor Clarke, an expert on international relations, was 
based on reliable data.512 On these grounds, the Court of Appeal examined both Professor 
Clarke’s academic credibility as well as the credibility of his scientifically reached historic 
conclusions. Thus, the Court of Appeal agreed with the court of first instance that Professor 
Clarke was ‘a well-respected member of his academic discipline’ and that the method used to 
extract certain historic conclusions was reliable and properly academic.513 At the same time, 
the Court of Appeal also attached an importance to the methodological reliability of the reached 
conclusions. This is portrayed through the fact that the Court explicitly quoted the trial judge’s 
explicit reference to the methods of triangulation, context, and validation used by Professor 
Clarke to extract his conclusions.514 
In the case of R v. T,515 T was convicted for murder partly due to a comparative analysis 
of shoeprints. Coming to accept T’s appeal, the Court of Appeal examined not only whether 
shoeprints could be a reliable field of expertise to serve as admissible evidence, but also 
whether the expert witness had applied the knowledge that such a field could provide in a 
reliable way. Coming to answer in the negative, the Court criticized the expert witness for 
presenting his opinion in a way that did not permit judges and juries to see how the expert had 
reached his conclusions.516 Moreover, the Court held that while, in general, probabilistic 
calculations were accepted in relation to DNA-profiling evidence, in this particular case such 
calculations were not applied in a reliable manner in order to be deemed precise and thus 
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admissible.517 In that sense, regarding their application in the specific exigencies that the 
particular case presented, the Court did not only look at the reliability of these calculations in 
abstracto as a general method, but also in concreto and concluded that, outside the field of 
DNA, such probabilistic calculations should not be used.518 
On account of the aforementioned cases and the stance taken by English courts, senior 
legal officials have similarly stressed how important it is for the reliability parameter to also 
come and cover the question of an expert field’s application to the facts of a case. For example, 
echoing the Court’s pronouncement in Bowman, a guidance booklet for expert witnesses 
published by the Crown Prosecutions Service ordains the former to include in their report 
provided to courts the following details, inter alia: any information upon which they have relied 
to reach their opinion; how such opinions are scientifically justified; who conducted the 
relevant experiments and; any verifying examinations of the conclusions reached.519 
The emphasis jurisprudence placed on the fact that judges should form their stance 
based on reliable opinions, incurring upon expert witnesses the task of providing further 
justifications for reaching a certain epistemological conclusion, was ultimately transmitted in 
the arrangements embedded in the UK legislation. Already from the first decade of this century, 
academics and the UK Parliament expressed a stance in favour of the adoption of the Daubert 
standard.520 In coming to propose the parallel creation of a Forensic Advisory Council,521 the 
House of Commons’ Science and Technology Select Committee came to the conclusion that  
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‘The absence of an agreed protocol for the validation of scientific techniques prior to 
their being admitted in court is entirely unsatisfactory….We recommend that one of the first 
tasks of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be to develop a ‘gate-keeping’ test for expert 
evidence. This should be done in partnership with judges, scientists, and other key players in 
the criminal justice system and should build on the U.S. Daubert test.’522 
Quite importantly, the proposal for the establishment of a Forensic Advisory Council 
came at a time when the Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners was already in 
place. By endorsing a list of experts meant to provide expert testimony before courts and 
echoing inquisitorial influence, a continental law, the Council aimed to ensure that the 
testifying experts would enjoy certain credentials. Nevertheless, the establishment of the 
Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners addressed only the reliability of the 
experts themselves. Proposals, such as the one regarding the Forensic Advisory Council, 
demonstrated how important it was for the reliability of the provided opinion to be equally 
addressed.523 Thus, it may not be accidental that, in 2009, the Council for the Registration of 
Forensic Practitioners ceased to exist.524 Proposals for reforms in expert testimonies suggested 
by the Science and Technology Select Committee were shared by the Law Commission. In its 
2011 report525 the Law Commission expressed its discomfort with the fact that, inter alia, expert 
evidence was admitted too quickly without allowing the judges adequate time to filter the 
reliability of the provided evidence.526  
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The UK Criminal Procedure Rules must also be seen in a similar, pro-Daubert vein. 
Although the Rules do not include any guidelines on how the judge must assess expert 
evidence, they do include instructions for expert witnesses on what elements their reports must 
encompass. They thus stipulate that expert witnesses must say who carried out the 
examinations or tests upon which their opinion is based or give the scientific credentials of the 
people they relied upon for their opinion527 as well as the reasons behind the opinion’s 
conclusions.528 Expert witnesses must include ‘such information as the court may need to 
decide whether the expert’s opinion is sufficiently reliable to be admissible as evidence.’529 
By ordaining expert reports to be reliable and contain these Daubert-like elements, the 
Rules put under judicial scrutiny whether this is in fact the case. Thus, although the reliability 
parameter and the Daubert-like elements in the Rules, for example the conducting of tests and 
investigations, are directly addressed to expert witnesses, indirectly they also affect judges. 
This is because in coming to decide on the admissibility of such expert evidence, judges must 
also examine whether this reliability parameter has been considered. This is expressly 
acknowledged by the Criminal Practice Directions which endorse the Rules’ elements 
contained in Rule 19.4 as the ‘factors which the court may take into account in determining the 
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5.3 Beyond the Oceans: The Assessment of Expert Evidence and the Impact of English 
law on other Commonwealth nations 
 
Whereas the Commonwealth nations extend over all the globe, resting in many cases 
thousands of miles away from England, it is interesting to see that in most cases, the physical 
distance and the non-geographical vicinity are not so strong in order to create a rupture between 
these nations and England. Accordingly, their legal arrangements, also when it comes to the 
issue that this thesis focus upon, namely the expert evidence assessment, follows, at least as a 
starting point, the English law arrangements. This is the case for example with Australia whose 
courts have tended to traditionally view the question of expert evidence assessment the same 
way their English peers did. Already from the ‘80s, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
had declared that an expert witness is seen as someone who, through the specialized knowledge 
he or she possesses on a subject, is meant to elucidate the court on a certain issue.531  
In Federal Law, Section 79 of the Evidence Act aspires to introduce a uniform law of 
evidence to all state jurisdictions in Australia and is the relevant provision that governs expert 
testimonies in courts.532 Subsection 1 of Section 79 stipulates that if a person has specialized 
knowledge based on his or her training, study or experience, he or she can supply an expert 
opinion but it must be based wholly or substantially on this expertise knowledge.533 The 
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reference to ‘specialized knowledge’ has been perceived as echoing the U.S. Federal Rules of 
Evidence.534 
Nevertheless, with regards to expert opinions, Australian federal legislation places the 
emphasis on the academic or scientific credentials of the opinion’s provider, but nothing is said 
in the law itself on whether such an opinion must be reliable or according to which standards 
the judge is meant to examine such reliability.535 The question of reliability is completely linked 
to the question of whether or not the provided opinion, in fact, falls within the expert witness’s 
field of expertise,536 and scholars have lamented the lack of clear standards on the fields that 
can give rise to admissible expert testimonies.537 Based on the law’s reference to ‘specialized 
knowledge’, these scholars have argued that such reference should be read as to include 
scientific fields.538 This should be viewed in tandem with the assertion of the High Court of 
Australia that the ‘specialized knowledge’ reference in the provision draws directly from the 
Daubert judgment.539 
One should note that although the reliability parameter was not expressly included in 
Section 79 of the Evidence Act, this does not mean that a reliability requirement has not been 
viewed by Australian courts as an essential element for the admissibility of an expert opinion. 
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For example, in the Lakatoi case before the New South Wales Supreme Court, Einstein J took 
the stance that, under the particular section, a trial judge must examine evidentiary reliability.540 
The same conclusion regarding the fact that the reliability parameter can be traced in 
the legal landscape created under the Evidence Act was also reached by Justice Higgins in 
Lipovac, heard before the Australian Capital Territory’s Supreme Court.541 On a federal level, 
the High Court of Australia traced ‘a line of authority’542 in coming to proclaim the reliability 
parameter as an element that judges must address when coming to weigh on expert opinions.543 
At the same time, Australian jurisprudence did not further elaborate on which subjects 
require expert opinions and under which standards these opinions should be deemed as reliable. 
Nevertheless, these two questions came to be gradually addressed in Australian jurisprudence. 
As logically expected, the question of the thematic span of an expert opinion was addressed 
before any discussion of the relevant standards unveiled. Regarding which subjects can fall in 
the realm of an expert opinion, the ‘leading’544 Australian case on this matter is Clark v. 
Ryan.545 In this case, Dixon CJ held that judges should resort to expert opinions in cases where 
the subject matter ‘partakes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit 
or study in order to obtain a knowledge of it.’546 Scholars have deduced through the use of the 
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phrase ‘nature of a science’ that the expert opinion should rely on scientific principles.547 At 
the same time, these scholars proceeded to note that the particular judgment did not elaborate 
about the identity of these principles.548 
The susceptibility of the subject matter to the rendering of an expert opinion was further 
clarified by the South Australia Supreme Court in Bonython549 which is often cited by English 
courts.550 In coming to assess whether a witness is competent to give evidence, Chief Justice 
King held that the judge must take notice of two issues. In his words 
‘The first is whether the subject matter of the opinion falls within the class of subjects 
upon which expert testimony is permissible. This may be divided in two parts a) whether the 
subject matter of the opinion is such that a person without instruction or experience in the area 
of knowledge….would be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance 
of witnesses possessing special knowledge or experience in the area and b) whether the subject 
matter of the opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently 
organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special 
acquaintance with which by the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court. 
The second question is whether the witness has acquired by study or experience sufficient 
knowledge of the subject to render his opinion of value in resolving the issues before the 
court.’551 
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This stance towards expert testimony has been declared by Gaudron J as the classical 
position of common law on the issue552 and has been reiterated in a number of federal High 
Court judgments.553 Reliability concerns refer only to the field of knowledge that relates to the 
expert opinion, but not to its application on the facts of the particular case. This, in essence, 
has given rise to incidents of miscarriages of justice as is the case with Lindy and Michael 
Chamberlain whose little daughter, Azaria, disappeared from her tent on a camping trip and 
has never been found.554 The Chamberlains claimed that Azaria was taken by a dingo, but their 
version of the events was refuted in court by expert witnesses and they were convicted in 1982. 
Nevertheless, new expert evidence came to refute the previous evidence that had been accepted 
by courts and, ultimately, a Royal Commission that was established to inquire about the case 
concluded that ‘some of the opinions were based on unreliable or inadequate data.’555 Along 
these lines, scholars pointed out that courts should also start to address issues of the expert 
opinion’s reliability and they even endorse the Daubert standard.556 
Such developments caused a gradual shift in Australian jurisprudence to the extent that 
more recent judgments on a federal level do include assessments of the methodologies of the 
provided expert opinions.557 Moreover, the High Court, in its Expert Evidence Practice Notes 
issued in 2016, explicitly addresses the reliability of the provided expert opinions.558 The 
importance for judges to take into account the expert’s reliability as well as that of the 
methodology of the expert’s opinion is starkly demonstrated in section 3 of Annex A. There, 
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under the title ‘Content of Report’, it is stated, inter alia, that the expert must furnish the court 
with his qualifications that render him eligible to prepare a report, together with ‘the 
assumptions and material facts on which each opinion expressed in the report is based’, ‘the 
reasons for and any literature or other materials utilized in support of such opinion’, and ‘any 
examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied.’559 Similarly, also 
under the previous legal arrangements drafted by the High Court judges, Practice Note CM7 
holds explicitly that the expert’s report must contain both the factual assumptions upon which 
such a report has been based as well as the reasons behind the expert’s opinion.560 
The Expert Evidence Practice Notes seem to imply an Australian High Court preference 
for the Daubert standard, nevertheless, so far, this has not been stated explicitly in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. One explanation for this may be that Australia’s Federal Court tends to see the 
issue of reliability as one that is detached from the establishment of a ‘reasoning process’ for 
the assessment of the provided opinion. Rather, such ‘reasoning process’ is viewed only as an 
auxiliary means for the Court to attest to whether the witness testified on issues pertaining to 
‘specialized knowledge’, as required by section 79 of the Evidence Act.561 Consequently, any 
Australian judicial references to the concept of reliability have taken place through the lens of 
the ‘general acceptance test’, without these judicial bodies unequivocally endorsing Frye. 
For example, in Osland 562 an appeal case from the Supreme Court of Victoria, the High 
Court had to decide whether the Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS) was scientifically 
                                                          
559 Federal Court of Australia, Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT) October 25,2016, Annexure A, 
Section 3 (c ), (d),(e) and (g) available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/law-and-practice/practice-
documents/practice-notes/gpn-expt  
560 Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM7, June 4,2013 available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/law-
and-practice/practice-documents/practice-notes/cm7 
561 Federal Court of Australia (Full Court), Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v. Jetopay 
Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463 (27 November 2000), para. 23; Supreme Court of New South Wales, Makita (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v. Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305 (14 September 2001) para.85 
562 Osland v. R [1998] HCA 75 
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substantiated in order to form a ‘reliable body of knowledge or experience.’563 To this question, 
Kirby J, palpably expressed the Court’s stance in rejecting the appeal by holding that BWS 
should not be viewed as ‘a universally accepted and empirically established scientific 
phenomenon.’564 While the Court does not explicitly mention Frye, the judgment’s 
phraseology is starkly reminiscent of Frye,565 in tandem with a similar practice that seems to 
be prevalent among Australian courts.566 At the same time, even before the adoption of Daubert 
in the United States, Australian jurisprudence did not explicitly refer to Frye giving rise to 
arguments that Australian courts were never amenable to a Frye standard approach in the first 
place.  
Additionally, in Gilmore567 the New South Wales Court of Appeal concluded that 
spectrographic voice analysis was a ‘recognized field in which a properly qualified expert can 
give admissible evidence.’568 The need for the epistemological field to be ‘recognized’ echoes 
Frye’s ‘general acceptance’ test. At the same time, while quoting a passage from the United 
States v. Baller judgment,569 Street CJ stressed that it was important that provided opinions are 
testable and are attained through scientific, objective procedures.570 The relevant passage that 
the Australian court judgment quotes closes with the notice that ‘absolute certainty of result or 
unanimity of scientific opinion is not required for admissibility.’ As a result of this notice, 
Street CJ concluded that to recognize ‘a degree of risk of inaccuracy and to recognize a need 
for caution in the use of evidence, is far from treating the evidence as inadmissible.’571 
                                                          
563 Ibid, para.53 
564 Ibid, para.165 
565 For the fact that psychological syndromes including the BWS may not be susceptible to the definitive testing 
that Daubert seems to require see Stephen Odgers & James Richardson, supra note 404 at 119; Ian Freckelton, 
When Plight Makes Right- the Forensic Abuse Syndrome, 18 Crim. L. J. 29, 34 (1994) 
566 On this see Paul Giugni, Runjanjic v. R, 14 (4) Sydney L. Rev. 511, 514-15 (1992) (discussing the approach of 
King CJ in the case of Runjanjic) 
567 R v. Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 
568 Ibid at 939 
569 United States v. Baller 519 F2d 463,466-467 (1975) 
570 R v. Gilmore, supra note 567 at 939 
571 Ibid at 941 
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Such statements and the inclusion of these Daubert-like characteristics in a judgment 
that has not explicitly endorsed Frye, prompted scholars to argue that any references to the 
need for the scientific opinion to be recognized should not lead to the conclusion that Australian 
courts adopt Frye, rather that they consider this parameter important the same way Daubert 
does.572 
This inclination of Australian jurisprudence towards Daubert is more palpably seen in 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Courts of the Australian States comprising the Australian 
federation. Among these Courts, some endorse Daubert implicitly rather than explicitly.573 
Other judgments issued in chronological vicinity with the proclamation of the standard in the 
U.S. raise the question of whether the parameter of the novelty of expert evidence should 
constitute a reason for judges to proclaim that the relevant evidence is inadmissible or such 
novelty should be considered by judges under the free probative discretion they enjoy in the 
evaluation of the different evidence presented before them.574 Some Supreme Courts, like that 
of New South Wales, seem to endorse the view that if the Daubert-inspired rules governing an 
expert witness’s testimony and contained in the Expert Witness Code of Conduct are not 
respected, this should not lead to the inadmissibility of the provided evidence.575 
                                                          
572 Stephen Odgers & James Richardson, supra note 404 at 123 
573 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Re: Dr Ken Michael Am; ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd 
& Anor [2002] WASCA 231 (23 August 2002); Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Murdoch v. R [2007] 
NTCCA 1 (10 January 2007) paras. 287, 289, 300 (citing the Court of Appeal which noted that the expert witness 
had not published any of her scientific assertions, the Supreme Court itself further examining whether the expert 
witness had sufficiently applied her methodology on the facts of the case and coming to the conclusion that her 
testimony should be rejected because it was not based on scientific premises) 
574 Lipovac et al. v. Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd et al. [1996] ACTSC 98 (13 September 1996), paras. 546-547 
(Justice Higgins seeing novel expert evidence as falling in the judge’s free probative discretion). For the fact 
that Australian jurisprudence in the ‘70s viewed the question also of whether an opinion is based on facts as a 
question that refers to the weighing of the evidence rather than to its admissibility see Millirpum v. Nabalco Pty 
Ltd [1971] 17 F.L.R. 141,162-63 
575 Supreme Court of New South Wales-Court of Criminal Appeal Decisions, Wood v. R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 
February 2012), para.728. The Expert Witness Code of Conduct applicable in New South Wales can be found at 
Schedule 7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 and similar to other Codes of Conduct mentioned in this 
thesis, it contains the stipulation that the expert witness must inter alia provide the court with the examinations 
and investigations upon which he has relied to reach his conclusions and the literature that supports the expert’s 




On the other hand, there is a category of cases that seem to endorse, albeit non- 
explicitly, a Daubert-like test in the admissibility of expert evidence. For example, in Re 
Michael, before the Western Australia Supreme Court576 concerning whether the Regulator of 
Western Australia had erroneously interpreted the National Third Party Access Code for 
Natural Gas Pipeline Systems, the Court had to rely on expert opinions in order to interpret 
some economic terms that appeared inside the Code.577 While the Court found that there was 
no ‘uniform, accepted and certain’ meaning to these terms,578 it proceeded to hold that this fact 
should not bar the Court from holding the particular expert testimonies as admissible. On these 
grounds, echoing Daubert, the Court placed the focus on the fact that these terms, as appearing 
in the Code, seemed to imply ‘a principle or theory, the essential tenets of which are widely 
understood, though there need not be uniform acceptance of them.’579 
Nevertheless, despite this clear tendency among Australian courts towards the 
endorsement of the Daubert standard, the fact that the Australian High Court has not taken a 
clear stance on the issue coupled with the indications that Australian jurisprudence, at least till 
the mid-80s, endorsed Frye580 and the fact that ‘Australia has had perhaps the most vociferous 
debate outside the United States’581 has rendered the impression among scholars and judges 
that, when it comes to the reliability test, ‘the issue has not been determined by the highest 
courts in Australia.’582 
 
                                                          
576 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Re: Dr Ken Michael Am, supra note 573, paras. 6-10 
577 Ibid, para.106 
578 Ibid, para.105 
579 Ibid, para.107 
580 Ian Freckelton, supra note 531 at 369 
581 David Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 Yale J. Int’l. L. 123 (1996) 
582 Ian Freckelton, Doctors and Forensic Expertise in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW (Ian Freckelton 
& Kerry Petersen eds., The Federation Press, 2006) 412. See also Peter McClellan, Admissibility of Expert 
Evidence under the Uniform Evidence Act, Melbourne, October 2, 2009 at 7 available at 
http://netk.net.au/ExpertEvidence/McClellan.pdf  (noting that some courts in Australia have endorsed Frye, 
others require the court to examine the reliability of the source of the evidence and others enforce elements of 




This evolution of the Australian jurisprudence from the classical stance taken by the 
English courts to one more accommodating of Daubert, can be seen also in New Zealand courts. 
In line with the general stipulations on expert evidence that common law has undertaken in its 
traditional form as described above for England and Australia, before 1980, New Zealand 
courts did not place traditionally any emphasis on the nature and reliability of the opinion itself, 
but rather, on the scientific credentials of the testifying expert.583 This came to change after 
1980 with New Zealand courts adopting the stance that the provided expert opinion should also 
be reliable. More characteristically, this was demonstrated in Makoare, where the New Zealand 
High Court held that expert opinion should be based on supporting literature or other 
verification grounds in order to be deemed admissible.584 This reliability parameter was 
traditionally understood as referring to a ‘sufficiently recognized branch of science’ similar to 
the U.S. Frye approach.585 Nevertheless, after the adoption of the Daubert standard by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the New Zealand High Court equally endorsed Daubert, albeit tacitly, both in 
its Code of Conduct as well as in a number of cases.586 
For example, in Calder587 a case, decided in 1995, that concerned the alleged attempted 
murder of a man by his ex-partner, incriminating evidence included what the test experts had 
undertaken from the victim’s hair as proof that a by-product of acrylamide could be traced. The 
                                                          
583 Karen Belt, Novel Scientific Evidence and Judicial Gatekeeping: R v. Calder and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Compared, 28(2) Victoria University of Wellington L. Rev. 399 (1999) 
584 R v. Makoare [2001] 1 NZLR 318,324  
585 R v. B [1987] 1 NZLR 362,367 
586 The Code of Conduct includes the stipulations that must be present in order for expert testimonies to be 
admitted as evidence. It requires the expert to inter alia specify the investigations he has undertaken and the 
materials he has relied upon in order to reach his conclusion. On this see G D Clews, Responsibilities of an Expert 
Witness. Paper for the 2004 Tax Conference, 15-16 October 2004, Christchurch, New Zealand available at 
http://www.taxcounsel.co.nz/Resources/Publications+papers+and+commentary/Responsibilities+of+an+Expert
+Witness.html . See also, Ian Freckelton, Doctors and Forensic Expertise in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH 
LAW (Ian Freckelton & Kerry Petersen eds., The Federation Press, 2006) 412 
587 R v. Calder, Unreported, April 12 1995, High Court, Christchurch Registry T 154/94 cited in Karen Belt, 
Novel Scientific Evidence and Judicial Gatekeeping: R v. Calder and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
Compared, 28(2) Victoria University of Wellington L. Rev. 399 (1999) 
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defence asked the Court not to admit these tests as evidence on the grounds that they were 
based on an unreliable novel scientific approach.588 Tipping J, coming to conclude that there 
was no direct authority in New Zealand when it came to the admissibility of expert evidence, 
drew from the Daubert standard in order to voice his stance that judges should not examine 
whether a scientific opinion was generally accepted in order for the latter to be deemed 
reliable.589 Rather, the expert opinion should pass a ‘minimum threshold of reliability,’ which 
would be asserted each time by the jury,590 without the Court providing any further criteria on 
how such a threshold assessment would take place.591 In coming to reach his conclusion in 
Calder, Tipping J found support in a discussion paper produced by the New Zealand Law 
Commission which stated that not only should generally accepted scientific theories be 
admitted as evidence, but also that ‘newly developed’ theories and theories representing the 
views of a minority could still be deemed to be reliable.592 Coming to adopt a Daubert-inspired 
approach in Calder and again in  Brown593 the New Zealand High Court rendered an important 
dynamic, first to the inclusion of the reliability parameter in any expert testimony assessment 
and second to the criteria according which such an assessment should take place.594 
This dynamic was mirrored in the reports issued by the New Zealand Law Commission. 
These reports continued detail the government’s attempt to codify a field of law, such as the 
                                                          
588 For the fact that in the U.S. hair analysis is not deemed to be an established forensic technique see Clive 
Stafford Smith & Patrick Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or 
Twentieth Century Snake Oil? 27 Columbia Hum. Rts. L. Rev.227,234 (1996) 
589 Karen Belt, supra note 583; Bruce Robertson, Battered Woman Syndrome: Expert Evidence in Action, 9(2) 
Otago L. Rev. 277,298 (1998) 
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591 Erica Beecher-Monas, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS, Cambridge University Press (2007) 13 
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No.18, Wellington, 1991 
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law of evidence which was perceived to be ‘chaotic.’595 In 1999, the Commission penned its 
report and a proposed act, named the Evidence Code, which could potentially be adopted by 
the New Zealand parliament. This Code included a Commentary in which the Commission 
brought its views on the relevant interpretation of the clauses it proposed.596 In this proposed 
draft, section 23, entitled Admissibility of Expert Evidence, stipulated that expert evidence 
should be provided by a qualified expert and that such evidence was to be ‘substantially 
helpful.’ The Commission, citing Calder and Brown, proceeded to note that both judgments 
referred to the Daubert standard. The Commission also stated that, in coming to assess the 
provided expert opinion’s reliability, the New Zealand High Court considered it useful to 
examine whether or not the expert’s scientific theory was, or had been, subject to scientific 
review and publication, if its error rate was known, and if it had been accepted widely by the 
scientific community.597 
The emphasis placed on the importance of provided opinions being of ‘substantial help’ 
to judges and the whole Daubert philology of the ‘substantial help’ requirement is also 
endorsed by the 2006 Evidence Act. Ultimately, this Act put an end to the decades’ quest of 
codification of New Zealand’s law of evidence. As stated in the first paragraph of section 25 
in the Act,  
‘An opinion by an expert that is part of expert evidence offered in a proceeding is 
admissible if the fact-finder is likely to obtain substantial help from the opinion in 
                                                          
595 Sarah Croxford, Has the Evidence Act Been a Successful Codification? Is it a True Code? LLM Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, Faculty of Law, 2015, VI available at 
http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/5114/paper.pdf?sequence=1  
596 New Zealand Law Commission, Evidence Report 55-Volume 1, Reform of the Law, Wellington,1999 available 
at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/report/R55/  
597 Ibid, section 23, no.100 
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understanding other evidence in the proceeding or in ascertaining any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the proceeding.’598 
It is noteworthy that the above paragraph does not provide any guidelines on how expert 
evidence is to be assessed. At the same time, following the line of the Law Commission, New 
Zealand courts have explicitly taken the stance that whether the specific expert evidence is 
‘substantially helpful’ or not should be seen as utterly tied to the question of whether it is 
reliable and can thereby, be admitted by the court. For example, in Shepherd v. R concerning 
the robbery of a bar, the Crown Prosecution’s expert witness compared images taken from 
CCTV during the robbery with still photographs of the defendant while in custody, in order to 
argue that the defendant was the culprit.599 
In coming to assess whether the expert’s testimony could be considered substantially 
helpful, the rhetoric question was asked of whether the evidence was not substantially helpful 
because it was unreliable. The Court of Appeal referred to the fact that the defence team tied 
the helpfulness of the expert’s testimony with issues concerning its reliability, such as the fact 
that it was not based on a statistical database and that there were alleged technical flaws in the 
process and the methodology endorsed by the expert witness.600 The Court of Appeal 
proceeded to adopt elements of the Daubert reliability criterion in coming to discuss how the 
judge should evaluate the admissibility of expert evidence. Strongly echoing Daubert, the 
Court referred to the role of the national judge as a ‘gatekeeper’ when it comes to the admission 
of evidence.601 It further held that the judge is meant to evaluate the quality of the evidence 
                                                          
598 Evidence Act 2006, Section 25(1) available at 
http://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2006/0069/40.0/DLM393600.html. On this see also the pronouncement of 
the New Zealand Supreme Court that ‘if expert opinion evidence does not meet the standard of ‘substantial 
helpfulness’ set by s.25(1), it is not admissible.’ (R. Gwaze [2010] NZSC 52, para.49 available at 
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599 Shepherd v. R [2011] NZCA 666 at 3 available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
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600 Ibid at 35 
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before he or she reaches any decision on its admissibility and that such assessment of evidence 
may include, inter alia, ‘the validity of the expert’s methodology.’602 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that this particular expert testimony should be deemed as introducing pieces of 
evidence that were admissible.603 In the Court’s words, the evidence was ‘plainly relevant, 
cogent and detailed’ and it ‘was clear that the images analysed were sufficiently reliable’ to 
permit the expert to reach his conclusions.604 
Whereas Australia and New Zealand are in geographical vicinity and it could be argued 
that they could easily enter into a judicial dialogue on the question of whether they should 
assess expertise according to Frye or Daubert, Canada is another major Commonwealth state 
which belongs to the adversarial criminal tradition although similar to continental law 
arrangements, in Canada, experts are considered helpers of the Court and are meant to elucidate 
issues about which juries and judges hold no knowledge.605 This was pronounced by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the early 80s in Abbey and was later reiterated in Beland & 
Phillips.606 It follows from this that expert testimony can be denied if it is deemed not essential 
in order for the judge and the jury to form their opinions on a contested issue.607 
Following the adversarial tradition, Canadian courts also found themselves having to 
address issues concerning the experts’ impartiality. In that sense, it is interesting that rather 
than resorting to solutions provided by English law, the Canadian courts noted the vicinity with 
the U.S. and paid notice to the fact that the same problems were recorded in the U.S. legal 
                                                          
602 Ibid  
603 Ibid at 88 
604 Ibid  
605 Pierre Patenaude, De l’Expertise Judiciare dans le Cadre du Proces Criminel et de la Reserche de la Verite: 
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order.608 Conceding to this fact,609 shortly after Daubert was decided in the U.S., the Canadian 
Supreme Court also came to develop rules governing the admission of expert testimonies. 
These criteria became palpable in Mohan, because they stressed the judges’ obligation to 
examine the scientific reliability of the provided experts’ reports and resembled those in 
Daubert.610 
Mohan was a case concerning a paediatrician who was charged for sexual assault on 
his young female patients, aged thirteen to sixteen.611 The defence attorney called a psychiatrist 
to testify that the accused, as a paedophile, belonged to a limited and unusual group of 
individuals.612 The psychiatrist opined that if the accused had indeed committed all the acts he 
was charged for, he would be termed as a sexual psychopath.613 The trial judge held that the 
evidence was not admissible as it did not fall in the sphere of expert evidence.614 
In coming to address the admissibility of the provided expert evidence, the Canadian 
Supreme Court uttered four principles that should be taken into account, namely a) the 
relevance of the evidence to the facts; b) the necessity of providing such evidence for assisting 
the judge in reaching a conclusion; c) the absence of any exclusionary rule and; d) the proper 
qualification of the expert.615 
The need for the provided expert opinion to be relevant raises the need for it to be also 
reliable. On this, the Court in Mohan drew from previous jurisprudence in Melaragni where 
                                                          
608 On this see R v. Nielsen (1985) 16 C.C.C. (3d) 39. See also the remark of the Director of the Toronto 
Forensic Science Centre that ‘the scientist must learn, or at least accept, that the judicial process is not a search 
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Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34 J. Forensic Science 
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610 Ibid at 9 
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612 Ibid at 14 
613 Ibid at 15-16 
614 Ibid at 11 
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Canadian courts applied a reliability test to what the Court termed  a ‘new scientific technique 
or body of scientific knowledge.’616 In turn, echoing the Daubert standard, these reliability 
concerns brought forth the need for scientific evidence to be grounded on scientifically valid 
grounds. Nevertheless, distancing a bit from the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Canadian Supreme Court reached the need for criteria of scientific validity to be established 
not through a doctrinal, but through a teleological, cost-benefit analysis, resembling the 
economic approach of law.  
In particular, the Supreme Court held that expert evidence should be deemed admissible 
if the benefit of doing so exceeded the cost.617 The cost was not to be seen on financial terms 
but as referring to the impact such admission of the evidence will have on the trial.618 If its 
admission will have a gross impact to the extent that the evidence is not substantiated enough 
to be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the innocence or guilt of the defendant, such 
evidence should be rejected by the judge.619 When it comes to scientific evidence, such grossly-
founded evidence would entail evidence that was not based on an established scientific 
methodology or on an uncertain technique.620 
While reference to concerns tied to the undertaken methodology or technique are highly 
reminiscent of the Daubert parameter, the Canadian Supreme Court in Mohan did not explicitly 
endorse Daubert.621 Yet any thoughts of the Court adopting Frye in Mohan are refuted by the 
fact that the judges hold that trial judges are to assess each time the validity of a scientific 
opinion rather than refer to the prevailing views among the scientific community.622 
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The Supreme Court conclusions in Mohan were applied by the same Court in R v. J. L.-
J.623 In this case, the accused was convicted on first instance for sexual assault on two young 
male children. The first instance court did not accept the testimony from a psychiatrist who, 
testifying as an expert witness, asserted that the accused belonged to one of the groups 
mentioned in Mohan. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s conclusion regarding the 
admissibility of the expert’s testimony.  Siding with the trial court, the Canadian Supreme 
Court noted that the expert witness had not persuaded the court that his methodology of the 
tests administered to the accused was reliable.624 
Whereas Australia and New Zealand are in close geographic vicinity with  each other 
and Canada is close to the U.S., it could be argued that the geographic position played a role to 
these countries either following each other’s example and drifting away together from the 
classical English approach, as could be the case with Australia and New Zealand or doing so 
due to being too close to the U.S. and too much influenced by it rather than by England in the 
case of Canada. Yet, it is interesting to see whether Commonwealth countries equally 
thousands of miles away from England but also not close to the U.S., would opt to lean towards 
the U.S. Daubert standard or would aspire to undertake the classical common law approach as 
this is articulated in the English jurisprudence discussed above.  
Quite interestingly, both in the cases of South Africa and India which were taken as 
examples of such countries, courts have appeared ready to assess also the reliability of the 
undertaken method of expertise along a Daubert mode. This is the case despite the fact that 
neither India nor South Africa have only common law influences in their legal systems. In 
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India, although there has been a  debate on whether this should be the case,625 in criminal 
proceedings, Indian courts follow the adversarial system rather than the inquisitorial one.626 
Still, the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure has provisions that relate to the inquisitorial 
system.627 When it comes to witnesses and the law of evidence, this means that although the 
summoning of witnesses to testify in the criminal trial is a task bestowed upon the parties, the 
judge also has the right to examine any person as a witness even if such person has not been 
relatively summoned by the parties.628 
The discussion regarding the place of the Daubert standard in India’s criminal 
proceedings encompasses the perusal of both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian 
Evidence Act.629 The latter, a piece of legislation dating from 1872 and the days of the British 
Raj, contains instructions on how evidence is to be assessed by courts in both criminal and civil 
law proceedings. When it comes to the role of experts in trials, the Evidence Act focuses on 
the ‘relevance’ aspect of such testimony. As stated in section 45 of the Act on scientific matters, 
the opinions of persons competent to provide them are relevant for the clarification of any 
disputed points. This is similar to the wording of section 702 in the U.S. Rules of Evidence. 
Yet, whereas in the U.S. Rules of Evidence the Daubert standard is introduced in the discussion 
on the epistemological validity of the furnished opinions on reliability grounds, such a 
discussion in the Indian Evidence Act  remains in the realm of the ‘relevance’ framework. 
Additionally, section 51 states that ‘whenever the opinion of any living person is relevant, the 
grounds on which such opinion is based are also relevant.’ For example, the scenario is given 
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where an expert ‘may give’ as mentioned ‘an account of experiments performed by him for the 
purpose of forming his opinion.’ The use of the word ‘may’ instead of ‘must’ together with the 
treatment of the issue as a matter concerning the relevancy rather than the reliability of the 
testimony distance the Law of Evidence Act approach from that introduced by the Daubert 
standard. Moreover, section 293 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that a 
report compiled by a government scientific expert may be used as evidence without the 
provision proceeding to articulate on whether and how such report is to be assessed by the 
judge.  
This assessment gap is addressed by the Indian Supreme Court.630 Already in 1992, 
almost five years before the U.S. Supreme Court came to coin the Daubert standard, the Indian 
Supreme Court judges held that ‘the expert witness is expected to put before the Court all 
materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the 
Court on the technical aspect of the case by explaining the terms of science so that the Court, 
although not an expert, may form its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard 
to the expert’s opinion.’631 Of particular importance is the fact that this judicial pronouncement 
came together with the judges’ assertion that they would evaluate the expert’s opinions and 
reports in conjunction with the victim’s testimony, in that case a victim of rape. For the Indian 
Supreme Court expert opinions are meant to verify and buttress or not the victim’s account of 
the event, the same way the thesis envisions expert reports to play a similar role in international 
criminal proceedings.  
Similarly, in South Africa the legal framework governing expert witnesses contains 
both adversarial as well as inquisitorial elements. Thus, following the common law paradigm, 
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South African courts have held that the testifying experts must show that they have knowledge 
or skill in a particular field but they do not have to be professionally qualified in order to 
undertake such a task.632 On the other hand, and more similar to arrangements in inquisitorial 
systems,633 South African courts have clarified that an expert is seen as a helper to the judge.634 
At the same time, the role of ‘helper’ has not deterred courts from actually examining 
on their own issues that pertain to science. In coming to do so, the South African Supreme 
Court has crowned the reliability of the evidence as the defining parameter. This is exemplified 
in the way the Court has come to decide in different chronological phases on the question of 
whether the sniffing by a police dog of certain footprints, which ultimately led to the arrest of 
the accused, could be accepted as admissible evidence.635 In R v Trupedo decided in 1920,636 
the Court held to the negative. Innes CJ came to note that such evidence needed to be based on 
‘scientific and accurate knowledge’ of the dogs’ behaviour, and since such knowledge was 
lacking from the Court’s part, it could not but hold the presented evidence as inadmissible.637 
This stance changed in the 1980s. In Shabalala,638 the Supreme Court held that the Court’s 
utterance in Trupedo should be seen as tied to the exigencies of the era and the ability at that 
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time to interpret dogs’ behaviours. Since then though, science progressed to the extent that, at 
the time of the Shabalala judgment, the Court deemed that such evidence based on dog sniffing 
could not be deemed ‘untrustworthy’, but rather should be admitted as reliable.639 The South 
African is reminiscent of the approach also courts in Cyprus take-another Commonwealth 
member- regarding the need for the judges to be persuaded about the authenticity and the 
scientific character of an undertaken method.   
          For example, in a criminal case reaching the country’s Supreme Court and 
concerning allegations that police officers had illegally exerted physical violence over certain 
individuals, the whole incident was video- recorded and two experts were called in to assess 
whether the video produced was authentic or not.640 One expert held that chances were that the 
tape was authentic although he could not say this on a determinative basis. The second expert 
was absolute and held that the tape was authentic.641 The Court of lower instance ultimately 
ruled that the authenticity of the tape could not be determined. In order to reach this conclusion, 
the lower instance judges casted doubts on the absolute conclusion reached by the second 
expert by referring to methodological elements of his analysis. In particular, the judges noted 
how the second expert did not explain in concreto the methodology he followed in the 
particular case but sufficed to just refer the Court to previous writings of his on the subject.642 
The case reached the Supreme Court which similar to a Daubert standard mode, reviewed the 
scientific methodology pursued by the experts and held that their methodology as well as the 
conclusions reached could bolster the claim that the tape was authentic. Along these lines, the 
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640 Anotato Dikastirio Kiprou, Deyterovathmia Diadikasia, Genikos Isageleas tis Dimokratias v. Andrea 
Eustathiou et als., No.56/2009-65/2009 (in Greek) [Supreme Court of Cyprus, Proceedings on Appeal, The 




641 Ibid  
642 Ibid  
145 
 
Supreme Court ordered the case retrial.643 In another criminal case concerning the beating of 
an individual by the defendants, the District Court of Ammohostos resorted to the expert 
evidence of doctors in order to assess the head injuries the victim had sustained. Along these 
lines, the Court discredited the expert opinion of one of the doctors because he had not 
conducted an examination of the case on his own but had blindly relied on the findings of one 
of the other doctors serving as experts.644 
All these case from these three different Commonwealth jurisdictions which can’t be 
argued that they share much apart from their Commonwealth membership, demonstrate how 
even among Commonwealth members the traditional stance of English law regarding expert 
witnesses tends to give its place to one that favours more the review of the reliability not only 
of the persons posing as experts but also of the scientific conclusions themselves. The next 
section will examine whether this is true also in the case of Ireland and Israel.  
 
5.4 The cases of Ireland and Israel and the question of the Daubert standard 
application in non-Commonwealth countries  
               Whereas the previous section explored the impact of the English law arrangements 
on Commonwealth states, the current one wishes to shift the focus upon states which were once 
part of the British Empire, but are not current Commonwealth members in order to see whether 
the English arrangements continue to play a prominent role on how these jurisdictions look at 
the role of experts in criminal trials. Ireland and Israel will be discussed as two such examples.   
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Indeed, heavily influenced by their English peers, Irish courts have traditionally only 
viewed the issue of expert evidence through the lens of relevancy. Yet in the aftermath of 
Daubert, in its 2008 report, the Irish Law Reform Commission645 examined the possibility of 
Ireland also adopting the Daubert reliability standard in the assessment of evidence.646 
Explicitly stating the pros and cons of such a move, the Commission’s members, including a 
retired judge of the Supreme Court, solicitors, and a university professor, advocated for such a 
step.647 
Irish courts have also related to the need for judges to base their judgments on 
scientifically reliable evidence. In The People (DDP) v. Fox, the Special Criminal Court did 
not accept as admissible the expert’s opinion meant to prove that the defendant had signed a 
particular document. The Court exerted criticism of the expert due to the fact that he relied only 
on lower case writing without giving any reasons for doing so and did not proceed to provide 
any scientific criteria for his opinion.648 In The People (DDP) v. Ramzan concerning whether 
one of the defendants accused of drug trafficking was insane, the trial judge refused to declare 
the expert’s opinion as admissible evidence due to the fact that he based it on secondary 
sources, such as documents and reports, rather than on his own findings.649 The Court of Appeal 
conceded.650 
In The People (DDP) v. Kelly, the defendant sought to overturn a previous murder 
conviction on the grounds that the confession that had been extracted by the police was not 
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penned by him. In order to prove his point, the defendant relied on a new scientific technique 
called cumulative sum analysis (CUSUM) that could purportedly tell whether a document was 
authored by one or more persons. Two experts testified before the Criminal Court of Appeal 
and while one of them held that the CUSUM method was scientifically valid, the other held 
the opposite.651 In coming to decide on the matter, the judge held, as a decisive parameter, 
whether or not the CUSUM method has been published in any peer review journals. The Court 
noted that the expert supporting the scientific validity of CUSUM had conceded in the cross-
examination that the method had not been accepted in any court in the U.S. in the course of a 
criminal trial and that, once asked about the technique’s peer review scientific validity, he had 
referred to works of his.652 The Court concluded, then, that it could not accept CUSUM as a 
technique that has ‘a properly established scientific provenance or that it has achieved the 
requisite degree of expert peer approval.’653 Thus, the inauguration of the Daubert-inspired 
peer review element as a decisive parameter for the opinion’s reliability is noteworthy.  
The reliability of the provided expert opinions and reports has also been an issue before 
the Irish Supreme Court. In The People (DDP) v. Connolly654 concerning the conviction of the 
defendant on drug sale charges, a forensic scientist was called as an expert in order to attest 
that the packs of powder, found in the defendant’s possession, contained amphetamine. The 
forensic scientist testified before the trial judge that whereas she could not exactly determine 
the percentage of amphetamine that the packs contained, she had followed an ‘accredited 
laboratory procedure’ in its detection.655 Notwithstanding the fact that ultimately the Supreme 
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Court struck down the defendant’s conviction because it held that the prosecution should have 
also proved that the quantity of amphetamine present in each pack was significant and not as 
low as 1%,656 it did uphold the validity of the expert witness’s  testimony and stressed that her 
results came from an ‘accredited laboratory procedure’ based on ‘a statistical model for 
sampling.’657 In other words, the expert’s methodological grounds were deemed important for 
setting the validity of the provided opinion by reminiscing on the significance Daubert 
attributes to methodology. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s verdict.  
As noted in Chapter 4, apart from providing a mode of expert evidence assessment, the 
Daubert discussion is often seen as highly related also to the question of whether the judge 
should endorse a gatekeeping role. As seen in the previous chapter, much of the criticism 
directed towards Daubert relates to this gate-keeping role and along this line the stance adopted 
by the Irish jurisprudence on the issue holds a particular interest. To the extent that the relevant 
case is a civil law rather than a criminal law one, the thesis will deviate on this occasion from 
its principle not to discuss civil law cases relating to Daubert. The case revolved around an 
accident taking place when a worker tried to clear a blockage in a combine harvester.658 While 
ultimately the accident’s victim reached a compromise with his employer and was indemnified 
by the latter, the employer, in turn, opened judicial proceedings against those who had leased 
and supplied him the harvester. The employer argued that the machine was defective in the 
first place.659 On these grounds, experts were called in in order to assess how the accident took 
place and whether this was due to a deficiency with the harvester.660 
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The existence of different expert testimonies raised questions of whether they were, in 
fact, reliable, as their reliability was conceded by the parties themselves as a sine qua non 
condition for the admissibility of these expert opinions as evidence.661 Along these lines, one 
of the counsels proposed to the trial judge that a ‘threshold of reliability’ should be introduced 
for the assessment of the provided testimonies.662 When called by the Court to further elaborate 
on what this threshold would include, the counsel explicitly referred to elements put forth by 
Daubert, namely ‘if the opinion is supported by scientifically valid principles and criteria 
which enable the judge to test the accuracy of the expert’s conclusions’ and ‘whether the 
proposition advanced by the expert is both capable of being empirically tested and has, if 
practicable, been tested by the expert.’663 The Court, without being averse to the idea that expert 
evidence needs to be scientifically reliable, refused to endorse a reliability threshold and left 
the question open.664 
Ultimately, this is also how the Law Reform Commission came to view the question of 
the Daubert introduction in Irish law. In its 2016 Report, the Commission deemed it necessary 
to clarify that, while it supported the introduction of the reliability parameter in Irish law, it did 
not advocate the adoption of the Daubert standard to the extent that this would mean the 
endorsement of a certain threshold test which scientific evidence should meet and the 
responsibility of the judge to be a gatekeeper of such evidence.665 In that sense, the Irish Law 
Reform Commission made clear the distinction between the reliability component, on the one 
hand, and the role of the judges as gatekeepers on the other. It thus pointed to the fact that the 
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national legislator and national courts can plausibly endorse the Daubert reliability parameter 
without this meaning that they will have to also equally adopt the more dubious ‘gatekeeping’ 
role that Daubert came to introduce. 
            The importance cast on the scientific reliability of the furnished expert opinions 
and reports in the course of the criminal proceedings is evident also in Israeli law. The 
Israeli criminal procedure follows the adversarial system and it is the parties rather than 
the judge which bring in expert opinions to support their claims.666 At the same time, 
whereas the Criminal Procedure Act states that the court can order an expert to submit 
a written opinion on a matter of scientific or technical expertise,667 it does not contain 
any details on how such an opinion is to be assessed or on the elements it must be 
contain. On this, it is the Israeli Supreme Court that has held in a number of cases that 
any expert opinions must be based on scientifically reliable grounds.  
For many years, spanning well over the decade of the 80s, Israeli courts tended to admit 
evidence, including expert evidence, even when it was not reliable.668 With the exception of 
cases referring to polygraph examinations, courts generally did not take the step to establish 
concrete rules for assessing evidence. The fact that such evidence came from a credible expert 
and was relevant to the case, was enough in order for it to be admitted to the trial proceedings,669 
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although in some instances the Israeli Supreme Court did stress the need for some type of expert 
evidence, like for example videotapes, to be also reliable.670 
This reliability parameter has been underlined the last few years in a number of Israeli 
Supreme Court judgments. For example, in 2003, in a rape case and coming to answer the 
question of what role the DNA could play in determining the rapist’s identity, Judge Chesin 
held that any scientific evidence brought before the Court should be reliable and acceptable by 
the wider scientific world. Whereas though such an acceptance reference would make someone 
think that Judge Chesin endorsed Frye rather than Daubert in the admissibility of expert 
evidence question, he proceeded to state-echoing Daubert- that the scientific theory in question 
need not be accepted by all the scientific community.671 
In 2010, in a criminal law case concerning a woman who in the age of 26 initiated legal 
proceedings against her father for acts of rape and incest he performed on her between the age 
of 6 to 10, the judges had to decide on whether repressed memories could be scientifically valid 
in order to constitute the basis for the woman’s story.672 Writing the Court’s judgment, Judge 
Amit explicitly went over the scientific bibliography and referred extensively to cases in the 
United States in order to reach the conclusion that the repressed memories academic writing 
established a school of scientific thought ‘ according to the spirit of Daubert’.673 On this 
account, Judge Amit referred to a previous judgment of the Supreme Court dating from the 
‘90s when Judge Zamir had held that in order for a scientific theory to be deemed as belonging 
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to a school of thought, it must not necessarily be shared by all experts in the field or its 
postulations to be regarded as almost certain; rather the important thing was that the proposed 
view was scientifically reliable.674 Based on this, Judge Amit proceeded to accept the repressed 
memories arguments as a basis for incriminating the father. 
          The fact that for the Israeli Supreme Court scientific reliability can be demonstrated each 
time ad hoc even if a priori the reached conclusions do not abide by the dominant views of the 
scientific community, echoes Daubert rather than Frye. Yet, similar to the case of Ireland, the 
question of whether the need for the judge to assess each time the presented scientific opinions 
means that he should be awarded also a gatekeeping role, has been more controversial among 
Israeli judges.  
          Whereas, judgments like the one penned by Judge Chesin and mentioned above have 
been seen as endorsing such gate-keeping role,675 other Supreme Court judges have hailed to 
state that in the Israeli legal order, Daubert should be seen as part of the question of how much 
weight is to be attached to the presented evidence rather than a question related to its 
admissibility in the proceedings.676 Indeed, it can be argued that the Israeli legal order has 
moved from the endorsement of Frye to an approach which views all issues of expert evidence 
as matters pertaining to the weight due to be awarded to the furnished evidence rather than to 
its admissibility in the first place.677 The Daubert standard parameters of the validity of 
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scientific evidence including its acceptance among the scientific community, the methodology 
undertaken in the expert report or its margin of error, are not seen as relating to whether this 
particular report should be discharged or not but whether this should be the case altogether for 
the suggested scientific field upon which this report is based.  
 This has been rendered evident in the Court’s approach taken in a case where the 
defendant appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court for his conviction on manslaughter.678 One of 
the main issues that emerged before the Supreme Court appeal was the credibility of an expert’s 
report on the shoeprints that were found in the site of the crime and according to the prosecution 
belonged to the defendant. The defence attorneys questioned the admissibility of the shoeprints 
expert report as evidence.679 
Writing the Court’s judgment, Judge Hendel noted that since it had been held by the Court in 
previous decisions that shoeprints formed a valid scientific field, there could be no doubt that 
a shoeprint report could be admissible as evidence.680 Having stated this, Judge Hendel 
proceeded to examine the validity of the report provided therein and found several blemishes 
in its methodology and margin of error. On this account, he proceeded to hold that the particular 
report should hold ‘limited’ value as evidence.681 In order to reach this conclusion, Judge 
Hendel referred to the lack of statistical data, the disagreement among the experts, the 
methodology followed and the margin of error.682 In other words, all these elements which in 
the U.S. have been typical components of the Daubert standard in order for the judge to decide 
upon the admissibility of expert evidence, serve in the Israeli jurisprudence to determine the 
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weight of such evidence.683 This is explicitly stated by Judge Hendel that ‘following Daubert, 
and its endorsement in our legal order, the rules have changed. The time has come to require a 
minimal threshold before attributing weight to a certain piece of scientific evidence, even if its 
admissibility has not been rejected in general terms.’684 
 As already noted in chapter 4, such an approach runs the danger of entering pseudo-
science as part of the considerations the judge has to take into account in coming to render his 
judgment685 and it is this risk that prompted the endorsement first in Frye and then in Daubert 
of certain standards of expert evidence assessment. Moreover, by holding that expert evidence 
should be assessed on the basis of its weight rather than on admissibility grounds, the Israeli 
courts end up perusing such evidence. Even if ending up attributing zero or minimal weight to 
them, it has been argued that the existing stance of the Israeli jurisprudence is highly 
problematic.686 The fact that the judge is exposed to expert evidence which in other 
jurisdictions might not pass the admissibility threshold due to their dubious scientific validity, 
raises the stakes that the final judgment will be ultimately influenced by such an exposure.687 
On this account, the reliability parameter to which the Israeli legal order adheres, can be seen 
as a  safeguard of minimizing any adverse repercussions of the aforementioned stance.  
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The current chapter has traced the Daubert standard in common law jurisdictions 
outside of the U.S. Acknowledging the role the United Kingdom has historically played in 
political and legal developments in the common law countries, the chapter started its analysis 
with expert evidence in England and Wales. It then proceeded to encompass large common law 
countries such as Australia, Canada, and India which are Commonwealth Members, but also 
included Ireland and Israel, which were once part of the British Empire, but are now not part 
of the Commonwealth. The comparative analysis found that the examined legal orders do 
include the requirement for the judge to base his judicial analysis and discussion of matters of 
expertise on scientifically reliable grounds which can include also views which are not 
dominant among the scientific community. For this though to happen, the judge has to delve 
into the methods and conclusions of the experts as the Daubert standard advocates, without this 
necessarily meaning that foreign jurisdictions like Ireland or Israel have also endorsed the gate-
keeping role of the judge that the standard calls for.   
It could be argued that the readiness of common law jurisdictions to endorse Daubert 
and the way the standard entrusts the discussion of what is scientifically reliable to the judge 
rather to the general conclusions of the scientific community, should be expected due to the 
common features all common law jurisdictions share, the U.S. one being no exception. On 
these grounds, the litmus test is whether the Daubert precepts and the requirement for the judge 
to discuss issues of expertise on scientific grounds that he will term as reliable in relation to 
the specific facts before him, can be met also in other jurisdictions beyond the common law 
world. This is something that the next chapter will discuss.  
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Chapter 6: The Daubert Standard Beyond the Common Law World 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the Daubert standard can be seen as being 
relevant in the most representative common law jurisdictions. Yet, in order to be considered to 
constitute a general principle of law, the standard must also be pertinent in jurisdictions beyond 
the common law world. These jurisdictions can be clustered in three major categories. The first 
relates to the jurisdictions in Europe which have traditionally endorsed the inquisitorial system. 
On these grounds, in addition to Germany, France, and Spain which have historically impacted 
on other jurisdictions around the globe, jurisdictions all over Europe, from Finland and Sweden 
in the Scandinavia to Greece and Portugal in the south will be explored in order to see whether 
the inquisitorial system is also amenable to Daubert. The second category relates to 
jurisdictions which historically have roots in continental law and the inquisitorial system, but 
have decided at a particular historical phase to adopt the adversarial system in criminal 
proceedings. Examples of such jurisdictions include a number of Latin American countries and 
Italy. Finally, the third category includes states which, although never under the colonial rule 
of any European powers, have come under Western influence in their legal systems and have 
adopted elements of the inquisitorial system. States in the Far East, for example China and 
Japan, can be considered as examples of such hybrid legal systems688 and will be examined as 
such in relation to if and how they have come to endorse the Daubert standard principles.  
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6.2 The Daubert Standard in Inquisitorial Criminal Jurisdictions in Europe 
 
In inquisitorial criminal jurisdictions, the initiative for expert witnesses to come and 
testify is mainly undertaken by the presiding judge in the trial. To this extent, the introduction 
of these experts in the trial by the judge is done through an already drafted list that is at the 
court’s disposal and this renders it less possible for the judge to ultimately cast doubts on or 
reject their testimony.689 The presumption that their testimony is going to be trustworthy, 
relevant, and reliable lessens the need for the judge to apply Daubert-related criteria and 
scrutinize the report’s quality and methodology. This does not mean that such criteria are totally 
absent in continental law jurisdictions, yet they are provided in the beginning of the report’s 
compliment rather than in the end of the process. In other words, the judge instructs the expert 
to draft a certain opinion or report based on a certain scientific methodology, rather than coming 
to examine the existence of such a methodology after the document has already been compiled. 
Along these lines, this section will examine the relevant arrangements in some of the major 
continental law jurisdictions in more detail.  
6.2.1 Germany 
In Germany, the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts the judge with the task of 
introducing expert testimonies in the trial.690 These testimonies are meant to assist him or her 
with the elucidation of the facts691 and Section 73 states that ‘the judge shall select the experts 
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to be consulted and shall determine their number.’692 On this account, the judge can either 
respond positively to a relevant request posed by the parties to a criminal trial693 or act proprio 
motu and draw from a pool of experts.694 The requirement for the expert witness to be drawn 
from a public registry provides an assurance to the judge that the furnished report will come 
from an accredited expert in his or her field and thus will be donned with a mantle of 
reliability.695 On these grounds, although Section 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does 
not enclose any details on the particular components such expert evidence is to include, 
reliability becomes a major parameter. More specifically, when it comes to issues of science, 
such reliability is ascertained once the judge reaches the conclusion in accordance with the free 
probative value of evidence in German law that certain scientific methods conform to the 
‘general empirical studies of science.’696 Often, this is with no recourse to the expert witnesses. 
The ‘general empirical studies of science’ (allgemeine Erfahrungssatze der 
Wissenchaft) phraseology may render the impression that German jurisprudence aligns with 
Frye. Nevertheless, such a conclusion would be incorrect. The question of whether a scientific 
opinion is reliable is not left to become a mere reference to the prevailing opinions among 
                                                          
692 German Code of Criminal Procedure StPO, 7 April 1987, Federal Law Gazette Part I, p.1074,1319, Section 73  
(translated in English under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Justice) available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.pdf  
693 Hinrich Ruping, supra note 692 at 2  
694 Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hornle, CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, Oxford University Press 
(2014) 511 (noting that in German criminal procedure it is the judge’s task to introduce witnesses, experts and 
other evidence) 
695 Michael Bohlander, supra note 691at 212. For the fact that the experts must be reliable see also Daniel Krause, 
Siebenter Abschnitt, Sachverstandige und Augenschein, Section 81(f), para.18 in Lowe-Rosenberg, DIE 
STRAFPROZESSORDUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ, Grosscommentar, De Gruyter Recht, Berlin 
(2004) 237 
 
696 On this see for example BGH, Judgment 11 June 1952-3 StR 229/52, LM No.9 to Section 261 of the Criminal 
Procedure (concerning the method of fingerprint identification). For the treatment of the fingerprint identification 
in U.S. jurisprudence see Lyn Haber and Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence 
under Daubert, 7 Law, Probability & Risk 87 (2008) 
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scientists. Rather, it is the task of the judge, each time, to ensure that reference to issues beyond 
the judicial expertise takes place on reliable grounds.697 
Along these lines, the German Federal Court reached important conclusions on the 
matter in a case reaching it on appeal from the District Court of the city of Koblenz 
(Landsgericht Koblenz).698 The case concerned the District Court’s conclusion that the 
defendant, accused of murder, suffered from a severe psychological disorder and thus should 
be admitted to a psychiatric hospital. The Court based this conclusion by unquestionably 
adhering to the opinion provided by a court-appointed psychiatrist. Despite the fact that the 
defendant’s lawyers cast doubts on the opinion’s epistemological soundness and asked the 
Court to grant permission for a second psychiatric evaluation to be undertaken by mental health 
experts endorsed by the defence team, the Court refused the request.699 On appeal, the Federal 
Court overturned the District Court’s verdict. The Federal Court emphasized that judges should 
not accept the findings of experts without investigating beforehand whether such findings were 
grounded on reliable scientific sources and whether the expert’s undertaken methodology 
corresponded to the techniques and methods established by the relevant literature in the field.700 
Judges must additionally ensure that an expert’s conclusions can be verified and that they are 
bereft of bias.701 
Whereas the Federal Court did not proceed to instruct judges on how they could 
measure the reliability parameter,702 the reference to the undertaken methodology seems to 
imply a Daubert-like test. This is further underlined in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 
244 holds in subsection 4 that the judge will not refuse the granting of a second expert opinion 
                                                          
697 Artur Appazov, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Springer (2016) 164 
698 BGH, Judgment 12 November 2004-Az.2 StR 367/04 
699 Ibid, para.4; Artur Appazov, supra note 698 
700 Ibid, para.28; Antonio Esposito & Christoph Safferling, Report-Recent Case Law of the Bundesgerichtshof 
(Federal Court of Justice) in Strafsachen (Criminal Law), 9 German L. J. 683,695,697 (2008) 
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if the provided first one is based, inter alia, on erroneous factual suppositions, contains 
contradictions, or the second expert ‘has means of research at his disposal which seem to be 
superior to the ones of an earlier expert.’703 
This reference to the means of research is particularly reminiscent of the methodology 
element underlined in Daubert. As the Federal Court has held, such ‘means of research’ must 
be seen as encompassing the research tools and procedures only, and not the overall esteem the 
expert enjoys among his peers.704 Along these lines, experts must provide the court not only 
with the results of their research but also with the followed methodology,705 so that their 
conclusions will denote the undertaking of a holistic approach on the subject.706 In that sense, 
this case to case duty of care entrusted to judges concerning the reliability of a provided opinion 
or report resembles more the ‘gatekeeper’ function Daubert reserves for courts.  
 6.2.2 France 
In France, expert witnesses have been part of the trial on civil matters as far back as the 
17th century.707 The first lists of experts that were introduced in the criminal trial were drafted 
in the end of the 19th century.708 In 1971, these lists of experts were unified with those for civil 
matters. This classified experts according to their specialties and drew the arrangements 
concerning expertise in French civil and criminal law close to each other.709 Decree No. 2004-
1463, as has been since modified by consequent Decrees, further updated the arrangements 
                                                          
703 German Code of Criminal Procedure StPO, 7 April 1987, Federal Law Gazette Part I, p.1074, 1319, section 
244(4)  (translated in English  under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Justice) available at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.pdf 
704 BGH, Judgment 21 November 1969, Az 3 StR 249/68, para. 49 (referring to the expert’s ‘Hilfsmittel und 
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706 Daniel Krause, Siebenter Abschnitt, Sachverstandige und Augenschein: Section 72, para.25 in Lowe-
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707 Rapport de la Commission de Reflexion sur l’Expertise, March 2011 at 4 
708 Ibid  
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regarding the composition of expert lists and the procedure undertaken for a particular expert 
to be included in these lists.710 The fact that the scientific fields from which experts will be 
called to offer their opinion are ordained by law has been seen as a way for the French legislator 
to keep ‘junk science’ outside the courtroom, thus mirroring the Daubert aspirations. In French 
law, experts are deemed to be ‘occasional helpers of the judge’ (‘collaborateurs occasionnels 
du juge’ or ‘experts de justice’).711 In that sense, any claims of expert bias are reduced, albeit 
not completely eliminated. Nevertheless, in that sense, the French criminal procedure addresses 
these bias claims by first allowing the parties in the trial to modify the questions posed to the 
expert712 and secondly by allowing them to contest the expert’s conclusions either orally or in 
writing.713 
Yet, while the French Code of Criminal Procedure details the procedure along which 
the judge is to ask experts to provide their opinions to the court and the possibility for such 
expert views to be refuted by the parties during the oral procedure,714 the Code is rather 
taciturn715 and does not contain any particular provisions on how the reliability of the provided 
expert opinions and reports is to be ensured. On this issue, the gap is filled by bodies, such as 
the so-called ‘Commission on Reflection of Expert Evidence’, convened under the auspices of 
the French government with the task of proposing reforms in the law of expert testimonies in 
civil and criminal law. In its report, the Commission underlined the fact that expert reports and 
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opinions must be written in clear language that can be understood by the judge and the relevant 
parties.716 Furthermore, in criminal matters, the judge must be ready, if necessary, to provide 
experts with certain questions that must be answered or with certain forms that he or she will 
be called on to fill out.717 These forms examine, inter alia, whether the conclusions reached by 
the expert are relevant, precise, and clear.718 In turn, expert opinions and reports that hold these 
characteristics of relevance, precision, and clarity also hold more chance of being equally 
reliable.  
In that sense, the Commission Report places the reliability parameter in the centre of 
the expert report’s discussion. This is the case despite the facts that its recommendations do 
not stress this reliability parameter as a precondition of an expert reports’ credibility nor do 
they contain any references to the Daubert standard itself. Yet, the emphasis these 
recommendations put on the fact that the judge is due to provide the experts with forms to be 
filled out can be seen as an attempt to ensure that the judge will receive a methodologically 
sound report, pursuant to the stipulations of the Daubert standard.  
Similar recommendations have also been put forth by the French High Court (Cour de 
Cassation).719 In these recommendations, the Court explicitly addresses the question of 
whether the judge, in coming to ordain an expert with a certain mission of compiling a report 
on a matter, should also specify the methodology that the expert must apply.720 It is noteworthy 
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720 Cour de Cassation, Recommandations de bonnes pratiques jurisdictionnelles, 15-16 novembre 2007: Sur la 
Definition de la Mission d’Expertise, Question 3 available at 
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that the Cour de Cassation recommendations refer to civil law matters. Nevertheless, the Cour 
de Cassation serves as the highest judicial authority both in civil and criminal matters and 
analysis of expertise in civil and criminal law has been combined in other public documents 
concerning expertise testimonies. One could, therefore, argue that the Cour de Cassation 
recommendations could be seen as applying mutatis mutandis also to criminal law matters,721 
especially given that the Cour de Cassation has not issued separate recommendations for 
expertise issues in criminal law.  
6.2.3 The Netherlands 
Traditionally, the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure was silent when it came to the 
introduction of standards for expert witnesses.722 Such standards on expert witnesses in 
criminal trials were introduced in 2009723 and, to a large extent, resembled those in the German 
legal system. There is a public registry of experts from which the judge draws each time an 
expert is needed to testify on a matter.724 Moreover, particularly for issues pertaining to 
forensics, the Netherlands Forensic Institute exists as a governmental organization meant, 
according to its statute, to provide high-quality forensic services to state authorities, such as 
the prosecution in a criminal trial or the police. The existence of such an institute echoes that 
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of the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the U.S. that attempts to ensure the 
reliability of forensic science in the aftermath of the Daubert ruling.725  
In comparison to the relevant arrangements in German law, the Dutch criminal 
procedure contains a much more explicit reference to the need for expert testimony to also be 
reliable. Section 51l of the Dutch Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that ‘the expert witness 
shall submit a reasoned report to the party who instructed him. In this report he shall indicate, 
where possible, which method he has applied, to what extent this method and the results thereof 
can be considered reliable and his ability in the application of the method.’726 
This need for expert opinions to be based on relevant and reliable foundations has also 
been mirrored in Dutch jurisprudence.727 In the ‘Anatomically Correct Dolls’ case, the 
defendant was convicted of sexual offences against children based on expert testimony 
provided through use of so-called ‘anatomically correct dolls’ that were used for sex education 
practices.728 The defendant appealed the verdict on the grounds that the expert opinion 
grounded on the use of these dolls could not be deemed to be reliable. While the Appeal Court 
quashed the appeal, the Supreme Court accepted it finding the case to be an opportunity to 
pronounce its general doctrine on the necessity for expert opinions to be reliable. Once such 
reliability is put under question by the defendant, a court must offer particular reasons why it 
feels compelled to rely upon the particular opinion.729 
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This emphasis on the reliability parameter is further noted in the Supreme Court’s 
judgment in the ‘Shoemaker’ case.730 In this judgment, the Court, requiring that the providing 
expert testimony be reliable, questioned the competency of a shoemaker to act as an expert 
witness and provide reliable information regarding shoeprints.731 The Court held that, although 
the shoemaker had experience in fitting approximately 400 orthopedic shoes per year, he did 
not have a similar experience analysing shoe traces and it was unclear which method he had 
used in doing so and why he considered this method to be reliable.732 
In that sense, although the Supreme Court did not formally endorse the Daubert 
standard, the emphasis these Supreme Court cases placed on the reasoning and the 
methodology of the provided expert opinion, rendered, in some instances, the impression to 
courts of lower instance that they should examine the validity of any provided expert evidence 
along the requirements of Daubert. For example, in a judgment dating from 2008, the Utrecht 
Penal Court of First Instance explicitly mentioned Daubert in coming to examine whether the 
provided expert testimony adhered to the standard.733 Finding this was not the case, the Court 
proceeded to assess such evidence according to its free probative discretion.734 
6.2.4 Greece 
Greece is part of those countries that follow, in their criminal procedure, the continental 
law legal tradition. Thus, when it comes to the role of experts in the criminal trial, the Greek 
Code of Criminal Procedure holds that these experts are to be appointed by the judge from a 
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list that is kept by the court.735 The Code gives details on how the experts are to be appointed 
as well as on their rights and duties.736 It states, inter alia, that the experts are to compile a 
written report which must be submitted to the court and must justify its conclusions, including 
those of any minority opinions.737 The text of the article does not describe, however, how the 
judge is to assess the provided report nor does it contain any explicit reference to the fact that 
the handed report must include information about the pursued methodology. In that sense, and 
faithful to its Germanic law heritage, the Greek Code does not endorse the Daubert standard. 
This does not mean, though, that the standard’s precepts and the need for the judge to be able 
to assess the reliability of any scientific or technical findings, in particular, are foreign to the 
Greek criminal system. Most notably they are found in the legislation concerning narcotics and 
the way the criminal judge is called to assess the psychiatric reports provided for individuals 
claiming to be drug addicts.  
The Greek penal law envisions much more lenient prison terms if someone is found in 
possession of drugs if he or she is a drug addict rather than a drug dealer.738 The defendant’s 
drug addiction then becomes a cardinal issue. In coming to pronounce a stance on it, the judge 
largely relies on the expert’s report which is ad hoc compiled. Along these lines, Act 3459/2006 
stipulates, in Section 30 subsection 3, that experts must decide whether or not a defendant is a 
drug addict and must determine the following: whether the addiction is physical or mental and 
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if this is possible also its degree; the specific drug and its dose that is mostly used by the 
defendant and the suitable therapy that is recommended in order for the addict to recover from 
his addiction.739 In that sense, the law in this particular case requires the judge to be able both 
to assess whether the defendant is or is not a drug addict through reliance on the expert’s report 
and  review the elements contained in it.  
When it comes to the assessment of psychiatric or psychological reports, Greek scholars 
have argued that, although under the Greek criminal procedure the judge is free to evaluate the 
evidence as he or she sees fit and thus reject the conclusions reached in these reports, the judge, 
in doing so, must provide explicit reasons for not accepting the provided reports.740 These 
reasons may relate to the real facts of the case, the applied scientific rules and principles, or the 
way the facts of the case have been subjugated to these rules.741 Along these lines, it becomes 
clear that, in order to do so, the judge must open a dialogue with the expert who provided the 
report regarding the Daubert standard precepts of reliability and pursued methodology.  
Moreover, Greek scholars have underlined the fact that expert reports can have an evidentiary 
value only once they present scientifically reliable conclusions extracted through the 
application of scientific rules and principles.742 
6.2.5 Spain 
Spain belongs to those countries that adopt the inquisitorial system in their criminal 
proceedings.743 According to the Spanish Criminal Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento 
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Criminal), expert witnesses are appointed by the judge and must compile reports that include, 
inter alia, conclusions reached according to the scientific rules and principles.744 Similarly, 
Article 788.2 of the same document also states that the reports of laboratories will constitute 
expert evidence to the extent that they follow the scientific protocol.  
This reference to the scientific principles brings the particular provision closer to the 
Daubert reliability precept.745 On this account, in the realm of the provision in Article 788.2, 
the Spanish Supreme Court has held that the defendant can bring experts of his or her own to 
contest the relevant laboratory reports, but still this must be done in a way that the judge is able 
to review the need for such experts to counter-argue the conclusions of these reports.746 In other 
words, the judge must always be able to understand the scientific debate in order to be able to 
rule on the necessity of the provided expert testimony from the defendant’s point of view. As 
well, such a judicial evaluation must be in tandem with the judge’s ‘gatekeeping’ role 
established by Daubert. This is further depicted in Article 588 of the proposed amendment to 
the Law of Criminal Prosecution (Anteproyecto de Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal) according 
to which reasons should be given for any contestation of the experts’ conclusions, although it 
was eventually abandoned due to the proclamation of general elections. 
This rapprochement between the Spanish criminal procedure and Daubert becomes 
more evident when looking at the jurisprudence of the Spanish courts on the issue of expert 
evidence in criminal proceedings. The country’s Supreme Court has not explicitly cited 
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Daubert on criminal law matters.747 Yet, in the realm of the civil procedure it has held that 
experts’ must explain, in their reports, how they reached their conclusions and which 
methodological tools they used.748 Similarly to the methodology quest requirement, Spanish 
courts also demand that experts explicitly state their reasoning in order for the judge to be able 
to hold whether he should admit the provided report as evidence or reject it.749 In that sense, 
the non-discussion of Daubert in criminal matters so far, seen in conjunction with the cited 
provisions of the Law of Criminal Prosecution, should not be interpreted as an aversion of the 
Spanish courts towards the requirements of the standard and the need for judges to also base 
their pronouncements on firm scientific principles in criminal proceedings.  
This was reaffirmed in the Draft Code of Criminal Procedure (Proyecto de Codigo 
Procesal Penal) which was drafted in 2013 in order to replace the Law of Criminal Prosecution 
which was deemed, due to certain parts, to not offer satisfactory solutions to the challenges 
criminal justice faces.750 Ultimately, due to political reasons, the Draft Code was not adopted751 
but it is interesting to note that when it came to the assessment of expert evidence, it 
incorporated the Daubert standard paradigm.  
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Along these lines, the concept of reliability, as one of the precepts that should govern 
expert testimonies,752 is found in Article 400 in the Draft Code, which is similar to Article 478 
of the Law of Criminal Prosecution. The Draft Code held that the expert’s report should also 
contain, among other things, the conclusions which should conform to the principles, rules, and 
techniques of the expert’s scientific, artistic, technical, or practical field.753 The words 
‘techniques’ ‘technical’ and ‘practical’ which were added to the Draft Code seem to depict a 
Daubert trilogy influence. It is also noteworthy that scientific and technical knowledge appear 
together in section 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence.  The Daubert influence is even 
starker in article 401 of the Draft Code which states that the experts can be called to testify 
orally before the court, inter alia, on the methodology they used in order to reach their 
conclusions. This particular provision is to be contrasted with article 483 of the Law of 
Criminal Prosecution, however, which states that the judge can pose questions to the experts 
and ask for clarifications, but does not make any explicit reference to methodological issues.    
The role that the Daubert standard imparts on expert reports in the Spanish Criminal 
Procedure becomes more acute when it comes to the appraisal of psychological matters. Along 
these lines and depicting a clear Daubert influence, the Psychologists’ Deontological Code 
holds, in Article 48, that the psychological reports have to be clear, precise, rigorous, and 
intelligible.  They have to define the scope of their conclusions, limitations, degree of certainty, 
and the techniques they employed to reach certain conclusions.754 
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6.3 The Daubert Standard Beyond the Common Law/Continental Law Divisions: Europe, 
the Far East, and Latin America 
 
As noted in chapter 4, the distinction between the adversarial and the inquisitorial 
systems largely follows the division between common and continental law. Yet, there have 
been cases of countries that came from a continental law background but ultimately decided to 
adopt the adversarial system in their criminal procedures. Examples of such countries can be 
found all over the globe with the exception of Africa. Africa as a continent is a sui generis 
category due to the fact that, so far, there has been no known case of a state that came from the 
continental law heritage but imbedded common law elements in its criminal proceedings. This 
is true both for countries that are former German or French colonies as well as states, such as 
Cameroon,755 South Sudan756 or Rwanda757 that could have undertaken a common law 
                                                          
755 For this history and how part of Cameroon was under British trusteeship before the country gained 
independence, see Andrew Ewangsone, Criminal Procedure in Cameroon: From Dualism to a Common Code in 
READINGS IN THE CAMEROON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (Andrew Ewangsone ed., Presses Universitaires 
d’Afrique, 2007) 15-16. As the State of Cameroon notes in its response to the UN Human Rights Committee on 
account of its 4th periodic report ‘Cameroon is a bijural country with the common law and civil law systems 
being applicable.’ On this see ICCR, Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports submitted by States 
Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, CCPR/C/CMR/4, 11 May 2009, para.47. On this account, see also the 
Cameroon Criminal Procedure Code which, when it comes to expert opinions, seems to follow the French 
model containing no provisions on how these opinions are to be assessed by the judge. On this see Criminal 
Procedure Code, Law No. 2005 of 27 July 2005, sections 203-217 available at 
http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/Cameroon/Criminal%20Procedure%20Code%20Cameroon%202005.pdf .The fact that French law 
elements are entrenched in Cameroon’s legal system is further demonstrated by the fact that the French model of 
law reform commissions was adopted for the drafting of a criminal procedure code. On this see Andrew 
Ewangsone, Criminal Procedure in Cameroon: From Dualism to a Common Code in READINGS IN THE 
CAMEROON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (Andrew Ewangsone ed., Presses Universitaires d’Afrique, 2007) 21 
756 After its independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan adopted common law. On this see Kuang Harriet 
Logo Mulukwat, The Formative Stages of Common Law in South Sudan: The Ensuing Consequences for the 
Judiciary, June 3 2014 at 6 available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445313&download=yes. Yet, its criminal procedure code 
does not contain any provisions on how the judge is to assess the experts’ reports. On this see South Sudan Code 
of Criminal Procedure Act 2008, section 213 just stipulating that ‘Any document purporting to be a report under 
the hand of any expert in bacteriology, physiology, biology, pathology, chemistry or other branch of scientific 
knowledge in the civil service of Southern Sudan or other parts of the Sudan, regarding any matter or thing duly 
submitted by him or her for examination or analysis in the course of any proceedings under this Act, may be used 
as evidence in any trial or other proceeding under this Act.’ (Code of Criminal Procedure Act 2008 published at 
the Southern Sudan Gazette No.1 Volume 1, 10 February 2009 available at 
http://www.gurtong.net/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HwVixTfxA0Y%3D&tabid=342)  
757 After the 1994, Rwanda made a turn to common law, yet its code of criminal procedure code does not reflect 
this, the relevant provision on the assessment of expert opinions stipulating that the judge will ask for the 
reasons behind the experts’ opinions only in case two or more opinions are conflicting. On this see Law 
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approach in their criminal proceedings due to their unique colonization and political historical 
background and the role common law came to play as a result.  
Along these lines, the case of Namibia must be cited. Namibia is a country which has 
gone through a German continental law colonization period, but spent a considerable period of 
time under South African rule beforehand. For historical reasons, the South African legal order 
entails continental law elements due to the Dutch rule,758 hence Namibia and a number of other 
countries in the region, for example Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, are 
considered have a hybrid legal system.759 Nevertheless, as is the case with Botswana since its 
independence,760 Namibia has also showed a particular orientation towards common law, at 
least when it comes to criminal matters.761 As a country most recently acquiring its 
independence in this region, the Namibian example can serve as a paradigm for the other 
countries in the region that also have a hybrid. 
The criminal proceedings in Namibia follow the adversarial system. This is manifested, 
among other things, by the fact that according to the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act 2004, 
it is the parties that call in expert witnesses.762 However, this Act does not contain any 
                                                          
No.30/2013 of 24/5/2013 Relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Gazette, No.27 of 08/07/2013, 
article 83. For the adoption of common law by Rwanda after the genocide see Kuang Harriet Logo Mulukwat, 
The Formative Stages of Common Law in South Sudan: The Ensuing Consequences for the Judiciary, June 3 
2014 at 14-15 available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445313&download=yes  
758 Francois du Toit, Roman-Dutch Law in Modern South-African Succession Law, Ars Aequi 278-79 (2014) 
available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/147c/1f66472afa468f63515c55ecc0bcfa3d0e8b.pdf 
759 Dunia Zongwe, Equality has no Mother but Sisters: The Preference for Comparative Law over International 
Law in the Equality Jurisprudence in Namibia in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION IN AFRICA (Magnus Killander ed., 2010, Pretoria University Law Press) 137 
760 Charles Manga Fombad, Botswana and the Dynamics of Legal Modernization within a Dual English 
Common Law/Roman Dutsch Law Legal Heritage, 13 African J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 7 (2005) 
761 Sam Amoo & Isabella Skeffers, The Rule of Law in Namibia in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
NAMIBIA, (Nico Horn & Anton Bosl eds., 2008) 17,32. In this realm, it is interesting to note that this adherence 
to common law has not always been to English common law but to common law as developed by the courts of 
South Africa. For the fact that this has been the case with courts in Botswana, see Gardiol J. van Niekerk, The 
Application of South African Law in the Courts of Botswana, 37 The Comparative & Int’l. L. J. Southern Africa 
312,318 (2004)  
762 Namibia, Criminal Procedure Act, 2004 (Act. No.25 of 2004), section 173 available at 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/223230. For the fact that generally proceedings in Namibian courts can have 
also continental law elements when it comes to the law of evidence, see the Rules of the High Court drafted in 
2014 where it is stated that the court can appoint an expert, similarly to what is the norm in continental law 
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arrangements on how judges are expected to assess the furnished expert opinions and reports. 
Section 173 holds that the accused can call an expert witness, rendering it clear that the 
proceedings are waged under the adversarial system and further stipulating that the evidence 
provided by the expert can be rebutted, but does not elaborate further on the grounds that this 
can be done on. However, when it comes to psychiatric opinions that must be provided to the 
court on whether an accused is fit to stand trial or not, section 86(3) goes into more detail 
regarding the reports that are required. According to this provision, such reports must contain, 
inter alia, ‘the purport of evidence that has been given that is relevant to the accused’s mental 
conditions or mental capacity.’ In other words, there must be a display of the relevant evidence 
before the judge that leads to a sanity or insanity statement so that the judge is put into a position 
of ultimately being able to review the particular piece of evidence. The message that is being 
imparted is that if this evidence is not scientifically reliable, then the provided psychiatric report 
will not be able to stand the scrutiny of judicial review. 
This same message on the need for scientifically reliable expert reports is conveyed 
more starkly in the Rules of the High Court of Namibia, being put into force by the Judge-
President of the Namibian High Court with the approval of the Republic’s President.763 Already 
from the first set of Rules enacted in 1990, the year the country became independent, the High 
Court stressed that expert witnesses were not be called unless it was accompanied by a 
summary of the expert’s opinion and the reasons for it.764 Similarly, in the 2014 version, the 
                                                          
countries. On this see Rules of the High Court of Namibia, Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, 14 
January 2014, Section 30 available at http://www.lac.org.na/laws/2014/5392.pdf  
 
763 For the position of the High Court in the Namibian legal judicial legal system both as a court of first instance 
as well as a court of appeal on civil and criminal matters see Geraldine Mwanza Geraldo & Isabella Skeffers, 
Researching Namibian Law and the Namibian Legal System, GlobaLex, December 2007 available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Namibia.html 
764 Rules of the High Court of Namibia, Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, 10 October 1990 at 
99-100 available at http://www.lac.org.na/laws/1990/90.pdf 
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Rules became more eloquent regarding expert opinions and their reports.765 Not only does 
section 29 of the 2014 Rules repeat that the expert must cite the reasons behind his or her 
opinion, as stated in the 1990 Rules, it also goes one step further. Section 31 states that if the 
expert thinks that an experiment is necessary in order for him to shape his view, he must notify 
the trial parties accordingly and invite them to attend the experiment. Whereas the Rules do 
not provide any explicit justification for such a procedure, the reference to experiments as part 
of an expert’s view is highly reminiscent of the prominent role science plays under Daubert. 
The need for the parties to be present while the experiment takes place serves the Daubert 
requirement for the underlying methodology to be clear so that, ultimately, it can be put under 
judicial review.    
This ideological approach of the Daubert standard precepts regarding expert evidence 
that can also be recognized in the Namibian legal system is equally met in a number of other 
jurisdictions around the globe that consciously move from the inquisitorial to the adversarial 
system. Thus, the Daubert standard will be examined beyond the continental law/common law 
divisions in three continents in the subsections that follow. The first subsection will examine 
Europe which includes states that have traditionally belonged to the continent’s western bloc 
and those that used to belong to the communist bloc, for example Italy and Poland. Outside 
Europe, those countries in the Far East which were never under European colonization, such 
as China, Japan, and South Korea will be examined in the second subsection. Finally, the third 
subsection will examine the move from the inquisitorial to the adversarial system in Latin 
America where a considerable number of countries have made the relevant switch.  
 
                                                          
765 Rules of the High Court of Namibia, Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, 14 January 2014 




6.3.1 The Daubert Standard and the Transition from the Inquisitorial to 
the Adversarial System: Italy and Poland as Case Studies in the 
European Continent 
 
Italy and Poland are good examples of European states that recently chose to switch 
from the inquisitorial to the adversarial system for their criminal procedure. For years, both 
countries partook of the continental law tradition, adopting the inquisitorial system for criminal 
proceedings. In Italy, from the moment the various states in the Italian peninsula formed a 
single state in 1861 till 1988, the influence of the French Napoleonic Code was evident in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure.766 Whereas certain amendments, particularly in the 1970s, 
brought adversarial elements, such as the concept of orality during proceedings into the Italian 
criminal procedure, still, the inquisitorial system remained the basis for any criminal procedural 
arrangements.767  
In 1988, a new Code of Criminal Procedure was introduced which, inspired by the 
Anglo-American adversarial system,768 came into effect in 1989.769 The new Code inserted 
features such as the adversarial presentation of evidence, cross-examination at trial, and the 
limited ability of judges to introduce evidence.770 These new features, particularly the 
limitation of the judges’ roles, were highly criticized, first and foremost by judges themselves 
and were seen as running contrary to Italy’s cultural values in criminal procedure which, 
                                                          
766 Giulio Illuminati, The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian Procedure Code of 1988), 4 
Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev. 567 (2005); Lawrence Fassler, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An 
Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 Columbia J. Transn’tl L. 245,248 n.18 
(1991)   
767 Giulio Illuminati, ibid; Changsheng Li, Adversary System Experiment in Continental Europe: Several 
Lessons from the Italian Experience, 1(4) J. Politics & L. 13 (2008)  
768 Ricardo Montana, Procedural Tradition in the Italian Criminal Justice System: The Semi-Adversarial Reform 
in 1989 and the Inquisitorial Cultural Resistance to Adversarial Principles, 20(4) Int’l. J. Evidence & Proof 
289,290 (2016) 
769 Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48(2) American J. Comparative L. 
227,228 (2000); William Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties 
of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 Yale J. Int’l. L. 1 (1992); Lawrence 
Fassler, supra note 767 at 251  
770 Giulio Illuminati, supra note 767 at 571  
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pursuant to the ethos of the inquisitorial system,771 saw an augmented role for judges and 
prosecutors.772 Along these lines, disbelief in the new system was portrayed through judicial 
rulings which expansively interpreted the judges’ powers to introduce evidence despite the new 
Code’s narrow discretion.773 The enacted 1988 Code did not fully adopt the adversarial system 
but rather kept some inquisitorial elements.774 This was further highlighted when, following a 
series of Constitutional Court judgments, Parliament passed a law in 1992  that added more 
inquisitorial features, such as allowing parties to introduce evidence that had emerged in the 
course of other proceedings.775 
This, though, was not the end to the Italian criminal procedure saga, as in 1997, the 
Italian Parliament reintroduced the adversarial system in its criminal proceedings. Yet, the 
Constitutional Court found such an initiative to be unconstitutional.776 As a result, the 
Constitution was amended accordingly in order to portray the lawmaker’s relevant volition on 
the matter. Article 111 of the Italian Constitution explicitly states, in its current form, that ‘the 
criminal process is governed by the adversarial principle for the determination of evidence.’ In 
2001, the new Italian Code of Procedure was enacted, returning back the adversarial system.777 
When it comes to expert evidence, the 2001 Italian Criminal Procedure Code includes 
provisions for the appointment of experts,778 but it contains no further details on how the 
provided expert opinions are to be assessed by the judge. Due to this, the Italian Supreme Court 
on civil and criminal matters (Corte Suprema di Cassazione) has come to explicitly make 
                                                          
771 For the fact that such an ethos provides a hostile climate for adversarial reforms see William Pizzi & Luca 
Marafioti, supra note 770 at 3 
772 Ricardo Montana, supra note 769 at 302-303 
773 Giulio Illuminati, supra note 767 at 571 
774 Elisabetta Grande, supra note 770 at 232 
775 Giulio Illuminati, supra note 767 at 571; Elisabetta Grande ibid at 232  
776 Giulio Illuminati, supra note 767 at 576 
777 Ibid at 581 




reference to the Daubert standard in a series of judgments relating to such an assessment, 
holding that the judge is expected to assert whether the expert’s proposed conclusions find a 
general acceptance amidst the scientific community. According to the Court, to do this, the 
judge must examine whether the undertaken research was broad, rigorous, and objective as 
well as the reception of the specific research by the academic community.779 At the same time, 
in the established approach undertaken by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, novel scientific 
theories can play a probative role. As the Court notes, it is enough that a scientific precept is 
generally acceptable given ‘the widespread awareness of the relativity of the scientific 
knowledge.’780  
The Court’s approach to scientific opinions is clearly perceived in the Municipality of 
Boca di Cardore case.781 The case referred to the petition the Municipality of Boca di Cardore 
filed before the Corte di Cassazione arguing that it had been wrongly held accountable for the 
collapse of a building that resulted in the deaths of many people.  In coming to examine the 
causality of the issue, the Court noted that the event was as a result of a multitude of factors 
that had to do with time and space.782 Since the judge must establish such causality based on 
science and experience,783 the Court took the stance that it should first ask what a scientific law 
is. In order to answer the question, the Court proceeded to set out a number of parameters in 
alphabetical order. These parameters were: 
                                                          




780 Ibid. In the words of the Court ‘è utilizzabile anche una legge scientifica che non sia unanimemente 
riconosciuta essendo sufficiente il ricorso alle acquisizioni maggiormente accolte o generalmente condivise, 
attesa la diffusa consapevolezza della relatività e mutabilità delle conoscenze scientifiche’ 




782 Ibid at 5 
783 Ibid  
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a) The need for the scientific precept to be general. 
b) The need for the scientific precept to be susceptible to review and verification. 
c) The need for the scientific precept to conform to one scientific theory. Thus, the Court 
must clarify that the corroboration of a scientific conclusion with an established scientific 
mantra should not be absolute. Reference is made explicitly to the Daubert standard and 
its criteria which are also enumerated by the Italian Court.  
d) The scientific precept to be either accepted or not by the wider scientific community.784  
  Along these lines, by applying these parameters, the Court found that lower courts had 
sufficiently established the casual link between the convicted individuals’ omissions and the 
collapse of the building and rejected the filed petition.785 Similarly, Italian scholars have equally 
argued for the assessment of expert evidence along the Daubert standard in the realm of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure.786 This is because, in Italy, although the new Code does not 
explicitly endorse the Daubert standard, collaboration between courts and scholars has led to 
the endorsement of an interpretation that moves towards this direction.  
The same can also be said in the case of Poland whose legal system, being an amalgam 
of the French and German legal traditions, is based on the continental law approach.787 Yet, the 
last few years have seen also an acute influence of common law in various fields, such as 
securities law, company law, as well as civil and criminal procedure.788 When it comes to the 
                                                          
784 Ibid at 5-7 
785 Ibid at 15  
786 Marco Serraino, “Cronaca di Una Morte Annunciata”: Perizia e Perito nel Processo Penale, Tra Tensioni 
Normative, Istituzionali, Culturali, La Legislazione Penale, 17 July 2017 at 12-14 available at 
http://www.lalegislazionepenale.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Serraino-luglio-2017.pdf  
787 Beata Gessel-Kalinowska vel Kalisz, Mixing Legal Systems in Europe: The Role of Common Law 
Transplants (Polish Law Example), 4 Eur. Rev. Private Law 789, 793 (2017) 
788 Ibid at 800-802 
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latter, this means that criminal proceedings have moved from an inquisitorial to an adversarial 
mode.  
The current Polish Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions which refer both to 
the appointment of experts as well as the assessment of their reports by the judge.789 As far as 
the latter is concerned, Article 200 holds that expert reports must contain, inter alia, information 
on the activities undertaken and the results reached. However, there is no mention in this 
particular provision about whether or not the experts must also provide details on the pursued 
methodology and whether this matter is to be assessed by the judge as part of the assessment 
of the conclusions even though scholars and the Polish Supreme Court have argued that this 
should be the case. Scholars have argued that judges must have a dialogue with the expert who 
provides the opinion and must check the validity of the following: the research activities and 
the way these were performed; the research methods and; the accuracy and probability of the 
scientific findings.790 On this account, the Polish Supreme Court has held that, in the case of 
expert opinions and reports, judges should not only review the logical correctness of the 
expert’s conclusions but also their scientific validity.791 This is because in the Polish criminal 
justice system of free evidence, the judge freely evaluates the evidence material. 
The validity of the provided expert report acquired a pivotal position in the Polish 
Supreme Court’s ruling on whether osmology could be deemed as a valid criminal investigation 
                                                          
789 Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, Act of 6 July 1997, arts. 193-202 
 
790 On this, see Joanna Dzierzanowska & Joanna Studzinska, Assessment of Expert Evidence in Polish Court 
Proceedings in Comparison to other European countries, 106 Problems of Forensic Sciences 456,458 (2016) 
790 Polish Supreme Court, III K277/06, LEX no.257859 cited by Jozef Wojcikiewicz, Judges’ Attitude towards 
Scientific Evidence, 3 Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo/Ljubljana 64/249,252-253 (2013) available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/133f/a9e0407b07beaa2944606db3d4b55999b948.pdf 
791 Polish Supreme Court, III K277/06, LEX no.257859 cited by Jozef Wojcikiewicz, Judges’ Attitude towards 
Scientific Evidence, 3 Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo/Ljubljana 64/249,252-253 (2013) available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/133f/a9e0407b07beaa2944606db3d4b55999b948.pdf    
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technique.792 The question concerned the use of police dogs for their sense of smell and whether 
to the extent that these dogs had smelled something suspicious, their findings could be admitted 
as evidence in criminal proceedings. On this account, the judgment that the Polish Supreme 
Court issued in November 1999 is path-guiding.793 In this particular judgment, the Court 
proceeded for the first time to hold that any osmology conclusions should be based on relevant, 
comparative scent trace tests which should be conducted in a faultless way and thus should be 
led by an expert. The Court not only held that osmology should be the object of an expert 
testimony, it also proceeded to outline methodological guidelines aimed at those experts who 
perform the osmological tests, stressing that the testing should be conducted in an 
irreproachable manner.794 
The treatment of the osmology issue by the Polish Supreme Court permits the reader to 
peruse the importance that this Court attributes to the methodology used by osmologist experts.  
Thus, in its judgment dated 28 July 2005, the Court accepted that when doubts existed 
regarding the methodological correctness of the osmological expert analysis, it could admit an 
additional expert opinion provided by a competent Institute.795 Yet, beyond the osmology 
question, the Polish Supreme Court has held also on other instances that expert opinions should 
be drafted in an understandable way and should include clear conclusions and a statement of 
the research methods undertaken.796 
                                                          
792Tomasz Bednarek, Legal Aspects of Osmological Expertise available at 
http://www.osmologia.wortale.net/302-LEGAL-ASPECTS-OF-OSMOLOGICAL-EXPERTISE.html  
793 Polish Supreme Court, V KKN 440/99, Judgment,5 November 1999 cited in Tomasz Bednarek, Legal 
Aspects of Osmological Expertise available at http://www.osmologia.wortale.net/302-LEGAL-ASPECTS-OF-
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794 Tomasz Bednarek, Legal Aspects of Osmological Expertise available at 
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796 Polish Supreme Court, Judgment of 28 May 2001, IV KKN 89/01, LEX No.51839 cited in Joanna 




6.3.2 The Daubert Standard and the Transition from the Inquisitorial to 
the Adversarial System: China, Japan, and South Korea as Case 
Studies in the Far East 
 
Despite the fact that they face important cultural, historical, and political differences, 
China, Japan, and South Korea are examples of three states defining a wider geographical 
region in the Far East that have never formally been under European colonization, yet have 
engaged in the continental/common law nexus when it comes to criminal procedure. Thus, as 
noted above, although these countries come from a continental law background, they have 
adopted elements which denote acceptance of the Daubert standard precepts mainly through 
the interpretative functions of their domestic courts.  
For example, with the exception of the Portuguese dominance over Macau and the 
British colonization of Hong-Kong, China is a country where European powers never set 
foot.797 This lack of physical dominion of the West on the Chinese political and legal systems 
rendered China the ability to develop itself with no preconditions or expectations of either the 
continental or the common law model. This does not mean, though, that the Chinese legal 
system has been untouched by any Western legal influences. The official evidence law was 
enacted towards the end of the Qing dynasty (1636–1912) and involved the transplantation of 
the legal system of Germany as well as that of Japan.798 While some scholars have seen such 
                                                          
Comparison to other European countries, 106 Problems of Forensic Sciences 456,458 (2016). See also Appellate 
Court in Gdansk, Judgment, 18 February 2015, II Aka 7/15 at Judicial Quarterly, IV 2015 at 249, 255 (in Polish) 
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797 For the fact that even after the withdrawal of the British, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region still 
retains its own common law-inspired legal system and thus does not fall in the analysis contained in the current 
section see Ronald Yu, Electronic Evidence and Electronic Discovery in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, People’s Republic of China, 13 Digital Evidence & Electronic Signature L. Rev. 26 (2016) 
798 Nanning Zhang & Douglas Walton, Recent Trends in Evidence Law in China and the New Evidence 
Scholarship, 9 Law, Probability and Risk 103,104 (2010) 
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Western influence as an anathema, others have pointed to the opportunities that such interaction 
with the West posed, as the Chinese legal system had the opportunity to adopt a system based 
on either the continental or common law countries. In fact, it has been argued that, particularly 
when it comes to the law of evidence, the Chinese legal system is not only seen as an amalgam 
of the continental and the adversarial law traditions,799 but also as further moving from the 
continental law model towards the Anglo-American one.800 This is because China’s legal 
system has features such as the inclusion of lay assessors in criminal trials801 and also due to 
the fact that since the 2012 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law, there is a possibility 
for witnesses to give oral testimony before courts pursuant to the adversarial law precepts.802 
       The Chinese legal system is, in principio, highly reminiscent of the continental one.803 
Along these lines when it comes to the role of experts in the oral phase of the trial, it is the 
court, rather than the parties, that has the prerogative of ordering an expert to testify.804 The 
parties can appoint their own experts, but only in order to refute the provided expert’s 
opinion.805 As stated Article 192 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, parties can appoint their 
experts in order to assist in the cross-examination of the expert evidence.806 Yet, largely, the 
role of experts in criminal proceedings is not considered crucial by the judges, with expert 
                                                          
799 Richard Wise et al., A Comparison of Chinese Judges’ and US Judges’ Knowledge and Beliefs about 
Eyewitness Testimony, 16 Psychology, Crime & Law 695,699 (2010) 
800 Nanning Zhang & Douglas Walton, supra note 799 at 114 
801 Richard Wise et al., supra note 800 
802 For the fact that the particular amendment and its content regarding witness oral testimony in criminal 
proceedings moved Chinese criminal law closer to the Anglo-American common law heritage see Zhuhao Wang 
& David Caruso, Is an Oral-Evidence based Criminal Trial possible in China? 21 Int’l. J. Evidence & Proof 
52,53-54 (2016) (referring also to the problems posed to the actual testifying of witnesses in oral proceedings 
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803 Nanning Zhang & Douglas Walton, supra note 799 at 104,112 
804 Bangda Chen, Examining Scientific Evidence in U.S. and Chinese Courts: A Comparative Study, 2 J. 
Forensic Sci. Med. 151, 156 (2016) 
805 Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, art.145, 1 July 1979 available at 
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china 
806 Ibid, art. 192; For a criticism on the institution of expert assistants based on the fact that these expert 
assistants do not have the same rights as expert witnesses see Bangda Chen, supra note 805 
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opinions being perceived to be ‘outside the legal scope of evidence.’807 As a result, an expert 
seldom appears before the courts to  present his or her conclusions orally and receive the 
questions of the parties.808 Once this though does happen, the questions do relate also to the 
reliability of the pursued forensics method.809  In other words, once the oral discussion of 
forensic evidence takes place, the Daubert-inspired scientific reliability parameter becomes a 
consideration to be examined. Although this does not mean an automatic embedment of the 
Daubert standard in the Chinese criminal order, it does mean that the Chinese legal system is 
not hostile to the standard and its precepts.  
Along these lines, it is characteristic that the Rules Concerning Questions about 
Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases published in 2010 by the Chinese 
Supreme Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministries of Public Security, 
State Security, and Justice, hold that, in coming to assess expert opinions, the judge will 
examine, inter alia, whether ‘the procedures, methods and analytical process used in the expert 
evaluation satisfy the required professional inspection and evaluation procedure and 
techniques.’810 Moreover, judges are instructed to examine whether or not the evidence 
evaluation criteria, including details on the expert’s inspection method, have been satisfied.811 
Consequently, errors in the expert’s evaluation methods and procedures must lead criminal 
courts to hold that the provided expert opinion cannot serve as a basis for the defendant’s 
conviction.812 
                                                          
807 Cong-Rui Qiao, Emerging Role of Expert Opinions in Chinese Criminal Justice, Blog of the Montaigne 
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808 Cheng Yan, The Guarantee of Reliable Application of Expert Testimony from the Perspective of Expert 
Witnesses’ Appearance in PROOF IN MODERN LITIGATION: EVIDENCE LAW AND FORENSIC SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 
(David Caruso & Zhuhao Wang eds., Barr Smith Press, 2017) 80 
809 Bangda Chen, supra note 805 
810 China’s New Rules on Evidence in Criminal Trials, (translated by Dui Hua) 43 Int’l. L. & Politics 739, 756-
57 (2011) 
811 Ibid  
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Similar stipulations and language are included in the Chinese Supreme Court’s judicial 
interpretation of the overall criminal procedure arrangements.813 Article 84(4) of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretational rules states that there is a need for the expert’s method to be subject to 
assessment by the judge who is instructed not to consider such reports when the expert’s 
‘evaluation process and methods do not meet the requirements of professional regulations.’814 
Whereas the Daubert standard is not explicitly mentioned, the need for the judge to take into 
account the validity of the expert’s methodology is an indirect reference to the Daubert trilogy.  
Like China, Japan is a country which was never conquered by Western powers. Along 
these lines, any western influences in its legal system did not come as a result of a western 
imposition, but rather as a decision of its rulers to turn their eyes towards the West in coming 
to shape the country’s legal landscape. The Meiji restoration in the middle of the 19th century 
saw Japan adopting the continental law inquisitorial system for its criminal procedure and a 
code of criminal procedure modelled after the French Napoleonic relevant code.815 The 1922 
Code of Criminal Procedure was based on German law and this continental law influence has 
remained evident even after World War II and is mirrored in the new Code of Criminal 
Procedure that was enacted after the war in 1948.816 The Code has been amended until then to 
address contemporary challenges that the Japanese criminal justice faces,817 but its main 
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orientation towards the inquisitorial system remains intact.. At the same time, after World War 
II and the Japanese defeat, it bears also considerable elements stemming from the Anglo-
American legal tradition818 due to the American presence on the country.819 
Along these lines, Article 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that the court 
may order a person of relevant knowledge and experience to testify as an expert, yet it does not 
contain any provision of the elements that the expert’s report must contain or how it is to be 
assessed by the judge. When it comes to expert witnesses in criminal trials, the focus in the 
Japanese system is on the identity of the expert rather than the appraisal of his or her findings 
which is similar to the case in those countries that follow the inquisitorial system. At the same 
time, the Japanese Criminal Procedure differs from other inquisitorial countries in that Article 
321(4), outside the framework established for the role of expert witnesses, holds that a 
document that contains the expert’s conclusions as well as the methodology used to reach these 
conclusions should be admitted as evidence.820 The reference to both the expert report‘s 
conclusions as well as to his line of thinking underlines the similarity to the methodological 
issues that fall under the review of Daubert.  
Having said this, it is equally true that in Japan, evidence has been traditionally viewed 
by professional judges and the law of evidence has been based on the perusal of thousands of 
documents. This has made judges averse to resorting to an expert’s help and insights.821 .822 
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Comp. L. Rev. 795,796 (2009) 
820 William Cleary, The Law of Criminal Procedure in Contemporary Japan, Hokkaido University, 28 March 
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821 Hirano Tetsuro, Discussion between Experts and Lawyers in Court: Proposal of ‘Conference of Evidence’ for 
Litigation requiring Expertise in Japan, 33 Ritsumeikan L. Rev. 13 (2006). For the fact that the judge did not 
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Similar to the stance in the inquisitorial system, the aim was for the judges to thoroughly 
investigate all matters that were brought before them in the course of the proceedings, even if 
these were brought in passim to the main question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. As a 
result, the tendency was for judges to admit all of the evidence and then assess it later rather 
than to hold a high admissibility threshold which would permit them to reject prima facie 
certain pieces of evidence as is the case in the adversarial system.823 
This turn of the Japanese criminal procedure towards the adversarial model happened 
slowly and gradually. A major reform in 2001 affected the role of experts before Japanese 
courts in civil trials,824 since in the criminal field such a massive reform was not possible due 
to the hurdles posed by the exigencies of the criminal proceedings and the difficulty to figure 
out how to enrich criminal trials based on adversarial principles such as these of directness and 
orality.825 Nevertheless, in 2009, the prospects for Japanese criminal justice to move towards 
the adoption of the adversarial model became more evident826 on account of the introduction 
of the saiban-in system.827  
This does not mean that through the saiban-in system, the institution of the jury was 
introduced in Japanese criminal trials,828 but rather, that in serious criminal cases, six citizens, 
                                                          
Capital Punishment in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA (Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds.,2013) 
Oxford University Press, 176 
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chosen at random, are hence ordained to serve as lay judges for one trial and deliberate together 
with three professional judges on the defendant’s verdict and sentence.829 Yet, as  a result of 
the saiban-in introduction to the trials, echoing the orality principle, criminal courts started 
relying less on written evidence and more on oral testimony.830 
The saiban-in’s lay status and their inability to cope with a bulk of evidence, has already 
prompted scholars to argue for the institution of admissibility guidelines when it comes to the 
presented evidence before the court.831 Although the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure has 
not been amended to explicitly incorporate the Daubert standard criteria, it would not be an 
exaggeration to argue that these criteria can be easily accommodated inside the Japanese 
criminal system. In fact, when it comes to civil litigation, scholars have lamented the fact that 
even though Japanese courts have started suggesting that the parties bring in their own experts, 
other than these appointed by the court, in case the parties’ experts’ reports are conflicting, 
there are no rules for the judge to adopt the one over the other.832 The introduction of the 
Daubert standard in Japanese law would solve this problem. 
Moreover, such an introduction would hold also a particular regional gravity given the 
region’s history and the influence Japanese law has come to exert over other legal systems such 
as that of Korea due to the peninsula’s Japanese occupation. Today, the adoption of a 
communist regime by North Korea renders it more difficult to trace any Japanese influences in 
its legal system, but such influences are more readily perceivable in the legal arrangements 
which are in place in South Korea. The legal system in South Korea, including its criminal 
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justice one, is heavily influenced by the European civil one due to the fact that the Japanese 
imposed their own system, namely a continental law-prone one, on the country.833   
The continental law influence on Korea’s legal system remained in place even after 
1945 and the Japanese retreat.834 Yet, while still entrenched in its continental law origins, in 
2007 the South Korean criminal justice system underwent a major reform which, for the first 
time, resulted in the introduction of the jury in criminal trials835 pursuant to the adversarial 
model. It is noteworthy that even before this reform, when it came to expert evidence, the 
Korean Code of Criminal Procedure dated from 1954 (Criminal Procedure Act from 2007 and 
hence) stipulated that the experts’ reports should ‘clearly’ contain the reasons behind these 
opinions.836 Such a stipulation has driven scholars to argue that ‘requiring experts to include 
their background and their research procedure in a written report of their arguments, would 
permit the court to better appreciate the framework and methodology responsible for the expert 
findings.’837 In that sense, although the Daubert reliability requirement has not been explicitly 
acknowledged, it is largely implied in Korean criminal procedure. It could be argued that if 
Japan also adopted the Daubert standard, such an endorsement could give a regional dynamic 
to the notion leading also Korea to explicitly proclaim it as part of its Code of Criminal 
Procedure. The effect such a regional dynamic can have to the inclusion of the Daubert 
parameters explicitly in national codes of criminal procedure, can be seen in the case of Latin 
America. It is the Latin American example that will be discussed in the next subsection.   
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6.3.3 The Daubert Standard and the Transition from the Inquisitorial to 
the Adversarial System: Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile as Case 
Studies in Latin America 
 
The Latin American paradigm holds particular importance. Despite the fact that, 
historically, its legal systems have continental law roots incorporating principles of the French, 
Italian, and Spanish legal systems,838 there has been a considerable number of reforms in the 
criminal law systems of Latin American countries in the last few decades that indicate a shift 
from the inquisitorial to the adversarial system or at least to a mixed one that entails adversarial 
elements.839 This shift should not be seen as an isolated attempt by these countries to merely 
change their criminal justice system. Rather, it is part of a larger phenomenon linked to these 
countries’ conscious efforts to instil transparency and more effective participation of the 
defendants in their criminal proceedings.840  
Quite notably, in some cases, as described below, this transition is also underlined   
linguistically through the new code of criminal procedure being called ‘Codigo Procesal Penal’ 
rather than ‘Codigo de Procedimiento Penal’. While, in both cases, the term can be translated 
exactly as ‘Code of Criminal Procedure’, still, the use of a different phraseology for the 
introduction of a new legislative text bears its own semantics. Moreover, as discussed in this 
thesis, while some countries such as Brazil still have not switched to the adversarial model841 
possibly implying the creation of a regional custom,842 other Latin American countries have 
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done so, indicating the  adherence  of the region to a certain model in criminal procedure that 
emphasizes a tendency that cannot be underestimated once the dynamics of the Daubert 
standard and its potential to constitute a general principle of law are considered.  This adherence 
is further underlined by the fact that even in Latin American countries that have not proceeded 
to incorporate the Daubert standard features in their criminal procedure codes,843 there are signs 
of these features given that, under the new adversarial mode codes, experts are required to 
discussed their findings orally.844 On this account, there are a number of Latin American 
countries which have made in the recent years this adversarial turn. 
Mexico is one of these. Historically, the country’s criminal law model has been based 
on continental law. The emperor Maximilian (1864–1867) briefly introduced the French 
criminal law code, whereas Benito Juárez, the president of Mexico, brought the Spanish model 
to the country.845 Then, in 1934, the Criminal Procedure Code (Codigo Federal de 
Procedimientos Penales) was adopted along the premises of the inquisitorial system,846 
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although Mexico never fully adopted the inquisitorial model.847 Thus, judges were left with the 
discretion to question the various witnesses, including the experts, during the proceedings.848 
Yet, when it came to expert witnesses, judges rarely resorted to them, relying, instead, on the 
testimonies of either the defendant or the victim in order to reach a verdict.849 Even when 
experts were contacted, it was difficult for both defendants and victims to access the experts’ 
findings or understand the methodology undertaken,850 this leading to a situation where both 
the defendant’s as well as the victim’s rights were jeopardized.851 
The systemic weaknesses that the application of the inquisitorial system in Mexico 
entailed, were rendered more acute in light of the dire criminal challenges that Mexico had to 
confront. For years, the country was hit with high criminality rates that led to the courts 
becoming overloaded due to the large number of criminal cases reaching the courts. The 
inquisitorial system led to lack of transparency in the followed procedures, to the detriment of 
the defendants’ rights.852 Along these lines, in 2008, the Mexican Congress decided to adopt 
the adversarial system for their criminal proceedings. What is interesting in the case of Mexico 
is that instead of the legislature amending the relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the Mexican Congress deemed it right to entrench the system change on a 
constitutional level. Under Article 20 of the Mexican constitution in its current form, criminal 
proceedings follow the adversarial system and are oral.853 With Mexico being a federal state 
comprised of different state jurisdictions, as is the case in the U.S.,854 Congress envisioned that 
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the constitutional changes that were put into force and the new Code of Criminal Procedure 
would apply in all Mexican territory by 2016.855 A draft Code was proposed for this aim.  
The Mexican Supreme Court has not explicitly referred to Daubert and while it has not 
discussed its criteria in criminal law cases, it has endorsed it in non-criminal law cases.856 
Whereas the current thesis only focuses on the application of Daubert specifically when it 
comes to criminal law procedure, one of the cases brought before the Mexican Supreme Court 
outside the criminal law framework highlights the thesis argument of how the application of 
the Daubert standard should be seen as combining both general, scientific findings and 
individualized reports and thus will be briefly discussed.  
The case concerned a member of the Armed Forces, who after being diagnosed with 
epilepsy, was asked by the army to retire. Contesting the army decision, the serviceman argued 
that the provision in Mexican law that held that epilepsy was a cause for compulsory retirement 
from the army was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of equality and the 
prohibition against discrimination.857 
The case reached the Supreme Court.858 There, the military serviceman argued that the 
medical certificate with which he was diagnosed with epilepsy was not scientifically reliable 
and could not be taken into account given that the military doctors did not explain the premises 
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upon which they based their conclusions and they resorted little to relevant bibliography and 
did not add the photostatic copies upon which they based their opinion. On these grounds, the 
Court had to assess whether the conclusions of the medical certificate could be buttressed by 
science and thus could be upheld with no further need to go into details of the certificate’s 
methodological validity.  
The Court was divided on the issue. The majority of the judges opted to rely on a 
scientific article on epilepsy that they found online that stated that epilepsy was an illness. 
Along these lines they ruled that the provision in Mexican law was constitutional and the 
Armed Forces could retire the particular serviceman without entering the discussion of whether 
the medical certificate could be deemed to be scientifically valid.859 On the other hand, the 
dissenting judge, Justice Minister Cossio Diaz, held that the provision was unconstitutional to 
the extent that it was too wide and it considered epilepsy as grounds for compulsory retirement 
in all cases, notwithstanding the fact that, according to science, there can be mild forms of 
epilepsy too which would permit an individual to continue his army service.860 Thus, similar 
to the way Daubert opts to see science and the assessment of scientific evidence, for Justice 
Minister Cossio Diaz it is each individual case that matters and any assertions contained in the 
medical certificate can be reviewed by the judge not in abstracto based on whether for example 
epilepsy is generally a disease and thus would not be unreasonable for the doctors to claim that 
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the serviceman before them did suffer from it, but whether this should be the case in concreto 
for the particular serviceman given the scientific findings of the doctors in the particular case.861 
The Mexican precedent in the endorsement of the adversarial system in criminal justice 
and within it the adoption also of Daubert, has a special value when it comes to other Latin 
American countries which face grosso modo the same criminality problems and have equally 
decided to make a turn towards the adversarial system in their criminal proceedings. Peru is 
such an example. For years, similar to the situation in Mexico, Peru’s criminal justice system 
was founded on the inquisitorial system. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Codigo de 
Procedimientos Penales), already in place from 1940, was based on the inquisitorial precepts 
and ordained that judges would be responsible for the appointment of experts who should be 
accredited experts in their fields.862 In cases where there were no such accredited experts, the 
judge could rely on the expertise of persons of ‘known for their honesty and competence on a 
subject matter.’863 Quite interestingly, Peru’s Code did not include anything about the experts’ 
reports and what these should contain. Rather, it just noted that judges will set the terms under 
which the experts must present their opinions and continued to delineate the procedure for the 
oral examination of the experts by the court.864 
In 2004, a new Code was introduced in Peru that embraced the adversarial model.865 
The Code contains an explicit provision on the content of the experts’ reports.866 Section 178, 
titled ‘Content of the Experts’ Report’, holds that such reports must contain details of the 
experts’ qualifications, a description of the facts on which the expert opinions were given, and- 
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most importantly for the current discussion- the foundations of any technical examinations, and 
citations of the scientific, technical, or medical criteria and the principles used by the experts 
to conduct their work.867  
The Daubert influence is evident in the explicit reference to the need for the scientific 
methodology to be present in the expert reports so that judges will be able to review it. Along 
these lines, Section 178 must be read in conjunction with the reference to science in Section 
172 where, contrary to the phraseology endorsed by the previous Code, there is an explicit 
reference to the fact that experts must have scientific or technical knowledge. Moreover, the 
elements that the expert’s report must comprise are included in Section 178 as part of a list 
which echoes the way the U.S. Supreme Court opted to list the relevant requirements in 
Daubert.  
The impact Daubert has exerted on the way expert opinions and reports are to be 
assessed in the course of criminal proceedings can also be discerned in the jurisprudence of the 
Peruvian Supreme Court. For example, in the case of Oyarse, the Court had to pronounce on 
the guilt or innocence of the defendants who were accused of pushing a player to his death 
during a football match.868 Reviewing the circumstances of the victim’s death, the Court had 
to call expert witnesses in order to establish whether the victim fell on his own after retreating 
in order to avoid the defendants or he was actively pushed to his death. In coming to assess the 
provided experts’ opinions and reports, the Court did not explicitly mention Daubert, but it did 
refer to the Daubert standard’s criteria. In doing so, the Court held that that in order for it to 
assess the rigor of the undertaken methodology, the experts’ reports should mention both the 
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196 
 
rationale through which their conclusions were reached as well as any undertaken discussions 
and deliberations the experts held before reaching the particular conclusions.869 
Colombia is another Latin America country which similarly to Peru, saw in 2004 the 
introduction of a new Code of Criminal Procedure. The adoption of the Code marked the end 
of Colombia’s continental law tradition involving judges commissioning expert opinions870and 
the beginning of its move towards the adversarial system and the U.S. Daubert standard.871 
According to the new Code, it is the parties who call on the experts.872 Section 406 ordains that 
experts are to be drafted not only by private entities but also from state institutions, for example 
the National Forensics Institute.  
Echoes of Daubert are evident in the Colombian Code not only from the way the judge 
must evaluate the expert opinions, but also from how experts are to be examined in court, and 
how the question of which scientific methodology was used must be clarified even during oral 
examinations. Scientific methodology is also a concern when judges evaluate the provided 
expert opinion, as Section 420 clearly renders that the judge is to take into account not only the 
experts’ ‘scientific and moral integrity’ but also the degree of acceptance of the experts’ 
arguments among the scientific community and the methods used by the experts to reach the 
particular conclusions. This requirement is further stressed in Section 422, where the Code 
explicitly refers to ‘scientific publications’ and stipulates that, in order for them to be 
admissible as evidence, they must satisfy a number of conditions which the Code comes to 
enumerate as follows: 
                                                          
869 Corte Suprema, ibid 
870 Luis Bernando Ruiz Jaramillo, La Prueba Pericial y su valoracion en el proceso penal colombiano, hacia un 
regimen procesal holistico (The Expert Testimony and its assessment in the Colombian Criminal Procedure, 
towards a holistic procedural regime) 45 Revista de la Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Politicas-UPB 481,495 
(2015) available at http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/rfdcp/v45n123/v45n123a07.pdf  
871 Codigo de Procedimiento Penal Colombiano, Ley 906 de 2004; Luis Bernando Ruiz Jaramillo, ibid at 485 




1. The theory has been scientifically verified. 
2. The theory has been published and has been addressed by the academic community. 
3. The methodology used by the expert is an accredited one. 
4. The methodology meets the acceptance of the academic community.  
The above conditions make explicit reference to the methodology parameters, 
particularly in an enlistment mode and clearly show the impact Daubert had on the Colombian 
Code’s drafters.  
Consequently, the Colombian arrangements cast their own influence on another Latin 
American country, Chile. The latter is an additional example of a country whose Code of 
Criminal Procedure shifted during the last few years from the inquisitorial system to the 
adversarial system.873 This switch is also denoted, inter alia, even in the slight alteration of the 
Code’s title from ‘Codigo de Procedimiento Penal’874 to ‘Codigo Procesal Penal.’875 At the 
beginning of the 20th century, Chile adopted the inquisitorial system for its criminal procedure 
and this remained in place for years. Yet, in 1995, a new Code of Criminal Procedure was 
presented to the Chilean parliament with the aim of reforming the country’s criminal justice 
system.876 The new Code, which ultimately became law in 2000, signified a split with the 
inquisitorial system through the introduction of the adversarial system.877 As expected, the 
                                                          
873 Bernardo Ramos Pavlov, Regulacion, Admisibilidad y Valoracion de la Prueba Pericial Penal en el Derecho 
National, Master Thesis at the Faculty of Law of the University of Chile, 2013 at 7-8 available at 
http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/116579/De36-Ramos_bernardo.pdf;sequence=1 
874 Codigo de Procedimiento Penal, Ley 1853, 13 February 1906, available at 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=22960 
875 Codigo Procesal Penal, Ley 19696, 12 October 2000, available at 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=176595  
 
876 Lydia Brashear Tiede, Chile’s Criminal Law Reform: Enhancing Defendant’s Rights and Citizen Security, 
54(3) Latin American Politics and Society 65, 69–70 (2012) 
877 Ibid at 70 
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differences were palpably exhibited on matters concerning the appointment and testimony of 
experts.  
Originally, mirroring largely the continental law model established by Spain during the 
colonial period,878 the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure (Codigo de Procedimento Penal) 
held that expert witnesses were to be appointed by judges from a list that was kept by the court 
and was updated every two years by the Court of Appeals.879 These experts were to be 
competent in the subject in which they provided their opinion.880 The reliability parameter was, 
thus, established concerning the credentials of the persons, similar to the Frye paradigm.  
When it came to the credentials of the expert reports themselves, Article 237 of the 
Chilean Code held that the reports needed specific information including: the report’s subject, 
the connection between the acts undertaken by the expert and the results produced and proof 
that the conclusions abided by scientific principles without though specifying how along a 
Daubert style standard test, the report’s conformity to such scientific principles could be 
assessed.  The nixing of any Daubert application under the previous Chilean Code is further 
underlined by the fact that the Code in Article 240 stipulated that if any clarification was needed 
regarding the content of the expert reports, judges were entitled to pose questions to the experts 
but could not explicitly point to the undertaken methodology.  
In contrast to this, the new Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure was based on the 
adversarial system and a Daubert-prone approach.881 Article 314 holds that it is the prosecution 
and the parties that have the right to introduce expert opinions and reports to the trial. The same 
                                                          
878 Ibid  
879 Codigo de Procedimiento Penal, Ley 1853, 13 February 1906, Article 221 available at 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=22960 
880 Ibid, arts. 220-221 
881 Mauricio Duce, Admisibilidad de la Prueba en Juicios Orales: Un Modelo para Armar en la Jurisprudencia 




Article also requires that the professional credentials of the expert must be provided to the 
judge and that expert reports should only be used when they are relevant for the proof of a 
factual point that cannot be illuminated without looking at the related scientific knowledge. It 
is evident that this provision, which largely incorporates the previous Chilean legal regime, 
endorses the reliability of experts and the relevancy of their opinions according to the Frye 
requirements. Yet, Article 318 takes a step forward towards Daubert, as it states that judges 
can pose questions to the experts during the oral proceedings in order to ascertain their 
reliability and the technical or scientific reliability of their conclusions.882 
The explicit reference to the technical and scientific reliability resembles Article 221 of 
the Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure which as discussed above, denotes the influence 
of the Daubert standard over the choices lawmakers in the specific countries make regarding 
the assessment of expert evidence,883 brings also the Chilean Code closer to the standard’s 
precepts. Furthermore, an echo of Daubert in the new Code can be found also in article 316 
which ordains the judge to examine the ‘seriousness’ and ‘professionalism’ not only of the 
expert but also of his or her report.884 It is reasonable to assume that in order for such judicial 
review to take place, the judge cannot but delve into a Daubert-related task of assessing 
elements underlying the report’s produced conclusions most notably the undertaken  scientific 
methodology and techniques.   
 
 
                                                          
882 Codigo Procesal Penal, Ley 19696, 12 October 2000, Article 318 available at 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=176595 
883 Bernardo Ramos Pavlov, supra note 873 at 28  
884 Codigo Procesal Penal, Ley 19696, 12 October 2000, Article 316 available at 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=176595, For the fact that the credibility of the expert is a separate 






The current chapter detailed the application of the Daubert standard beyond the 
confines of common law.  In that sense, it showed how the standard and the way it comes to 
look on how the judge must ensure that all matters of expertise are based and discussed on 
scientifically reliable grounds, can be applicable in jurisdictions all over the globe even if they 
largely pertain to the continental law tradition. On these grounds, the chapter examined first 
States like Germany, France and Spain which can be deemed the classical bearers of the 
continental law tradition and demonstrated how the Daubert reliability precept can be relevant 
also in these jurisdictions. The role of courts to this extent was particularly stressed. The chapter 
went on to examine continental law traditions in a broader sense, encompassing in its analysis 
jurisdictions which albeit historically belong to the continental law family, have opted in recent 
years to make a turn in criminal procedure to the adversarial system. The chapter further 
demonstrated how such turn in many cases like in Chile or Colombia, signalled also the 
entrenchment of the Daubert precepts in the new Code of Criminal Procedure adopted by these 
countries while in other countries like Peru, such an introduction of the Daubert standard in the 
domestic legal order should be seen as happening through Supreme Court decisions. 
Finally, the chapter put note to the regional dynamic that could trigger the endorsement 
of the Daubert standard principles and taking as an example the case of Latin America, 
examined also China, Japan and South Korea in the Far East, as examples of States where 
despite these countries’ strenuous past on a political level, their interwoven legal bonds and 
influence could possibly lead to a wider Daubert cognizance to the wider Far East region if the 
standard is explicitly endorsed by one of them.  
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The applicability in a number of different jurisdictions all over the world of the way 
Daubert looks upon the need for judges to base their assertions on matters of expertise on 
scientifically reliable grounds and not suffice to only accept as fait accompli any scientific 
statements presented by the experts, can give rise to the argument that the Daubert standard-at 
least as far as this reliability requirement is concerned-constitutes a general principle of law. 
Its relevance in criminal law as portrayed in all the cases discussed in this and the previous 
chapter, equally render it a general principle which can be seen as falling under the auspices of 
article 21 of the ICC Statute.  
Yet, even if conceded that the Daubert standard can be introduced to international 
criminal law, the question is whether international criminal law is amenable to its introduction. 
The fact that in the phase of the main trial international criminal courts and tribunals have 
refrained from viewing the assessment of the civilians’ suffering through a Daubert prism 
entailing the request of psychological opinions for the civilians specifically appearing and 
testifying before the docket, can arguably lead to the assumption that the courts are being led 
to this practice because taking individualized psychological opinions and reports into account 
is something that is outside their judicial ethos and legal mindset to the extent that as discussed 
in chapter 1, international criminal law puts the emphasis on the commission of crimes on a 
mass scale rather than an isolated, individual basis. In order to discuss this question of 
international criminal law amenability to Daubert, the next chapter will look how the 
international criminal tribunals discussed in chapter 2 and the ICC, treat the issue of civilian 






Chapter 7: International Criminal Courts and their Institutional 
Capacity to Engage with Mental Health Experts: A Look at the Stages 
beyond the Main Trial 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 2 discussed that when it comes to warfare’s psychological impact on civilians, 
international criminal courts and tribunals call on mental health experts in an inconsistent 
manner. The current chapter further examines whether this is because these courts and tribunals 
have an inherent inability to incorporate the findings of mental health experts in their 
judgments. This question holds significance given the fact that if international criminal courts 
and tribunals are structurally inept in engaging with mental health experts in an epistemological 
manner that explicitly includes discussing the relevance of expert reports provided and their 
scientific reliability to a particular case, any arguments for the introduction of the Daubert 
approach is bound to fail. On the other hand, if these judicial bodies have the tools, through 
their statutes and functions, to use expert reports in a way that integrates them into the facts of 
the case, the inconsistent approach described in previous chapters can be doctrinally amended. 
If so, then the argument in the current thesis for the introduction of the Daubert standard in 
international criminal law can hold a merit. 
In order to examine this question, the chapter will scan the attitudes of the international 
criminal courts and tribunals during the stages of the criminal process beyond the 
pronouncement of their judgments. This will include the sentencing phase and, for the ICC, 
also the reparations phase, as the inclusion of these stages is important. In essence, the 
sentencing decision culminates the trial and establishes the distribution of retributive justice as 
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required by criminal law. As well, according to the Rome Statute, the reparations phase is 
considered to be indispensable to the proper distribution of justice.885 The ICC has underlined 
this in the Bemba case, where the judges refused to stall the reparations procedure until 
Bemba’s appeal was heard, as was requested by his defence.886  Discussion of the role that 
experts play during the reparations’ phase is equally important given that Rule 97(2) of the 
ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence explicitly states that the Court can ask for the 
assistance of such experts in order to assess the harm sustained by the affected civilians and to 
provide advice on the types and forms that the awarded reparations may take.887 To the extent 
that the ICC has held that the harm endured by an individual in order to be termed a ‘victim’ 
may also include psychological harm,888 the inclusion of experts in the assessment of the 
psychological impact of certain warfare acts on civilians is an issue that is also pertinent for 
reparations decisions. This is because reparations are meant to serve the purpose of 
‘restorative’889 or ‘reparative’890 justice and to complement the retributive functions 
                                                          
885 See Articles 75 and 79 of the ICC Statute as well as Rules 94 to 99 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. For the fact that the reparations phase is unique to the ICC vis-à-vis the other international criminal 
courts and tribunals see Anne-Marie de Brouwer & Mikaela Heikkila, Victims Issues: Participation, Protection, 
Reparation and Assistance in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES, Goran Sluiter et 
al. eds., Oxford University Press (2013) at 1355-1359 
886 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Defence’s request to Suspend the Reparations 
Proceedings, 5 May 2017 
887 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 97(2); FIDH, Victims’ Rights before the ICC/Chapter VII: 
Reparations and the Trust Fund for Victims at 17 available at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/10-CH-
VII_Reparations.pdf 
888 On this see ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 85 (defining victims as ‘natural persons who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’). See also 
Situation: Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06, 11 July 2008, para.32 
889 Carolyn Hoyle & Leila Ullrich, New Court, New Justice?: The Evolution of ‘Justice for Victims’ at 
Domestic Courts and at the International Criminal Court, 12 J. Int’l. Crim. Justice 681,682-84 (2014) 
(discussing the general notion of restorative justice and the role of the ICC in the wider context); Anja Wiersing, 
Lubanga and its Implications for Victims Seeking Reparations at the International Criminal Court, Amsterdam 
Law Forun, VU University Amsterdam, 2012 at 24  available at 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/viewFile/278/459  
890 Lucia Zedner, Reparation and Retribution: Are they Reconcilable? 57 Modern L. Rev. 228,231 (1994); Malin 
Aberg, The Reparations Regime of the International Criminal Court: Reparations or General Assistance? at 9 
available at http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:801293/FULLTEXT01.pdf  
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accomplished by the defendant’s punishment.891 The inclusion of the reparations phase is also 
important for another reason. The ICC’s interaction with experts at that stage of the proceedings 
demonstrates how such interaction is not only possible, it is actually more naturally underlined 
once the Court deals with issues which fall inside the realm of the criminal trial, yet do not call 
for the application of criminal law rules. Rather, issues should be seen as resembling, yet not 
totally mirroring the French terminology partie-civil arrangements in civil law countries, where 
victims participate in the criminal proceedings in order to claim compensation if the defendants 
are convicted.892 The ability of international criminal judges to interact with experts, even in 
cases where the application of criminal rules is not involved, underlines the premise of the 
current thesis which examines the possibility of international criminal judges being aided by 
experts in order to assess the military commander’s criminal responsibility inside a framework 
that is Daubert-inspired and resembles administrative law.  
The chapter will first discuss the sentencing decisions and will then examine the ICC 
reparations orders. In the sentencing phase, the international criminal judges assess 
psychological or psychiatric findings. Although mental health experts have played a role in 
                                                          
891 Laurel Fletcher, Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International Criminal Court in CONTESTED 
JUSTICE: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS, Christian de Vos et 
als eds., Cambridge University Press, 2015 at 304. See also the relevant statement of the ICC’s former president 
Sang Hyun Song that ‘the ICC is about much more than just punishing the perpetrators. The Rome Statute and 
the ICC bring retributive and restorative justice together with the prevention of future crimes’ cited in Malini 
Laxminarayan, The International Criminal Court and Victim Well-being: A Restorative Approach? The Hague 
Institute for Global Justice, 17 March 2015 available at http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/latest-
insights/latest-insights/commentary/the-international-criminal-court-and-victim-well-being-a-restorative-
approach/ 
892 Redress: Justice for Victims; The ICC’s Reparations Mandate, 20 May 2011 at 1 available at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/REDRESS_ICC_Reparations_May2011.pdf;Luke Moffett, 
Reparations for Victims at the International Criminal Court: A New Way Forward? Int’l. J. Hum. Rghts. (2017) 
3 (noting though the differences also between domestic and international criminal proceedings to this effect). 
For the fact that the ICC victim participation cannot be seen as exactly mirroring such participation in domestic 
criminal systems see also Binxin Zhang, Recognizing the Limits of Victims’ Participation: A Comparative 
Examination of the Victim Participation Schemes at the ECCC and the ICC in THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 
IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA: ASSESSING THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Simon 
Meisenberg & Ignaz Stegmiller eds., TMC Asser Press (2016) at 518 (noting that before the ICC victims are not 
parties to the proceedings and can only intervene if the Chamber deems that their interests are affected). See also 
Victim Participation at the Case Stage of Proceedings, War Crimes Research Office, International Criminal 
Court Legal Analysis and Education Project, February 2009 at 2 
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many areas of law, for example to help judges decide whether a defendant is fit to stand trial893 
or other reasons,894 the current chapter will focus on instances where they are needed to assess 
the psychological harm inflicted on the affected civilians.  
The international criminal courts and tribunals whose jurisprudence will be discussed 
will be the same ones that the analysis in the previous chapter was based on though with the 
necessary adaptations. For example, tribunals such as the ICTR, discussed in previous chapters, 
cannot be expected to also be included in the current discussion since their reference to the 
mental harm caused to the affected civilians was not done in a way to demonstrate its role in 
the gravity of the crime and the magnitude of the imposed sentence.895 In essence, the analysis 
in the current chapter will focus on two international criminal bodies, namely the ICTY and 
the ICC. This is because only these two international judicial formations have been gripped 
with the question of how to evaluate civilians’ psychological suffering and whether or not any 
psychological or psychiatric judicial assertions should be linked to firm, epistemological 
evidence. A discussion and assessment of the stance undertaken by international criminal 




                                                          
893 Ian Freckelton & Magda Karagiannakis, Case Commentary: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
Hospitalization Syndrome as Potential Aetiologies of Unfitness to Stand Trial: The Gbagbo Decision, 21 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Law 645 (2014) 
894 See for example ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et als, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 22 February 
2001, para.509, note 1232 (referring to the defendant’s knowledge of the trauma his actions are bound to cause 
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7.2 International Criminal Judges and the Resort to Mental Health Experts in the 
Sentencing Phase  
 
It is true that in their quest to adequately determine the length of the sentence before it 
is pronounced, during the sentencing phase, international criminal judges take into account 
more the testimonies and reports of mental health experts relating to the harm inflicted on the 
civilians testifying as witnesses, compared to what is happening during the main trial. In the 
sentencing phase, judges do take into account also any mental health assertions concerning the 
defendant. If it can be shown that this defendant suffered from mental health disorders, in 
particular PTSD, then international criminal courts and tribunals can declare that their 
diminished mental capacity at the time they committed their crimes should have an effect on 
the verdict and/or the imposed sentence.896  
This connection between trauma and mental harm either when it comes to the defendant 
or the civilian victims who constitute the epicentre of this thesis, is largely discussed in the 
sentencing phase in the realms of sexual crimes,897 yet the aforementioned trauma-mental harm 
nexus can relate also to other cases, for example cases relating to the trauma that child soldiers 
                                                          
896 See for example ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., supra note 582, para. 1258; Saira Mohamed, Of 
Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass Atrocity, 115 Columbia L. Rev. 1157, 1187 (2015). For the 
fact that such arguments are not always being crowned with success before Trial Chamber judges even when 
they involve invocation of PTSD see Annie O’Reilly, Affirmative Defenses in International Criminal 
Proceedings in THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Colleen Rohan & Gentian 
Zyberi eds., 2017) Cambridge University Press, 498 (with further references to jurisprudence). But see also the 
case of Erdemovic where the ICTY Trial Chamber took into account as a sign of remorse and a mitigating 
factor, the fact that according to mental health experts, the defendant had suffered from what was described in 
the judgment ‘post-traumatic shock disorder’ as a result of his crimes. (ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. 
Drazen Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, 29 Nov.1996, para.98). See also the case of Todorovic 
where the Trial Chamber judges took into account in the sentencing phase two different testimonies of mental 
health experts, the one declaring that the defendant suffered from acute stress reaction and consequently from 
PTSD whereas the other expert did not opine likewise. Given the fact that both experts held that Todorovic did 
not suffer from any personality disorders the time the crimes took place, the judges decided not to acknowledge 
this PTSD parameter as a mitigation ground. (ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Todorovic, IT-95-9/1-S, 
Sentencing Judgment, 31 July 2001, paras. 94–95) 
897 On this see Farhad Malekian, supra note 6; See also ICC, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, paras.204, 989 
207 
 
have experienced as a result of their violent conscription.898 On this account, civilian trauma is 
usually discussed as an aggravating factor in the pronouncement of the final sentence.899  
This is the case given the fact that, contrary to the Statutes of international criminal 
tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute contains an explicit provision for 
experts to contend with the victims’ psychological plight900 and the ICC has allowed 
psychologists to accompany civilian victims during their testimony, especially if these victims 
are children.901 Nevertheless, even in the sentencing phase following the main trial and even if 
they take the civilians’ mental harm into account, echoing their main trial approach 
international criminal courts and tribunals do not always provide a solid link between the 
defendant’s actions and the incurred harm.902 Yet determining the level of the incurred harm is 
essential also in the sentencing phase. Whereas in the main trial it related to the question 
whether the causation of serious mental harm could be asserted and thus an international crime 
could be asserted, in the sentencing phase the seriousness of the incurred harm plays a role to 
the gravity of the crime and the height of the sentence the defendant will receive assuming he 
is found guilty.  For example, in Furundizja, it was revealed during the later stages of the trial 
that witness A, who had been raped and tortured, suffered from PTSD.903 The Trial Chamber 
                                                          
898 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ibid, para.1054 
899 Laurel Baig, Sentencing for Sexual Violence Crimes in PROSECUTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AT THE ICTY (Serge Brammetz & Michelle Jarvis eds.,Oxford University Press,2016)  277 (noting that ‘while it 
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the gravity of the crime’). Along these lines see SCSL, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Sentencing 
Judgment, SCSL-04-16-T, 19 July 2007, para. 19 (with further references also to the ICTY jurisprudence). For 
an example of the approach according to which the victim impact is considered as an aggravating factor see 
ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-39&40/1-S, 27 Feb. 2003, para. 56 
900 Jean de Dieu Sikulibo, International Criminal Justice and the New Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Prospects and Challenges in conflict-related sexual violence cases in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND 
OVERCOMING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Debarati Halder & K. Jaishankar eds.,Information Science 
Reference, 2017) 223 
901 Ibid  
902 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 23 May 2014, para. 61 
903 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Furundizja, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para.90 
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requested a re-evaluation of A’s testimony, calling on mental health experts to assert if PTSD 
could indeed be diagnosed.904 With mental health experts conceding that A’s behaviour pointed 
towards that conclusion, the Trial Chamber pronounced that she suffered from PTSD.905 
The importance of the conclusion that A suffered from PTSD became more evident in 
the sentencing phase where the judges declared that the pronounced sentence awarded to the 
defendant would take into account, inter alia, ‘the gravity of the crime’.906 The fact that witness 
A was viciously tortured and raped signalled to the judges that the relevant crimes had taken 
place in an aggravated form.907 At the same time, the judges noted that A had suffered ‘great 
emotional trauma’ as a result of the attacks.908 The judges did not proceed to make any 
transliteration of this ‘great emotional trauma’ conclusion into mental health terms and relate 
explicitly to the PTSD the A was diagnosed with. Yet, their reference to the concept of ‘an 
emotional trauma’ rather than to just ‘mental pain and suffering’, coupled with the extensive 
discussion and examination of expert witnesses in the oral proceedings, can lead to the 
conclusion that the ‘great emotional trauma’ expression can be seen as constituting the judges’ 
efforts to describe in a quasi-legal language the PTSD diagnosis.  
In the next subsection, the chapter will continue its analysis by discussing instances 
where the ICTY Furundizja approach should be seen as the norm or the exception in the way 
the ICTY approached mental health experts’ reports beyond the trial’s main phase. The analysis 
of the ICTY judgments will be followed by a similar analysis of the ICC practice on the issue. 
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905 Ibid,para.101  
906 Ibid, para.277 
907 Ibid, para.295 
908 Ibid, para.287 
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7.2.1 The ICTY and the Mental Health Experts’ Role in the Sentencing 
Phase 
Whereas Furundizja set an ordained way in which the ICTY seemed to deal with the 
need to summon mental health experts to assess the mental harm incurred to the particular 
civilians testifying before the judges and use these experts’ opinions to discuss the extent of 
the incurred harm and the height of the sentence, the Tribunal’s general practice reveals that 
the Furundija approach is not the approach that judges followed in all occasions. On the 
contrary, a look at the way issues of civilian mental harm and mental health experts’ opinions 
have been approached after the main trial phase, reveals that the same inconsistent way with 
which the ICTY deals with the issue during the main proceedings, as analysed in chapter 2, 
runs also throughout the trial’s sentencing phase.  
For example, in Dragomir Milosevic, the Trial Chamber held that the psychological 
harm sustained by the affected civilians was an element that should be taken into account as 
far as the gravity of the committed crime was concerned., The Trial Chamber substantiated 
such harm, by repeating witness accounts of the fear they had experienced as a result of the 
attacks. These civilians asserted that the terror and suffering they had been subject to, had left 
them, inter alia, with psychological scars that had not disappeared even twelve years later and, 
hence, might never disappear.909 Despite the veracity of this claim and the magnitude of the 
suffering by civilians that the Trial Chamber may have correctly traced, by not basing these 
assertions on reports of mental health experts, the Trial Chamber rendered itself vulnerable to 
the critique articulated in chapter 2. 
                                                          
909 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, supra note 147, para. 993 
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In  Nikolic, the defendant was brought before the ICTY to be tried for crimes of murder, 
torture and rape that took place in the Susica camp when he served as commander.910 In coming 
to express the aggravating element of the defendant’s crimes, the judges noted in their 
sentencing judgment the ‘immediate and long-term effects of the conditions in the Susica 
camp’. As far as the psychological impact of the defendant’s actions is concerned, the judgment 
rendered clear that these long-term effects included the trauma that the victims had experienced 
given that they suffered from their memories to that very day.911 The Trial Chamber ascribed 
an important role to mental health experts whose testimonies on the fact that the detention 
conditions experienced by Nikolic’s victims could lead to the emergence of trauma, played a 
role in the Tribunal asserting the gravity of the committed crimes.912 The mental health experts 
did not relate to the question of whether the civilians testifying before the judges had suffered 
also from such trauma, but the inclusion of these experts to the process is a positive step from 
the judges’ part indicating the importance they attribute to mental health experts’ reports at 
least for the substantiation of any sentencing pronouncements. 
A similar general use of expert evidence in order to buttress the extent of the trauma 
experienced by the victims and the resulting conclusion as to the severity of the defendant’s 
actions, is seen in Plavsic. There, the Trial Chamber referred to the testimony of a 
psychotherapist, Mrs. Teufica Ibrahimefendic, who provided the Trial Chamber with the wider 
picture of the psychological scars the war had on the civilians in Bosnia.913 This assessment 
was meant to reinforce the Trial Chamber’s assertion that ‘many of those persons who are 
forcibly transferred or expelled remain traumatized by their experiences, ten years after the 
                                                          
910 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 18 Dec.2003, non-
authoritative summary, I, paras. 2, 4 
 
911 Ibid, at VIII, para. 47 
912 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 18 Dec.2003, 
para.205 
913 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-39&40/1-S, 27 Feb. 2003, para.49 
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events.’914 In that sense, according to the judges’ rationale, Plavsic’s actions should be seen 
under an aggravating light.  
At the same time, there have been also cases where the ICTY judges have concluded 
that trauma has been incurred to the affected civilians, yet in coming to assess the gravity of 
the crime, the judges deem it sufficient to assess this caused mental harm based on the 
testimonies of the civilian victims rather through recourse to the aid of mental health experts.  
For example, in determining the length of the sentence in Bralo, the judges took into account 
the long-lasting effect that Bralo’s actions had on his victims.915 Regarding the psychological 
aspects of these effects, the Trial Chamber noted the trauma that one of Bralo’s detention and 
rape victims, Witness A, had experienced916 as well as the psychological problems rampant 
among the family members of those murdered by the defendant917 in order for the judges to 
conclude that ‘these statements paint a picture of shattered lives and livelihoods and of 
tremendous ongoing pain and trauma.’918 Whereas the suffering of these people is indisputable, 
the Tribunal should have resorted to the aid of mental health experts in order to substantiate 
beyond reasonable doubt its assertions on the ongoing character of the pain and the trauma or 
the level of the inflicted trauma in the first place. Bralo can be juxtaposed to this extent to 
Zenelovic where trauma assertions, crucial for the pronouncement of the final sentence, were 
made in connection to the victim’s young age.919 
Finally, in Vasiljevic, after relying on the prosecution’s Final Brief rather than on the 
assertions of mental health experts, the Trial Chamber held that the survivors of the defendant’s 
                                                          
914 Ibid  
915 Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment, 7 December 2005, para. 40 
916 Ibid, para.39 
917 Ibid, paras. 37–38 
918 Ibid, para.40 
919 On this see Inger Skjelsbaek, The Military Perpetrator: A Narrative Analysis of Sentencing Judgments on 
Sexual Violence Offenders at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 3(1) J. Social 
& Political Psychology 46,58 (2015) (noting how in the Zelenovic sentencing judgment, the assertion that a 
psychological trauma has been caused to the victims is followed by a phrase stating the victims’ young age) 
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crimes suffered from trauma and that this factor, among others, constituted an aggravation of 
the crime.920 Whereas regarding the affected civilians such an assertion was made with no 
resort to mental health experts, the Tribunal did examine and admit the evidence of mental 
health experts concerning the question of whether the defendant suffered from any psychiatric 
disorder and should, thus, be found to have diminished mental responsibility.921 Moreover, 
elaborating on the evidence admissibility rule they applied, the judges clarified that they had  
put both the expert’s relevance as well as the reliability of his or her report under scrutiny.922 
In that sense, the ICTY rendered clear that the parameters of the Daubert standard do not 
doctrinally oppose the principles and rules of international criminal justice.923 
The inconsistent manner with which the ICTY resorts to mental health experts in the 
sentencing phase is underlined in cases where the factual background is the same. The 
Srebrenica genocide provides an example of this. In Popovic, he and his co-defendants were 
indicted for crimes committed in and around Srebrenica in July 1995.924 In the course of 
pronouncing the relevant sentence for the defendants who were found guilty, the Trial Chamber 
came to substantiate the mental harm incurred by the affected civilians by pointing out to 
testimonies of the civilian victims without the buttressing of any expert reports. In Paragraph 
2151 of the judgment, the judges referred to the fact that ‘those who survived the executions 
underwent extreme suffering and severe mental and physical trauma.’925 In order to substantiate 
such a conclusion, the Tribunal cited Paragraph 847 of the judgment, where such mental health 
                                                          
920 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-T, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para.276 
n.671 
 
921 Ibid, paras.283-293 
922 Ibid, para.20 
923 For the amenability of the Daubert standard in the ICTR jurisprudence see for example ICTR, Trial Chamber 
II, Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, 1 December 2003, para.62 (the Prosecution arguing that an 
expert report should not be taken into account by the Tribunal because it showed no data or scientific research to 
authenticate its conclusions) 
924 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-T, 10 June 2010, para.2 
925 Ibid, para.2151 
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contentions were being made by the Trial Chamber on account of the testimony provided by 
the civilian victims.926 While some of these civilians testimonies still remain confidential by 
order of the Trial Chamber, others have been made available for public reading. These public 
testimonies contain descriptions of the fear felt by the civilian victims and trauma symptoms 
they experienced as a result. For example, Hafiza Salihovic, a woman lost her husband and 
sons who during the Srebrenica genocide and became a refugee together with her daughters, 
described how one of these daughters could not accept what had happened to her brother and 
continued to cry and was not able to properly eat even one year after the event.927 Assuming 
that, together with the other cited testimonies, this part of the testimony triggered the Trial 
Chamber to assert that the affected civilians had suffered from trauma, the judges did not try 
to scientifically substantiate such a conclusion by inviting a mental health expert either to 
examine Hafiza’s daughter and attest to her medical condition or to opine on whether the 
described symptoms could point to the existence of trauma.  
The Trial Chamber’s holding in Popovic can be starkly put opposite the stance the same 
Tribunal took in Blagojevic, a case also referring to the Srebrenica genocide. In Blagojevic, 
similar to in Popovic, the trauma experienced by the affected civilians was also considered to 
be an aggravating factor. Yet, the infliction of such trauma was taken into account as fact by 
the Tribunal through reliance on the testimony provided by a mental health expert in the realm 
of another case referring to the victims of Srebrenica.928 Whereas the fact that such expert 
                                                          
926 The fact that the testimonies belonged to civilian victims and not to experts can be easily asserted through the 
fact that all the cited testimonies on the issue of the trauma suffered were filed as a ’92 bis statement’, namely 
under Rule 92 bis of the Tribunal which allows a witness to file a written statement instead of testifying orally 
before the Court. For further information on the Rule and its integration in the ICTY system see ICTY, Trial 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Decision on Prosecution’s Request to Have Written Statements 
admitted under Rule 92bis, 21 March 2002 available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/20321AE517364.htm  
927 ICTY, Witness Statement, Hafiza Salihovic, 17 June 2000, p.3 available at 
http://icr.icty.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Exhibit/NotIndexable/IT-95-
5%2318/ACE117533R0000464958.pdf 
928 ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para. 845 
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testimony was given in the course of another trial and not in the realms of that concerning 
Blagojevic, still, resort to mental health experts for trauma incurred as a result of the Srebrenica 
genocide, demonstrates that such resort is not incompatible with the function of the Tribunal 
and could have easily taken place also in Popovic.  
 
7.2.2 The ICC and the Mental Health Experts’ Role in the Sentencing Phase  
The ICC has been called to assess warfare’s psychological impact in the course of a 
number of sentences that have been pronounced by its judges. For example, in Lubanga, in 
coming to deliberate on the length of the sentence that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo should get after 
being found guilty of conscription of child soldiers, the judges called Dr. Schauer as an expert 
witness to render her testimony on the trauma caused to the child soldiers. Dr. Schauer referred 
generally to her research on the trauma that child soldiers experienced as a result of their 
conscription929 both in the Democrat Republic of Congo where Lubanga’s crimes took place 
in the relevant period and in other countries such as Uganda.930 The Court did not proceed to 
articulate explicitly how this trauma could be seen portrayed in the specific child soldiers who 
were victims of Lubanga. Accordingly, the Court adopted the Dr. Schauer’s conclusions as a 
general background against which it came to see the gravity of the crime.931  
In other instances, the ICC judges did not take into account at all the opinion of mental 
health experts in coming to discuss the importance of warfare’s psychological repercussions 
on the gravity of the crimes committed. Thus, in Katanga, the Trial Chamber relied upon the 
non-expert testimony of the village chief in order to assert, with no further mental health 
                                                          
929 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of 
the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 July 2012, para.39 
930 Ibid, para. 40 
931 Ibid, para.44 
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evidence, that the women and men who survived being attacked still bore the trauma generated 
by these attacks.932 
In Bemba, although the defendant was ultimately acquitted for allegations of crimes 
committed in the Central African Republic,933 the Trial Chamber which issued the initial 
verdict did refer to the although reference to the psychological symptoms experienced by 
victims of specific rape incidents was made during the verdict,934 in the sentencing phase, 
judges made use of the information that mental health experts had provided regarding the 
general psychological and psychiatric implications of rape on the victims935 to substantiate the 
gravity of the crimes which Bemba was found guilty of. Taking into account the references of 
mental health experts on the adverse impact that the act of rape has on its victims in general, 
the judges proceeded to subjugate this epistemological truth to the facts as proven during the 
oral proceedings.936 Thus they related, in Paragraphs 36 and 37, to the conclusions of mental 
health experts who had testified before the Court on the general traumatic implications of rape 
in order to continue the analysis by opening Paragraph 38 with the phrase ‘the victims of rape 
in this case….’937 As a result, the Trial Chamber concluded that the crimes of rape were of 
‘utmost, serious gravity.’938 
The judges made it evident that reference to mental health expertise cannot be made in 
abstracto, but rather the subjugation of the epistemological findings to the proven facts must 
                                                          
932 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 23 May 2014, paras. 49, 57 
933 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’, ICC-01/05-01/08 A, 8 June 2018 
934 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, paras. 
472, 510, 551 
935 Ibid,para. 567, n.1761 
936 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Decision on sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 June 2016, paras. 36–38 
937 Ibid  
938 Ibid, para.40 
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also take place. The particular ICC approach is more nuanced than that undertaken by the ICTY 
or the ICC in other cases. Along these lines, in the ICC jurisprudence, one notices a linear 
progression in the integration of mental health opinions and reports and the discussion of the 
psychological impact of warfare from a general, in abstracto model to a more in concreto one. 
 At the same time, by endorsing such an approach towards the integration of the 
testimonies of mental health experts in the sentencing phase, the judges adopted the stance 
followed by the Office of the Prosecutor in the document delineating the Prosecution’s 
sentencing submissions in the particular case.939 In that particular document, the Office of the 
Prosecutor referred explicitly to the mental injuries of the affected civilians and to the 
psychological problems they experienced,940 discussing  the incurred mental harm with explicit 
reference to PTSD and underlining that it was imperative for the ICC to make the linkage 
between the sustained psychological civilian harm and the particular disorder by referring 
extensively to the relevant PTSD symptoms the civilians reported in their testimonies.941  In 
that sense, in the particular case, the Prosecutor undertook a holistic attitude towards civilian 
suffering, comprising both the linkage with certain trauma symptoms. It would be 
commendable if the particular approach was rendered standard practice, escorted also with 
psychological assessments of the suffering of the civilians testifying before the Court rather 
than general portrayals of the plights that the eruption of hostilities entails in a given instance 
defined widely by time and space. 
 
 
                                                          
939 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Public redacted version of Prosecution’s Sentencing Submissions, 11 April 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3363-Conf, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 April 2016 
940 Ibid, paras.46 &49 
941 Ibid, para.47 
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7.3 The ICC and the Resort to Mental Health Experts in the Reparations Orders 
  
The ICC demonstrates partly an intention to engage more with mental health experts’ 
reports. However, in other instances, the ICC’s approach tends to be similar to that undertaken 
by international criminal tribunals, as discussed in the previous section as well as in chapter 2.  
For example, in Lubanga, the Trial Chamber noted that the sustained harm from 
Lubanga’s crimes for which he was held guilty had to be assessed on a case to case basis for 
each affected civilian942 and proceeded to delineate a certain procedure that had to be followed 
to do so. Being divided into relevant steps, such a procedure encompassed, inter alia, the 
invitation of experts who were able to epistemologically assess the civilian harm.943 These 
assertions regarding the need for the sustained harm to be documented on an individual basis 
through recourse to experts, including mental health experts, was equally shared by other 
factors involved in the reparations phase, such as the Victims’ Trust Fund,944 which resorted to 
the aid of an NGO in order to provide the Trial Chamber with details of the collective 
reparations programmes.945 This NGO, in turn, enlisted the services of three medical experts, 
among them a clinical psychologist, in order to record the psychological harm that had been 
incurred to the affected civilians.946 
At the same time, reference to mental health experts is not rigorously undertaken by the 
Court itself. Echoing its aforementioned approach in the sentencing judgment, the Court 
                                                          
942 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Situation: Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be applied to reparations, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 7 August 2012, para. 228  
943 Ibid, para.282 
944 On the general role of the Trust Fund in the reparations procedure see ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Rule 98; FIDH, Victims’ Rights before the ICC/Chapter VII: Reparations and the Trust Fund for Victims at 4,28 
available at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/10-CH-VII_Reparations.pdf  
945 The Trust Fund for Victims, Public document: First submission of victim dossiers with twelve confidential, 
ex parte annexes, available to the Registrar, and Legal Representatives of Victims V01 only, ICC, Trial 
Chamber II, Situation: Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, 31 May 2016, paras.13,40 
946 Ibid, para.13 
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proceeded to adopt the expert witness’ general conclusions on trauma and child soldiers and 
did not request any further subjugation to the facts of the particular case. Ultimately, Dr. 
Schauer’s conclusions on the effect of trauma on child soldiers were used by the Court as the 
epistemological basis for the judges to conclude that these child soldiers who were victims of 
conscription by Lubanga equally suffered from psychological trauma and the development of 
psychological disorders such as suicidal tendencies, depression, and dissociative behaviour.947 
The legacy of the Lubanga reparations order is evident in Katanga. Katanga’s defence 
team stressed thus how the ICC judges, following the pronouncement of the Appeals Chamber 
in Lubanga, should specify the type of reparations ordered and should provide an explicit link 
between the actions of the defendant and the harm that was incurred to the affected civilians.948 
Along these lines, the Trial Chamber in Katanga followed this rationale in coming to 
discuss explicitly in its reparations’ decisions how the crimes for which Katanga was convicted 
had caused harm to the civilians. At the same time, the Katanga reparations decision seems to 
part ways from the Lubanga one to the extent that recourse to mental health witnesses is made 
in order for the Court to shape its judgment regarding the psychological harm that civilians 
have sustained.  
On the one hand, the ICC, citing its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, acknowledged 
in the Katanga reparations order that in order to award reparations, it first had to assess the 
harm sustained by the affected civilians. Along these lines, and citing its practice in the 
Lubanga reparations decision, the Court noted that such harm could be assessed through the 
                                                          
947 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision Establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’ of 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06 A A 2 A 3, March 3, 
2015, para.191 
948 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Defence Response to the Propositions des victimes sur des modalites des reparations dans la presente 
affaire, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 December 2016, para. 3 
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aid of experts.949 In fact, NGOs and other bodies, such as the Queens University Law Faculty 
experts who filed briefs before the Court in light of its reparations decision, stressed how 
recourse to experts, particularly when it came to the mental harm incurred, should be 
sanctioned by the Court as the way go. The reliance of the Court on expert opinions and reports 
pervades the question of the need to establish the suffered harm and encompasses, in the view 
of parties engaged in the proceedings, for example Katanga’s defence team, also the question 
of the types of reparations and the need for psychological support during the reparations stage 
as experts had suggested.950  
It is also interesting to note that, in some instances, for example in assessing whether 
the affected civilians had suffered from transgenerational trauma, the ICC Trial Chamber based 
its affirmations on the discussion of provided expert reports.951 In the case of the Bogoro attack 
for which the defendant was convicted and which resulted into psychological harm for the 
affected civilians, the Trial Chamber examined whether the victims could also claim 
reparations on the basis of the transgenerational harm that was sustained. This is because the 
children who would be born to these victims would bear a trauma.  Yet, despite the fact that 
the provided expert opinion referred to the psychological trauma present in many children 
whose parents had experienced the attack in Bogoro,952 the Trial Chamber decided not to 
endorse the expert report as far as the creation of transgenerational trauma was concerned, as 
no evidence was presented ‘to establish on a balance of probabilities the causal nexus between 
                                                          
949 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, Order for Reparations pursuant to article 75 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 24 March 2017, 
para. 31 n.57 (the Court noting that the Chamber may avail itself of experts according to Rule 97(2) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence) 
950 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Defence Response to the Propositions des victimes sur des modalites des reparations dans la presente 
affaire, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 December 2016, para. 4 
951 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, supra note 950, para. 132 
952 Ibid, para.133 
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the trauma suffered and the attack on Bogoro.’953 Similarly, contrary to the practice of the 
ICTY and of the ICC in the sentencing phase regarding the connection between the 
vulnerability of certain victims and the gravity of the crime, the gravity that the Trial Chamber 
attributed to the crime of child conscription undertaken by the defendant in Katanga is 
buttressed in the reparations decision through reference to the expert witness’ testimony before 
the Court that characterized child soldiers as a vulnerable group.954 
On the other hand, there are instances, for example in determining the question of 
whether the affected civilians had sustained psychological harm from the Bogoro attack, where 
the ICC judges preferred to be led to their conclusions with no reference to the opinions and 
reports of mental health experts.  The Trial Chamber acknowledged that the civilians affected 
by the defendant’s attacks could have suffered psychological harm. Such harm should be 
categorized, according to the Court, as two forms, namely indirect harm caused by the loss of 
family members and loved ones and direct harm experienced due to an attack. Relying on the 
balance of probabilities, the Court assumed that the surviving civilians had sustained indirect 
psychological harm due to the loss of family members, irrespective of whether such family 
member was a near or a distant relative.955 
As far as the direct psychological harm, the Court applied an assessment based on both 
the surviving civilians’ testimonies and on mental health expert certificates that described the 
harm a particular civilian had sustained.956 Nevertheless, despite the existence of mental health 
                                                          
953 Ibid, para.134 
954 Ibid, para. 157,n.242. For the fact that the Trial Chamber demonstrated in Katanga an acknowledgment of 
the views of experts on certain issues going beyond the assertion of harm, see ibid, para. 274,n.389, para. 278 
955 Ibid, paras. 121–122. On the problematic character of such a reliance see also the objections raised by 
Katanga’s Defence team at Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Defence Response to the Propositions des victimes sur des modalites des 
reparations dans la presente affaire, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 December 2016, para. 15 
956 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, supra note 950 at paras. 129–130 
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certificates, the Court decided that psychological harm should be assessed as asserted by the 
relevant civilians who had witnessed the attack in Bogoro. In the Court’s words, 
 
‘the Chamber regards the fact alone of having been in Bogoro on 24 February 2003 
during the attack and of having seen or fled the massacres and atrocities perpetrated had major 
ramifications for the mental health of the persons present that day.’ 
Furthermore, following the findings in the sentencing judgment as discussed above, in 
the reparations’ decision, the Trial Chamber reiterated the relevant paragraphs of the sentencing 
judgment which, based on the testimony of the village chief, refer to the trauma suffered by the 
affected civilians.957 
Interestingly, an ever further legalistic approach is taken by the ICC in cases where the 
potential psychological impact on civilians is not created through acts of warfare such as those 
acts examined in the current thesis but rather which refer to the destruction of monuments, 
buildings and objects of cultural significance. In Al Mahdi, in ordering reparations for the 
community of Timbuktu based, inter alia, on the destruction of cultural monuments for which 
the defendant was found guilty, the ICC referred to the ‘moral harm’ the people of Timbuktu 
had suffered and the sentiments of humiliation and suffering they had experienced.958 This 
moral harm is seen as encompassing death, personal injury, and loss of liberty, with mental 
harm and suffering being one subcategory of moral harm.959 Along these lines, the ICC 
appointed experts to assess the mental harm sustained by the civilians due to the destruction of 
the cultural monuments. Yet, unlike the Court’s approach in Lubanga and Katanga, such 
                                                          
957 Ibid, para.124 
958 ICC, Trial Chamber VIII, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Prosecutor v. Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, ICC-
01/12-01/15, 17 August 2017, para. 87 
959 Annex II, Expert Report-Reparations Phase, the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 




mental harm is discussed and assessed in Al Mahdi through international law experts rather 
than though assumptions based on the affected civilians’ testimonies or the opinions of mental 
health experts.960 Thus, in Al Mahdi, the whole analysis of the mental harm of the civilians is 
done using a human rights legalistic framework rather than using mental health sciences 
precepts.961 Nevertheless, as it has been argued, the Al Mahdi ICC analysis could well have 
followed the stance the Court took in Katanga as far as psychological harm is concerned.962 In 
Al Mahdi, where the crimes referred to the destruction of cultural monuments rather than the 
death of family members, it would be difficult to establish mental harm based on the indirect 
psychological harm the affected civilians would have experienced. Still, such psychological 
harm as the same as the indirect harm the affected civilians had experienced, yet to the extent 
that the Al Mahdi case also referred to the direct psychological harm sustained by civilians due 
to their being present and experiencing an attack, there is no reason that the Court could not 
have resorted to the rationale followed in the Katanga reparations decision and order 
reparations for these civilians. 
                                                          
960 See for example the two separate expert testimonies provided by the international law experts Marina Lostal 
and discussing inter alia the issue of the mental harm the civilians have suffered at Annex II, Expert Report-
Reparations Phase, the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Dr. Marina Lostal, 28 April 
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International Criminal Court in the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 
Reparations phase, 27 April 2017, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2017_05022.pdf   
961 See for example Annex II, Expert Report-Reparations Phase, the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 
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Rights, Expert appointed by the International Criminal Court in the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Reparations phase, 27 April 2017 at 29 available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2017_05022.pdf (referring to the humiliation the civilians have suffered as a form of 
infringement of their human rights and concluding that as a result the destruction of cultural sites may have 
constituted cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment for these civilians). It has to be note though that such human 
rights framework is present even in the Katanga reparations decision, yet it is more stressed in Al Mahdi. On 
this see Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, supra note 950, paras. 127–128 




In Bemba, while no reparations were ultimately awarded to the victims due to the defendant’s 
acquittal,963 the ICC had initially proceeded with the issue and had appointed even experts to 
assess the height these reparations should attain.964 The process included experts assessing the 
harm incurred to the affected civilians.965 While the professional affiliations of the appointed 
experts were kept confidential, since, as noted, the Trial Chamber acknowledged in its verdict 
the psychological suffering Bemba’s victims had endured on account of being subject to 
rapes,966 it is plausible to assume that mental health experts participated in the reparations 
process.  
Indeed, in their joint report submitted in November 2017, these experts-albeit their 
identity and affiliations remained hidden from the public eye-discussed also the mental harm 
the victims sustained. The experts discussed first the fact that according to international courts 
such as the ICC or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights psychological harm can be one 
form of harm civilians can suffer.967 Interestingly, these experts proceeded to rely on 
publications of the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric 
Association and on the mental health sciences literature in coming to further link the 
psychological civilian harm to psychiatric disorders such as PTSD, depression and generalized 
anxiety. Moreover, the experts went further in the mental health sciences analysis and 
                                                          
963 ICC, Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
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encompassed in their analysis also Post-Trauma Adaptational Styles in cases civilians may feel 
anguish yet not to a degree to demonstrate a mental health symptomatology or illness.968 
           Whereas the experts did relate to how reparations do not need to address the 
psychological harm incurred to each particular individual, they further substantiated claims of 
such harm by addressing its relevance in concreto to the particular civilians they interviewed 
who were affected by the crimes of pillage, murder and rape for which Bemba was indicted.969 
For example as far as the psychological harm caused by rape is concerned, the experts noted 
how the findings of a study conducted in the United States seemed consistent with what the 
experts had seen in the Central African Republic.970 In that sense also in the reparations case, 
along the mode argued in the thesis, discussion of the civilian mental harm ceases to be just an 
abstract intellectual analysis but through social sciences techniques such as qualitative research 
(interviews)971 turns to the psychological status of the civilians particularly affected by the acts 
for which Bemba was incriminated.  
 
7.4 Discussing the examined ICTY and ICC judgments  
 
The sentencing judgments and reparations orders that were examined demonstrate that 
international criminal courts and tribunals take into account the psychological harm civilians 
have sustained as a result of the defendant’s crimes undertaken in the course of warfare. In 
many instances, such psychological harm is explicitly related in the relevant analysis to the 
emergence of trauma in the affected civilians. This reference to the concept of ‘trauma’ that 
both the ICTY and the ICC systematically undertake is equally important. As noted, not all 
                                                          
968 Ibid, para.58 
969 Ibid at paras.72,83,116 
970 Ibid at para.113 
971 Reference to these interviews takes place throughout the experts’ report in Bemba. On this see indicatively 
ICC, Annex, Public Redacted Version of Annex, 28 November 2017, supra note 965, para.76  
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victims experience trauma, but it can be said that all those that do, can be considered as 
victims.972 In that sense, the connection between trauma and civilian mental harm serves 
international criminal courts and tribunals to further emphasize the tight correlation between 
mental harm and victimhood, thus bolstering the gravity of their sentencing pronouncements.  
        Moreover, while initially trauma is not considered as part of certain forms of distress and 
mental health disorders, the ICC judgments, in particular, seem to establish a certain pattern 
where PTSD is increasingly portrayed as manifestation of the experienced trauma. 
Occasionally, this is depicted in the reports of the experts themselves. For example, in 
Lubanga, Dr. Schauer precisely referred to the fact that the child soldiers she had seen suffered 
not just generally from trauma, but specifically from PTSD.973 Yet, despite the fact that through 
the aid of mental health scientists, international criminal courts and tribunals could specify 
more their analysis on the mental harm experienced by civilians exposed to warfare, 
international judges prefer to largely refer to ‘mental harm’ or to the ‘psychological suffering’ 
of these civilians running the risk for their assertions to be rejected as arbitrary and as not 
scientifically robust.  
 Another issue that is rendered evident through the comparison between the ICTY and 
the ICC approach to expert testimonies, relates to the fact that whereas the ICTY does not in 
principle rely on them when it comes to assess the gravity of a crime, the ICC has in certain 
cases required that mental health experts assess the psychological harm sustained by the 
specific civilians in question. For example, in its sentencing decision in Katanga, the Court 
seems to follow an ICTY-related approach and does not include opinions of mental health 
experts at all in the discussion on the incurred psychological harm upon the affected civilians. 
                                                          
972 Saira Mohamed, Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass Atrocity, 115 Columbia L. Rev. 1157, 
1173 (2015) 
 
973 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of 
the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 July 2012, para. 40 
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Nevertheless, in other instances, such as the reparations order in Lubanga, the ICC takes a 
different stance towards the involvement of expert evidence in the assessment of the harm 
incurred to civilians. In this case, as noted, the ICC requires that these experts depict the 
specific harm that each particular civilian has sustained in concreto in their reports instead of 
merely demonstrating in general terms that the affected civilians have suffered from a certain 
type of harm.974  
At the same time, the ICC sentencing approach in Bemba is equally more nuanced and 
needs to be read in conjunction with the Court’s approach in Al Mahdi. In the latter case, 
although legal experts were called to comment upon the mental harm suffered by the affected 
civilians rather than mental health experts, still, the ICC judges were keen on following a 
Daubert-style rationale by underlining the objectives undertaken by the experts’ research as 
well as the methodology followed.975 Along these lines, in 2017, the ICC’s sentencing approach 
in Bemba left room for talking about a potential linear evolution of the international criminal 
jurisprudence from a general, in abstracto model to a more in concreto one as far as 
international criminal justice and the discussion of mental health expert opinions are concerned.  
 Furthermore, the engagement of the ICC with experts for reparations cases holds 
significance for the current thesis because it proves, as stated above, that recourse to expert 
testimonies can take place in the course of a criminal trial once judges engage with law beyond 
the criminal law scheme. It is also significant because such judicial dialogue with experts takes 
place not only in the ICC, an international court, but also in the ECCC,976 a supranational, 
                                                          
974 For the fact that such an in concreto approach, requiring the ICC to assess harm specifically for the purposes 
of reparation, juxtaposed to the fact that the sustained harm is more generally proclaimed in the judgment, might 
lead to the need according to some scholars for separate ‘Reparations Chambers’ to be established, see Carsten 
Stahn, Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeals Judgment on Principles and Procedures of Reparation, 
EJIL!Talk, 7 April 2015, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/reparative-justice-after-the-lubanga-appeals-
judgment-on-principles-and-procedures-of-reparation/ 
975 On this see Annex III, Public redacted, ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxIII-Red2, 4 August 2017, Rapport redige 
par un college d’ Experts,p.p.6-8 available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2017_04902.PDF 
976 Sarah Williams & Emma Palmer, Transformative Reparations for Women and Girls at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 10 Int’l. J. Transitional Justice 311, 325 (2016) 
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‘internationalized criminal court.’977 On this account, the marked reluctance of the ICC judges 
to resort to the aid of mental health experts in all cases should not be read as a structural, 
inherent inability embedded in international criminal law.  
            It is true that psychological and psychiatric opinions and reports serve a different 
function in the stages following the main trial, where the harm inflicted to the affected civilian 
or civilians is often calculated through resort to presumptions and probabilities schemes. The 
Rome Statute itself does not specify the relevant standard that is needed in order for reparations 
to be awarded.978 Accordingly, the ICC has held that, at the reparations phase, the standard of 
proof is more flexible than in the course of the proceedings.979 Thus, facts do not need to be 
established ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as in the phase of the main trial. The reason is that 
victims often find it difficult to prove the harm they have sustained. If the evidence threshold 
was equally set to the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ level also at the reparations phase, civilians 
would find it difficult to be compensated for their suffering. This less stringent standard of 
proof in the reparations phase, is mirrored in the Court’s view that its role in the particular 
phase should be seen as lying beyond the precepts of criminal law.980 Against this background, 
the Trial Chamber has noted that the reparations phase bears resemblance to similar procedures 
before international human rights law bodies, such as the Inter-American Court of Human 
                                                          
977 On this, see how the Chambers are described as an ‘internationalized criminal court’ in Guidebook for 
Judicial Reparations in Case 002/02 before the ECCC, Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’ section, ECCC, 13 
November 2014 available at https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2015-07-
17%2017:01/E352.3_EN.PDF 
978 FIDH, Victims’ Rights before the ICC/Chapter VII: Reparations and the Trust Fund for Victims, p.p. 15–16 
available at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/10-CH-VII_Reparations.pdf 
979 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, supra note 950, paras. 59–60 
980 Along this vein, see the implied criticism of this stance, posed by the Legal Representative of the Victims in 
the Katanga reparations case, through his note, stressing the Court’s criminal character, that ‘the Court is not a 
State, an association or an NGO: it is a criminal jurisdiction which can order reparations.’ (La Chambre de 
Premiere Instance II, Situation en Republique Democratique du Congo, Affaire Le Procureur c. Germain 
Katanga, Public, avec Annexe 1 publique, Propositions des victimes sur des modalites de reparation dans la 
presente affaire (Article 75 du Statut et norme 38-1-f du Reglement de la Cour) ICC-01/04-01/07,8 December 
2016, para. 87) 
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Rights981 where presumptions are used in order for the magnitude of the incurred harm to be 
assessed.982 
 
          Yet, as demonstrated in Bemba and the experts’ report there, even in the reparations 
phase any discussion of the incurred mental harm on civilians cannot be done detached from 
the terminology provided by mental health sciences. Explicit reference to PTSD, depression or 
other psychiatric disorders comes to enrich the judge’s discussion of the psychological harm 
suffered conviction that mental harm has been caused to the affected civilians. In that sense the 
‘balance of probabilities’ test in the reparations’ phase does not mean that resort to 
psychological and psychiatric opinions and reports is left with no purpose, albeit as mentioned 
in chapter 1, the role these reports come to play in bolstering the state of victimhood is different 
from the one they perform during the main trial where the defendant’s innocence or guilt is still 
at stake.  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
 
When considering the findings of chapter 2 and the inconsistent stance of international 
criminal courts and tribunals concerning the integration of mental health expert testimonies in 
the judicial findings, one wonders whether this is due to an inherent structural defect in the way 
these judicial bodies approach such evidence or due to other reasons. The current chapter 
proceeded to record if international criminal judges take into account such expert input during 
the phases following the verdict focusing on both the sentencing pronouncement phase and the 
reparation orders issued by the ICC. The analysis of the relevant judgments and orders showed 
                                                          
981 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, supra note 909, para. 61 
982 Ibid, para.57 
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that, in some cases, international criminal judges dealt with mental health issues in the same 
way that they did during the phase of the verdict, that being either not at all or with general 
statements that were not necessarily connected to the psychological plight of the particular 
victims. At the same time, the analysis equally revealed a tendency, especially with regards to 
the ICC reparations orders, for the ICC to resort to mental health experts in order to 
substantiate, in concreto, the mental harm caused to the affected civilians.  
            This tendency on the ICC’s part is important given the Court’s principal role in the 
distribution of international criminal justice.983 It underlines the fact that, in essence, 
international criminal justice can accommodate the holdings of experts from scientific fields 
other than law in its pronouncements, particularly in procedures which are not strictly governed 
by criminal law.  
 The fact that even in the reparations’ phase where the mental harm incurred to civilians 
does not have to be exactly assessed, international criminal courts and tribunals do take into 
account the reports of mental health experts, underlines how much more this should be the case 
in the course of the main trial where the exact level and degree of the incurred harm is part of 
the question whether an international crime has been committed.  
 
 
           
                                                          
983 In this framework see also the remarks of Bantekas that ‘No judge is expected to follow scientific developments 
or obliged to infuse law with science. Rather, in their dispensation of justice, judges must (in theory) be open to 
all those factors that serve justice in the best possible way. Hence, they must invite, rather than oppose, expert 
opinions on matters that affect the type of human conduct they are determining….’, proposing along these lines 
that a scientific entity is established which inter alia will provide epistemological awareness to judges on non-
legal notions and mentioning PTSD in the case of soldiers as an example. (Ilias Bantekas, Introduction: An 
Interdisciplinary Criminology of International Criminal Law in CRIMINOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
                                         
In June 2017, in a speech before an audience in Sarajevo, the ICTY president, Carmel 
Agius, spoke about the end of the Tribunal’s work, making a short assessment of the things it 
had achieved. ‘We offered truth’ he stated, ‘not reconciliation.’984 Indeed, the ICTY and, in 
this respect, the other international criminal tribunals and courts that have been later instituted, 
have offered truth. However, as the current thesis has argued, when it comes to issues pertaining 
to the psychological toll warfare exerted on the civilian victims, that truth could be better served 
if it was escorted by scientific opinions and reports. So far, international criminal courts and 
tribunals have built a narrative in relating to such psychological suffering. Nonetheless it is not 
one that is legally rigid enough to withstand any criticism that it does not comply with criminal 
law’s demand for the culprit’s acts to be specifically described in order for his or her behaviour 
to be penalized.  
This thesis has argued that the introduction of the Daubert standard can lead to a more 
rigorous assessment of warfare’s psychological impact by international criminal courts and 
tribunals. On these grounds, the thesis demonstrated how this is feasible based on the general 
functions general principles have in international criminal law (Chapter 3) and the fact that 
when it comes to matters of expertise, Daubert introduces a certain mode of reliable assessment 
whose precepts can be found in many jurisdictions around the globe (see Chapters 5 and 6). At 
the same time, I demonstrated how the adoption of Daubert in international criminal law is not 
only feasible but also necessary taking into account the way international criminal courts and 
                                                          
984 Hague Tribunal President: ‘We offered Truth, not Reconciliation’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 21 June 2017 
available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hague-tribunal-president-we-offered-truth-not-




tribunals have related so far to issues of psychological harm sustained by civilians (see Chapter 
2). Moreover, such a mode of assessment of warfare’s psychological impact on civilians would 
not be inherently against the current structure of international criminal proceedings, given the 
fact that the ICC in particular has incorporated ad hoc opinions of mental health experts in the 
realm of the sentencing phase (see Chapter 7). 
 
8.1 Ramifications for Future Research 
 
The thesis has already made an important contribution by showing that it is necessary 
for international criminal judges to take psychological and psychiatric reports into account not 
only when they are deciding on factual issues pertaining to the psychological suffering of 
civilians but also when they assess another organ’s exercise of discretion and there is already 
a way provided in law beyond the domestic realm for this assessment to take place. Still, the 
aforementioned conclusion gives rise to additional connected questions which have not been 
addressed in this thesis and that can be the subject of future research. 
First, the thesis comes to postulate its normative Daubert standard application argument 
in the context of warfare. Accordingly, it assumes that an armed conflict, either of international 
or non-international character, is in place and that the laws of war apply. Yet, psychological 
harm can also be seen under the lens of international human rights law to the extent that the 
particular field applies concurrently with the laws of war.985 Along these lines, psychological 
harm can also be addressed through human rights law as a violation of a person's right to mental 
                                                          
985 On this see characteristically the classical piece of Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 
94 Am. J. Int’l. L. 239 (2000). The exact relationship of the two fields has been contested by some, while other 
authors have pinpointed challenges that such an application of human rights law brings forth. On this see Noam 
Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 Int’l. Rev. Red Cross 737 (2005) 
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health.986 The thesis has not addressed the question of whether the parallel application of human 
rights law in warfare could mean that any issues of mental harm could be pursued also in 
international courts beyond the confines of criminal law, for example before regional human 
rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court and 
whether in this case, the applicants could claim along a Daubert standard mode, that the judges 
of these respective courts would be obliged to assess the incurred mental harm only through 
reliance on mental health experts’ opinions. On a similar human rights tone, the thesis has 
equally not examined how the civilians’ right to mental health can be violated and whether this 
right should be deemed as having a minimum threshold beyond which any violation can be 
deemed to be automatically ‘serious’. 
           The thesis has argued for the introduction of the Daubert standard in international law 
as far as international criminal law is concerned. Yet, in domestic jurisdictions, the Daubert 
standard applies as an evidence assessment mode also in civil matters. The thesis has left for 
future research the question of whether the Daubert standard could apply when the ICJ comes 
to assess expert evidence as mentioned in Chapter 1.  Consequently, the thesis has not also 
explored what the implications of such an application would be for the question of whether 
international law should be seen as a separate field of law or just the transposition of domestic 
principles on a transnational level.    
           Finally, Chapter 7 describes that while making sentencing decisions, the tendency is for 
ICC judges, in particular, to discuss the psychological impact of warfare on civilians. This is 
done by referring to specific mental health experts’ opinions and reports provided ad hoc. As 
well, the judges are investigating the emergence of trauma among civilians with PTSD. Yet, 
the question of why Courts have focused specifically on PTSD when discussing civilian trauma 
                                                          
986 On this see Solon Solomon, supra note 253 
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and not on any other disorder that can manifest trauma, such as depression, has not been fully 
explored in this thesis.987 In that sense, I left for future discussion the question of whether PTSD 
should be seen as the psychiatric disorder largely associated with the discussion before courts 
of the mental harm stemming from the civilians’ exposure to hostilities.988 
 
 
8.2 Addressing the Gap in Warfare’s Psychological Assessment: From the 
‘Internationalization’ of the Daubert Standard to the Entrenchment of Consistency in 
International Criminal Law Jurisprudence  
 
The current thesis demonstrated that the way international criminal courts and tribunals 
assess warfare’s psychological impact can be changed and can become more epistemologically 
articulate. This can occur through both the introduction of the Daubert standard and the need 
for judges to use psychological or psychiatric opinions and reports when discussing the mental 
harm incurred to specific individuals. On these grounds, the thesis makes the following 
contributions: 
           In our globalized, international law is in constant dialogue with national legal orders.  
Writers speak about the internationalization of domestic law or the nationalization of 
international law.989 Yet, to the extent that globalization pulls the strings towards a more 
internationalized way of living and for more exposure of the individual to experiences beyond 
the national frontiers, it is evident that from this interplay, the loser is domestic law. As 
                                                          
987 R. Srinivasa Murthy & Rashmi Lakshminarayana, Mental Health Consequences of War: A Brief Review of 
Research Findings, 5(1) World Psychiatry 25 (2006) 
988 On this account see the fact that on account of the Tokyo Air Raids which were conducted in May 1945 by 
the U.S., the Japanese courts have refused to award damages to the victims despite the latter citing their 
suffering from PTSD as a result of their exposure to these attacks. On this see Cary Karacas, Fire Bombings and 
Forgotten Civilians: The Lawsuit Seeking Compensation for Victims of the Tokyo Air Raids, The Asia-Pacific 
Journal: Japan Focus available at http://japanfocus.org/-Cary-Karacas/3474/article.html  
989 David Fidler, Introduction: The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization Symposium, 6 Indiana J. Global L. 
Studies 421,422 (1999) (citing Kanishka Jayasuriya) 
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noted,990 domestic law has lost its omnipotent power and is nowadays largely supplemented by 
international law. In this sense, the thesis attempts to redefine the role that domestic principles 
can play beyond the strict confines of the national legal orders and the influence they can exert 
on current international arrangements and practices like the assessment modes international 
criminal courts and tribunals follow.  
            At the same time, in an era where international institutions are being treated with 
suspicion, the thesis offers a way for domestic law to provide tools that can underline the 
rigorous legal analysis that must be undertaken by international courts. Therefore, by nurturing 
international law in general and international criminal law in particular, the thesis aspires, 
through its call for the application of the Daubert standard, to augment the validity and, 
ultimately, the credibility of international criminal courts as judicial institutions. As noted by 
none other than Benjamin Ferencz, one of the Prosecutors in Nuremberg, ‘there can be no peace 
without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a court to decide what 
is just and lawful under any given circumstance.’991 It is this notion of justice that the thesis 
comes to reinforce.   
          Moreover, the question of whether or not the Daubert standard can apply in international 
criminal law and under which conditions, is treated in this thesis as an issue utterly related to 
the protection of the human rights both of the civilian victims as well as defendants. The need 
for judges to relate to civilians’ suffering only through reference to psychological and 
psychiatric opinions provided ad hoc for the particular civilian victims whose testimonies 
constitute the basis for the defendant's conviction assures the victims’ rights. This is because, 
once supported by expert opinions and reports, any legal pronouncement cannot be easily 
                                                          
990 Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 213,214 (2008) 
991 Benjamin Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, Oceana Publications (1980) 30, 31 
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attacked as arbitrary and refuted in the course of an appeals review. At the same time, the rights 
of defendants are equally protected to the extent that they know that they were convicted for 
the causation of mental harm based on provided expert opinions and not on the impression that 
the description of the events left to the judges’ emotional world.  
In sum, the current thesis offers a methodological path for the assessment of warfare’s 
psychological impact by courts and tribunals. Only time will tell if this proposed path will be 
eventually followed by judges themselves. For this to happen, judges will first and foremost 
have to liberate themselves from constraints and open a dialogue with other scientific fields, 
such as psychology or psychiatry, on a much wider basis. The current thesis has at least 
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